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Werner Ulrich's
Home Page: Ulrich's Bimonthly
Formerly
"Picture of the Month"
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September-October 2011 Kant on Rationality, Morality, and Politics |
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A note on
the convergence of Kant's
concepts of rationality, morality, and politics
Over
thirty years after first studying Kant in considerable detail
and intensity during my Berkeley years, I have recently been reading Kant once again. He
remains such an inexhaustible subject of inspiration
and critical reflection! One aspect of his work that I have
come to appreciate increasingly is what I see as a remarkable unity of thought in Kant's writings,
a unity of thought
that is often overlooked. People see in Kant the grand abolisher
of metaphysics, or the revolutionary theorist of knowledge,
or a rigorous moral thinker, or a political thinker of high
rank, a pioneer of international law, and so on; but rarely they
appreciate him for all of these achievements together. Even
more rarely I find systematic accounts of the relevance that
Kant's thinking in one field (say, moral theory) may have for
his contributions to other fields (say, epistemology or politics).
Against
such pigeonhole thinking in the contemporary reception of Kant's ideas,
I suggest it might be equally fruitful and important to learn from Kant about the
meaning of an integrated perspective of
what is good and right and rational, a perspective that our
epoch appears to have all but lost.
The
loss of an integrated perspective of the rational, the moral,
and the political
This loss causes difficulties to decision-makers and
professionals in all domains, for example, in the form of an
apparently ever increasing complexity of the issues they face,
as well as of a growing diversity of views and interests involved,
in dealing with major challenges of our epoch such as world-wide
poverty and malnutrition, huge economic disparities, deficits
of social justice and security, insufficient education and health
provision, poor infrastructure, violence and criminality, political
persecution, environmental degradation and global climate change,
lack of democracy, the deplorable state of human rights and
civil rights in many countries, and so on. Yet ours is an epoch
of unseen scientific and technological achievements, which means
that the bottleneck issue in dealing with all these major problems
is one of moral sense and, linked to it, political
will rather than one of lacking expertise, economic
resources, and instrumental rationality.
We
have lost sight of Kant's lesson that reason is fundamentally
two-dimensional. When it comes to acting reasonably, rationality
cannot be bisected into a rational theoretical and an irrational
practical part. The practical employment of reason inevitably
reaches beyond the limits of what we can know empirically and
explain theoretically; but even so we still can and need
to think reasonably about these non-theoretical conditions of
good and rational practice (Kant, 1787, Bxxv-xxx; cf. Ulrich,
2009b, p. 5f). It is in this sense that Kant, in the Preface
to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason,
proclaimed that "I have therefore found it necessary to
deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith" (1787,
Bxxx). The faith he meant was faith in the power of practical
reason, but certainly not faith in a stance of irrationality
or esoterics, of unfettered hedonism and utilitarianism, or
of dogmatism and ultimately, skepticism.
But
as I said, our epoch has almost forgotten this lesson – whence
comes the futile attempt to ground rationality in a primacy
of theoretical reason or "primacy of theory" only,
rather than in a fundamentally two-dimensional understanding
of rationality (cf. Ulrich, 2006b, pp. 7-12; 2006c, p. 5f;
2007, pp. 2-9). As a result of this loss of an integrated perspective,
we observe increasingly diverging speeds of development in science
and technology on the one hand and in morality and politics
on the other hand. While our scientific and technological know-how
grows exponentially, the capacity of securing good practice
in the sense of ethically desirable and defensible action and
democratically based processes of public discourse and legitimation
appears to stagnate or even to diminish in the face of increasing
ethical pluralism and cultural relativism. In short, we face
an alarmingly widening gap of rationality between the realms
of theory (based on science and technology) and practice (involving
morality and politics).
What
can Kant teach us about integrative thought?
In this situation, integrative thought is imperative.
Accordingly imperative it is also to examine what Kant, the
integrative thinker par excellence, has to teach us about
it. I can hardly answer this question systematically
and comprehensively in a short note such as
this one; but we can at least try to get a basic idea of the unity of
Kant's thinking. It seems to me there
is a convergence of Kant's concepts of rationality, morality,
and politics that is of utmost relevance for our epoch.
By paying more attention to this convergence than is usually
paid to it, we might gain a better basis for integrative thought,
and thus for dealing with the major challenges of our epoch
of which we have listed a few above. For example, we might gain
a deeper understanding of the deficits of rationality involved,
by focusing on the usual lack of integrative thinking in dealing
with such problems.
At
the same time, we might in this way also improve our understanding
of specific parts of Kant's work, which in turn will benefit
our understanding of the problems of our epoch. For example,
we might gain a better understanding of what Kant's seemingly
impossible undertaking of a self-critique
of reason is all about and how it is related to his conception
of an open and enlightened society. Likewise, we might learn
to better understand how the apparent formalism and rigor of Kant's
"categorical
imperative" and deontological ethics (i.e., ethics of duty) go together
with the emancipatory spirit of his enlightenment thought and
wherein consists its importance today for dealing with ethical
pluralism and relativism and indeed for all rational practice.
Or, as a last example, we might better appreciate how Kant's
vision of a cosmopolitan civil society relates
to his focus on individual autonomy and how both might relate
to a notion of rational practice that would be relevant and
helpful today.
Again,
these are big questions and I do not claim to have the answers.
But the difficulty of these questions provides no excuse for
ignoring them or for not thinking more carefully than is now
usual about their deep underlying connections. I suggest we
should make it a habit – and I have indeed tried to make it
a habit of mine – to think about these connections whenever
an opportunity arises. One such opportunity I find in my ongoing
work about the meaning of good professional practice, and my
related attempts to redefine our understanding of reflective
practice and to help develop tools to support it, ranging from
critical systems heuristics to critical pragmatism. But of course,
this is a long-term research program, the results of which I
cannot define in advance. A
more immediate (and less ambitious) opportunity to consider
these connections arose earlier this year, when I received an email message
from Amazon.com, presumably generated automatically by its Internet
server, asking
me whether I would not care to review the two books I had recently
bought through them, Hans Saner's (1973) Kant's Political
Thought and Onora O'Neill's (1989) Constructions
of Reason.
Three
related reviews
As I am sure you are aware, Amazon offers its
customers a possibility to write and publish so-called "customer
reviews" of books they have
read and would like to recommend to other people. I have often
found these comments quite useful and interesting; their quality
is sometimes remarkable and in any case they always reveal different
possibilities to read and appreciate the work
of an author. So, in response to Amazon's request, I checked what
customer reviews were available on the two books by Saner and O'Neill and,
to my surprise, found they had not motivated
any reader thus far to offer their comments or write a full-blown
review. Given that I had
already commented in quite some detail about the two books in my
Bimonthly of May-June 2011 (Ulrich, 2011b, cf. 2011a
for an introduction), only a small additional effort
was required to adapt my comments so that they could stand alone; so why should I not be willing
to share them with other (potential) readers? While most of
them will hardly be prepared to read my rather long and demanding
Bimonthly essays on Kant & Co., they may very well be
used to have a look at Amazon's "customer reviews"
as a way to inform themselves about books they consider reading,
so there was a chance to provide them with a sense of what the
two books have to offer and thereby, to encourage them to actually
read them.
After
adapting my comments about Saner and O'Neill's books, it was
a consequent next step to write a third review, dedicated to
Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of
Morals, perhaps the most influential work on moral reasoning
ever published. My main interest in reading Saner and O'Neill's
books had been the opportunity they offered me to review and
expand
my understanding of Kant's practical philosophy in the light
of his political thought or, more precisely, the political roots
of his critical philosophy; so it seemed
not a bad idea to return to the original source and review it
in this light. Again, I had written extensively about Kant's
concept of morality in an earlier Bimonthly, of March-April
2009 (Ulrich, 2009b), so I also went back to that earlier essay. There
I had also formulated some thoughts about Kant's concept of reason in general
and how it related to his concept of morality, with a view to
preparing the ground for my subsequent review of the Toulmin-Habermas
model of argumentation (Ulrich, 2009c). Another, previous opportunity
to review my understanding of Kant's practical philosophy had
been provided by a paper I wrote for the Interdisciplinary
Yearbook of Business Ethics about my proposed framework
for grounding ethical practice, critical pragmatism, and the
way it relates to Kant's principle of moral universalization
(Ulrich, 2006a). Reading these earlier conjectures again, but
now in the light of Saner's and O'Neill's books and of my newly
awakened interest in Kant as a political thinker,
I realize more than ever how much Kant's concepts of rationality
(good reasoning), morality (good action) and politics (good
government) converge.
Kant's
converging concepts of rationality, morality, and politics
So here I am writing
about Kant3 or the convergence of his concepts of
rationality, morality, and politics. I will first sum
up the way I currently see this convergence, by characterizing
my understanding of Kant's notions of good reasoning, good action,
and good government in a manner that should allow comparing
and connecting them. Subsequently I will put my readers in a
position to see and judge for themselves, by offering slightly edited versions
of the three reviews in question.
Table 1: Kant's
converging concepts of rationality, morality, and
politics
|
Concept
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Core
concern
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Key
requirement
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Vision
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Convergence
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Rationality:
good
reasoning in general
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Preserving
the integrity of reason:
avoiding
a merely private use of reason
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Public
use of reason:
the
principle of public scrutiny
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Enlightenment:
"a
public is more likely to enlighten itself than an
individual"
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Universal
communi- cability:
rational
is that which we can share and argue publicly (in a global community of free and reasonable beings)
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Morality:
good
action
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Securing
the universally good will of agents:
avoiding
a merely private morality
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Sensus
communis:
the
principle of moral universalization
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Kingdom
of ends:
"thinking
in the place of others" and "consequent
thought"
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Politics:
good
govern- ment
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Promoting
a just political order:
avoiding
a merely private use of power
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Republican
constitution:
the
principle of the civil constitution of legitimacy
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World
citizenship and international law:
a
cosmopolitan "way to peace"
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Copyleft
2011 W. Ulrich
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Table
1 sums up the overarching unity of thought that I find in Kant's
concepts of rationality (reasonableness), morality, and politics.
We may think of the three issues in terms of these three questions:
- Wherein
consists the rational quality of thought and argumentation,
that is, what is the essence of "good" reasoning?
- Wherein
consists the moral quality of volition and action, that
is, what is the essence of a "good" will and
of conforming action?
- Wherein
consists the political quality of a society's public
order, that is, what is the essence of "good"
government?
Good
reasoning as Kant understands it is thought and argumentation
that can be maintained consistently throughout. It is, consequently,
thinking that is not prejudiced by one's private conditions
of thought (Kant, 1793, B157). The essence of good reasoning
accordingly lies in its being able to withstand public scrutiny,
as it is based on principles of thought and action that can
be shared with everyone else, in the sense that all reasonable
agents can agree without needing to claim for themselves an
exception from these principles. Good reasoning thereby also
preserves reason's integrity, in the sense that its results
can at all times be maintained without accepting inconsistencies
of thought or action. Due to this double quality of integrity
– its freedom from prejudice and inconsistency – good reasoning
can at all times be shared openly with everyone; it never needs
to hide its true intentions, as it never boils down to a hidden
private agenda. Its ideal and means of realization at once is
the public use of reason (Kant, 1784, A484). The underlying
vision is that of an enlightened society, and the underlying
reasoning is that the public is more likely to enlighten itself
than an individual (Kant, 1784, A483):
For any single individual to gain
enlightenment is very difficult.… Therefore only
a few have succeeded, by cultivating their own minds, in freeing
themselves from immaturity and achieving personal competence.
…
But that the public should enlighten itself is more likely.
It is indeed almost unavoidable, if only freedom of public expression is granted;
for
among the majority of those who content themselves to follow
the opinion leaders, there will always be a few who, after freeing
themselves from the yoke of immaturity, will begin to think
for themselves and thereby will set an example to others.…
Thus all it takes for a
public to enlighten itself is freedom,
and indeed the most harmless kind of freedom to which this
term can properly be applied – the freedom to make public
use of one's reason at every point. (Kant, 1784, A483f; my simplified transl.,
my italics)
Kant's
understanding of rationality thus reveals itself to be very
different from the kind of narrow formalism and rationalism
of which people who apparently have not read him sometimes accuse
him; it is grounded in an encompassing vision of a free and
enlightened society. The central idea is that of the liberating
force of the public use of reason, as the only alternative there
is to all forms of immaturity, injustice, and despotism. We
recognize here the deeply political roots of Kant's thinking
that we have discussed in a previous Bimonthly (see Ulrich,
2011b). It comes as no surprise, then, that this same notion
of the importance of the public use of reason also informs Kant's
concepts of moral and of political reasoning, to which we now
turn.
Good
will and conforming action in Kant's conception of morality
is the orientation of an agent's volition and actions towards
ends and principles that respect the freedom, dignity and integrity
of other agents and for this reason can at all times be shared
with the community of all those interested or concerned. And
since we cannot usually delimit that community in advance with
certainty, except in the case of merely private action, good
volition or action can be said to be based on principles that
are universally valid. The essence of moral reasoning
accordingly lies in the universality of the principles of action
it assumes. Due to this quality of universality, moral reasoning
can at all times be defended rationally against all objections
by people who see their interests questioned by it; it never
needs to hide its true intentions, as it never boils down to
a merely "private use of reason" or even a hidden
private agenda. Therein consists its deep affinity to good reasoning
(or rationality, "reasonableness") in general. Its
ideal and means of realization at once is the sensus communis
(Kant, 1793, B157f, cf. my previous discussion in Ulrich, 2009b,
p. 10). The underlying vision is that of a universal moral
community of agents who freely coordinate their actions according
to these three maxims of well-understood common sense:
- The
maxim of unprejudiced thought: Think
for yourself! That is, take responsibility for your
actions rather than just relying on the views of others
or allowing your private conditions of thought to distort
your judgment.
- The
maxim of enlarged thought: Think in the place
of all others! That is, consider the perspectives
of all others concerned rather than just using other
people for your ends.
- The
maxim of consequent thought: Think consistently!
That is, think and act so that your premises could serve
as general principles of your and everyone's thinking,
rather than claiming special cases or exceptions from
such principles.
In
Kant's words:
Under
the sensus communis [i.e., well-understood common sense]
we must include the idea of a sense common to all, that is,
an
ability of reflection that considers the ways all other humans may
think … [rather than] allowing one's private conditions of thought, which one might
easily mistake for objective, to distort one's judgment.… The following maxims
of common human reasoning … may serve to elucidate the basic propositions
[that
I associate with well-understood common sense]. They are: (1) to
think for oneself; (2) to think [as if one found oneself] in the
place of everyone else; and (3) to always think consistently with
oneself. The first is the maxim of unprejudiced thought;
the second of enlarged thought; the third of consequent
thought. (Kant 1793, B157f, my simplified transl., abridged from
Ulrich, 2009b, p. 10)
The
underlying vision is that of a world-wide moral community in
which all rational beings are treated as ends-in-themselves
rather than just being instrumentalized for the ends of others
(e.g., those who hold power and/or pursue private interests).
Kant describes this ideal as a kingdom of ends or, as
we might prefer to say today, a commonwealth of citizens who
regard themselves and all others as ends-in-themselves and act
accordingly. They will act as if they were universal
legislators accountable for the welfare of that commonwealth,
that is, they will make sure the premises of their actions could
be general principles of action (or "laws") for everyone.
At the same time, they will accept that as members of that commonwealth
they are themselves bound by such principles, which is to say,
their sovereignty is limited by the equal sovereignty of all
other members. In this double sense moral agents will understand
themselves as both sovereigns and members of "a systematic
union of different rational beings under common laws" (Kant,
1786, B433, cf. B438f), beings who recognize their differences
but nevertheless respect their shared dignity as free moral
agents in a kingdom of ends. The moral core of Kant's practical
philosophy thus reveals itself as being deeply connected to
his political vision of a world-wide community of sovereign,
self-legislating moral agents.
Good
government accordingly is for Kant a form of government
that allows those governed to use their reason freely and publicly,
as if they were members of a kingdom of ends. That is,
in more contemporary terms, good political reasoning is based
on the notion that the ultimate source of a legitimate public
order, regardless of whether its form is that of a monarchy,
an aristocracy, a democracy or any combination of these, is
the citizenry; its underlying vision is a society of free and
active citizens who together coordinate matters of common concern
on the basis of reason and public discourse rather than force
and secrecy. The essence of good government thus lies not in
its external form but in the way (and spirit) in which it is
exercised, that is, in its intrinsic compatibility with a republican
constitution and with the basic civic rights that go with
it, rights such as the right of free expression, of active political
participation, of personal integrity and protection from arbitrary
persecution, and so on. At an international level, regarding
the relation among states, this republican notion of good government
translates into a cosmopolitan conception of international
law and human rights. Its vision is world citizenship,
understood as a self-governed community of reasonable and sovereign
beings. Within such a community, all issues become subjects
of world interior politics (von Weizsäcker, 1963, pp. 9
and 11f), which is to say there is no room for war and
violence among nations but only for mutual cooperation and (at
least temporary) hospitality. Kant's concept of good politics
(or good government) thus also embodies his vision of a cosmopolitan
way to peace (see Kant, 1795; for short extracts, cf.
Ulrich, 2005).
We
have already quoted Kant's conviction that the public
domain is key for the development and preservation of an open
and enlightened society, and indeed that such a development
is "almost unavoidable, if only freedom of public expression
is granted" (Kant, 1784, A483). Consequently, what is vital for protecting
the integrity of reason in general and for the theoretical employment
of reason (i.e., the human quest for knowledge and expertise)
in particular, is equally indispensable in the moral and political
employments of reason, the two most important uses of practical
reason (i.e., the human quest for a good and right way to live):
Reason
must in all its undertakings subject itself to criticism; should
it limit freedom of criticism by any prohibition, it must harm itself,
drawing upon itself a damaging suspicion. Nothing is so important
for its usefulness, nothing so sacred, that it may be exempted from
this searching examination, which knows no respect for persons.
Reason depends on this freedom for its very existence. For reason
has no dictatorial authority; its verdict is always simply the agreement
of free citizens, of whom each one must be permitted to express,
without let or hindrance, his objections or even his veto. (Kant,
1787, B766f; for discussion see Ulrich, 1983, p. 310; 2009b,
p. 15)
Considering
that this powerful plea for "the veto of free citizens"
is taken from the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant's
examination of the foundations and limits of theoretical reason, whereas
the previous quotes have been taken from his political and moral
writings, the deep unity of thought in his concepts of good
reasoning (rationality), good action (morality), and good government
(politics) could hardly be more obvious. They all converge in
the core idea that the public use of reason is constitutive
of rationality in all its employments. Different as these
uses of reasons are, claims to rationality always depend on
the possibility of public scrutiny and of free and unhindered
public criticism and debate. Where such debate is hindered in
any way, reason "must harm itself, drawing upon itself
a damaging suspicion." In an open and enlightened society,
the rational is that which we can share with everyone concerned
without entailing any need for secrecy, for accepting inconsistencies,
or for raising claims to exception.
The
reviews
After
this preliminary characterization of the convergence of Kant's
ideas on rationality, morality, and politics, I would now like
to give you the details as it were, in the form of the three
(slightly edited) reviews that provided the occasion for this
"note of convergence."
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Kant's way to peace:
a review of Hans Saner's (1973) Kant's Political
Thought
Saner's rather neglected book on Kant's political thought must be the
most detailed and careful exegesis ever written of the roots of Kant's
political thought as it developed throughout his work, from the
precritical writings to the three Critiques and on to his late
anthropological, historical, juridical, and political writings. |
To be
sure, Kant did not write about politics in the way we would understand
it today; he is not a modern-day political theorist. Systematic
political analyses are rare in his work – the main exception is his
treatise on Perpetual Peace of 1795 – and they have received scant
attention, the main exception being Karl Jaspers' chapters on Kant in
the first volume of The Great Philosophers (1962, German original
1957). Yet as anyone knows who has read Kant, political and judicial
figures of speech can be found throughout his writings. Saner (p. 3)
refers to them as basic "thought structures" or "thought forms,"
patterns of analysis and argument that Kant consistently employs to
describe the nature and scope of his project of a systematic (self-)
critique of reason.
A major political thought structure that Saner uncovers is what he
describes as "the basic problem of Kantian thought" (p. 4), Kant's
persistent attempt to find in all fields of philosophical reflection a
way from diversity (or antagonism and disorder) to unity (or consistency
and order) of thought and action. Kant makes reason the guardian of
this way. As Saner demonstrates in considerable detail (pp. 5-68), this
basic line of thought slowly emerges as a figure of speech in Kant's
early natural-scientific and metaphysical writings (the precritical
writings) and subsequently gains importance in the three Critiques. A
mere analogy at first, it helps Kant to formulate the problems of order
in nature and of the self-constitution of reason's own order. It keeps
recurring and slowly becomes a basic scheme of progress from "diversity"
(antagonism in nature, antagonism in society) via a "road to unity"
(physical community and reciprocity in nature, a law-governed social
order in society) to final "unity" (e.g., of the noumenal and phenomenal
worlds, of the universal history of nature and human culture, and of a
cosmopolitan constitution of government and civil society that would
secure peace, freedom, and justice for all). By the time Kant embarks on
his later writings on practical, legal, and political philosophy, the
scheme has become more than a means to the end; it now is part of the
end itself, of reason's self-set task of securing what I am tempted to
call cognitive and political peace at once. Both in his theoretical
philosophy (metaphysics and science) and in his practical philosophy
(ethics, law, and politics), Kant makes reason the big peacemaker that
paves the difficult way to unity of thought and action.
Unity is always in danger of being pursued in the wrong ways, by
shortcuts that rely on non-argumentative means; but for Kant, such unity
is worthless. The only kind of unity he wants is unity in freedom; a
unity that is compatible with free will, free argument, and mutual
fairness - essential conditions of true peace - as well as with reason's
peace with itself (cf. pp. 215-313). This is the "way to peace" that
Saner (pp. 3 and 312) identifies as a major political theme in Kant's
thinking. It is ultimately also the essential leitmotif of Kant's plea
for reason in general. The free and public use of reason - in Kant's
cosmopolitan ideal: a worldwide expansion of reason - requires peace and
at the same time embodies the only possible way to (worldwide) peace
(pp. 252-261). That makes it such a difficult, yet necessary way.
Kant is the philosopher of that way. He is not a pacifist of
metaphysics – after all, he rejects certain forms of peace – but in a
profound sense, he more than any other thinker, may be the philosopher
of peace. (Saner, 1973, p. 312)
Kant's philosophizing thus becomes for Saner "a propaedeutic for
political thinking," although, to be sure, "not merely such a
propaedeutic" (p. 312f). Indeed, I would like to add, isn't Kant's
philosophizing at the same time also the most meaningful kind of general
philosophical propaedeutic we might imagine; a primer to the proper use
of reason - not only by philosophers but also by citizens - that has
nothing to do with the narrow rationalism and formalism of which Kant is
so often accused quite superficially? As Saner's remarkable book
suggests to me – and the evidence it compiles is strong indeed – Kant's
entire philosophizing, drawing on its political root metaphor but
reaching far beyond, may ultimately be subsumed under the one central
theme of reason's quest for peace with itself. "All his philosophizing,"
Saner writes, "is understood by him as being en route to the peace of
reason." (p. 312)
Saner's book is an inspiring guide for anyone who wishes to explore
Kant's understanding of reason thoroughly, both in theoretical and
practical philosophy, in ways that reach far beyond the more common
accounts of Kant as a narrow formalist of reason.
To be sure, the book is outdated in that for obvious reasons, it
does not say anything about the more recent revival of Kant's thought in
contemporary political and moral theory, and particularly in Jurgen
Habermas' work on "deliberative democracy" and "discourse ethics." But
what it has to offer is far from being outdated; it is, in the best
sense of the word, a basic introduction to the political roots of Kant's concept
of reason.
I you are looking for a more up-to-date exploration of some of the
political roots and implications particularly of Kant's practical
philosophy, I would recommend Onora O'Neill's (1989) Constructions of
Reason to begin with (see the review of this book below). In a way
though, Saner's book still goes deeper; it really goes to the roots of
Kant's political thought, whereas O'Neill's equally admirable book deals
more with its contemporary relevance and application. I found Saner's
book to be an outstanding propaedeutic and companion to O'Neill's
account. Note that both books require some prior familiarity with Kant's
writings, otherwise they might provide tough and unproductive reading.
In any case, studying either book will demand quite some perseverance.
Saner's book, due to its detailed and partly almost biographical account
of Kant's personal way from metaphysics to critical philosophy and
cosmopolitan thinking, demands a particular effort; but in the end the
reader is rewarded by valuable insights into the deep affinity of
Kant's concept of reason to his political thought.
Source: Amazon
customer review (Ulrich, 2011c), slightly edited, originally
adapted adapted from W. Ulrich (2011b): "What is good professional
practice? Part 2: The quest for practical reason." Ulrich's Bimonthly,
May-June 2011.
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Kant's public construction of reason:
a review of Onora O'Neill's (1989) Constructions
of Reason Kant's revolutionary view of reason, according to his well-known
"Copernican" hypothesis, is that reason must construct the world after a
plan of its own. More than that, it also must construct itself: to
provide itself with the legitimacy and authority that no external force
can give it.
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Reason therefore
has no choice but to define its own principles and
to constitute its own critical tribunal, as a way to make sure it lives
up to these principles. To these two well-known challenges of Kant's
undertaking of a (self-) critique of reason, Onora O'Neill adds a third, less
well-known challenge: because reason, according to its own principles,
must not rely on any external authority, it needs to construct not only
its own cognitive order (or cognitive constitution) but also some just political
order, a basic social constitution that allows the free use of reason by
human inquirers and agents. The two problems of constructing cognitive
and political order are interdependent; neither can be solved without
the other. As O'Neill explains:
[Kant]
sees the problems of
cognitive and political order as arising in one and the same context. In
either case we have a plurality of agents or voices (perhaps potential
agents or voices) and no transcendent or preestablished authority.
Authority has in either case to be constructed. (O'Neill, 1989, p. 16)
To put it differently, in Kant's thinking reason and justice
originate in the same, ultimately political source (p. 16). Neither
reason nor justice is given naturally to mankind; both require for their
development and preservation constructive acts of interpersonal
cooperation and (self-) legislation. Both also respond to the
existential need of human agents to coordinate their views and interests
in ways that promote collaboration and peace rather than disorder and
discordance. Just as the human zoon politicon (Aristotle) depends for its
survival and welfare on the constitution of some societal and political
union with others, each plurality of human agents or inquirers depends
for their free and peaceful coordination on that peculiar force which we
call reason. In Kant's view, therefore, reason had to emerge in the
natural and cultural history of mankind as the only entirely
non-coercive force that can coordinate human agents or inquirers in
freedom. Or, in O'Neill's beautiful words, reason is the one force that
allows us to share a possible world, that is, to establish and
maintain both cognitive order and political order:
Reason and justice are two aspects to the solution of the problems
that arise when an uncoordinated plurality of agents is to share a
possible world. Hence political imagery can illuminate the nature of
cognitive order and disorientation, just as the vocabulary of reason can
be used to characterize social and political order and disorientation.
(O'Neill, 1989, p. 15f, similarly pp. 20-23)
In my own words: reason and justice are inseparable because at
bottom, mankind's never-ending quest for knowledge and understanding –
How can we master the world we live in? – shares its roots with the
equally unending quest for conviviality: How can we live together well
and peacefully? The common condition for solving both tasks consists in
the political task of securing the personal freedom of all humans to use
their reason and to express their free will publicly; the common
promise, in releasing the cooperative potential of mankind, that is, its
capability of dealing peacefully with matters of collective concern,
based on principles of reason rather than just the law of the stronger.
If reason is to help us realize this cooperative potential, it must
adhere to argumentative principles and standards of both truth and
rightness that can be shared. Or, as O'Neill (p. 56) puts it, reason
must limit itself to "principles that do not fail even if used
universally and reflexively." Otherwise both its integrity (the quest
for cognitive order) and its cooperative potential (the quest for
political order) are at peril. By its own insight, reason is therefore
impelled to reject all strategies of argumentation that risk turning its
public use into merely private use or which may undermine the
possibilities of cooperation in other ways.
The most fundamental principle of reason must therefore be to rely
on principles of thought and action that can be shared. But of course,
the community of those who may want to share is never known with
certainty in advance. Hence, to make sure our personal maxims or
subjective principles of thought and action are sufficiently shareable,
Kant requires them to be generalizable, shareable with anyone actually
or potentially concerned. This is the case, as Kant puts it, if the
maxims in question can be conceived to constitute "universal laws" (of
cognitive and political order, that is) without either undermining the
possibility of peaceful cooperation or leading into argumentative
contradictions, thereby damaging reason's own integrity and credibility.
Reason's fundamental principle of self-discipline, as I am tempted to
call it, accordingly reads:
The possibility of sharing principles is to be left open.... The
fundamental principle of all reasoning and acting ... is to base action
and thought only on maxims through which one can at the same time will
that they be universal laws. (O'Neill, 1989, p. 22f)
One may, but need not, read the reference to "universal laws" as
intending the categorical imperative. More in line with the present
discussion is to read it as standing for shareable principles of thought
and action in general, that is, as a fundamental principle of both
theoretical and practical reason. What, then, does it mean to say that
good reasoning should aim at propositions or proposals that can be
shared? O'Neill (p. 25f) refers to Kant's well-known maxims of
enlightenment:
- - "Think for yourself!"
- - "Think from the standpoint of everyone else!"
- - "Always think consistently!"
These are powerful rules of sound reasoning, to be sure; but the
constructivist perspective that O'Neill proposes reaches further. It is
at its best when it comes to grounding rather than just applying reason
as Kant understands it; that is, when our interest is in reason's
ultimate source of authority rather than its methods of proper thought
and justification. As O'Neill's book made me appreciate more than any
other exploration of Kant's thought that I have encountered before, this
ultimate source lies in what Kant calls the public use of reason. Kant
constructs reason on the fundament of public scrutiny! He does not say
it in these words, to be sure, nor does O'Neill. The phrase Kant and
O'Neill (p. 17) use is a negative one: reason must reject its merely
"private" use. Reason is merely "private" when it is deprived of public
scrutiny and therefore risks being impoverished, partial, lacking the
credibility and authority that only its public use can give it. Kant's
construction of reason builds on the public use of reason as the
antidote to its merely private use. In both its theoretical and its
practical employment, reason consequently aims at relying on principles
of thought and action that can be defended publicly. This is the case to
the extent we can share the maxims (subjective principles) that
underlie our claims and actions with everyone actually or potentially
concerned, universally.
This is the "positive" application of Kant's construction of reason,
or as Kant scholars say more traditionally: of Kant's principle of
universalization. The principle is often associated with the categorical imperative only, that is, with Kant's moral theory, but
O'Neill's constructivist reading of Kant highlights its role as a
constitutive principle of reason in general. We thus gain a new, helpful
understanding of the abstract and somewhat bloodless idea of (moral)
"universalization": universalization is really about ensuring the public
use of reason, as the only guarantee there is against its merely
private use, its becoming deprived and partial rather than complete and
universal. By making sure that our propositions and proposals can
be shared with everyone else, we also make sure that we can at all times argue
them, that is, support them by good reasons. This is what
universalization means, and why the public use of reason is Kant's major
construction principle as it were. By contrast, a merely private use of
reason instrumentalizes it for particular purposes that cannot be
shared; such private agendas deprive reason of its true potential (of
enabling cooperation) as well as of its ultimate source of authority
(its relying on principles of thought and action that can be shared).
The "negative" application is no less important: the public use of
reason and its instrumentalization for merely private agendas do not go
together well. Hence, whenever some merely private use of reason
threatens to dominate what counts as rational thought and action, it is
always a relevant idea to put ourselves in the place of Kant and ask
ourselves how he might have seen the situation, and whether from his
perspective we could still think and argue consistently. Kant's concept
of reason then becomes a standard of critique that examines whether a
proposition or proposal can be shared, that is, relies on principles
that we would find ourselves able to defend publicly. It is always a
relevant idea, for example, to examine claims to expertise and rightness
– our own ones as well as those of others, whoever raises them – as to
whether they can be argumentatively shared with all those potentially
concerned. Without adhering to this minimal standard, reason risks
losing both its integrity (impartiality, non-partisanship) and its
authority (credibility, arguability) and thereby its solidity as a basis
on which we can rely in constructing a world to share.
Another implication that I would like to point out here, although
O'Neill does not discuss it particularly, is that theoretical and
practical reason are much more closely intertwined than our contemporary
concepts of rationality assume. Since claims to (empirical) truth as
well as claims to (moral) rightness depend for their credibility on
their being shareable, treating everyone's possible concerns or
objections with equal respect and care is indispensable – a deeply moral
core of rationality. It follows that both in its theoretical and in its
practical employment, the authority and force of reason resides in its
impartiality, its not taking side with any private agenda, its
refraining from any partisanship except for its own integrity.
This, in short, is the essence of what I think this book has helped
me to understand better than I did before. To be sure, putting it this
way simplifies O'Neill's detailed and nuanced account considerably; it
even simplifies my own reading experience considerably. But
simplification is imperative in this case, given the richness and
scholarly ambition of the book. I can only try to do some justice to it
by explaining what I found most inspiring and relevant in it. This also
explains why this review has focused on the first and, in my opinion,
most original and insightful part of the book, titled "Reason and
Critique." There are two more parts, dedicated to discussions of Kant's
concepts of "maxims" and "obligations" (Part 2) and of Kant's ethics
(Part 3); but they move on more traditional and familiar grounds and
have not had a comparable impact on my understanding of Kant.
Finally, you may wonder, to whom do I recommend the book? Basically,
to everyone interested in a modern understanding of Kant's conception
of reason; more particularly, to all readers who (like myself) are
interested in recovering the lost practical dimension of reason, that
is, its normative core. I would not, however, recommend reading this
book without some previous familiarity with Kant's critical philosophy,
at least at an introductory level. Without such preparation the book
will hardly "speak" to its readers. Some readers might also find it
useful first to have a look at Hans Saner's (1973) book on Kant's
Political Thought, as a way to familiarize themselves with the
political roots of Kant's concept of reason. I have found Saner's book a
useful propaedeutic reading (see the review of this book above).
Further, potential readers might want to be aware of the circumstance
that O'Neill's book assembles twelve essays that have been written over a
number of years and which for this reason do not, taken together, offer
a concisely developed argument beginning with an introduction and
ending with a conclusion. Rather, as the book's subtitle points out
quite accurately, O'Neill offers "explorations" that come in plural
forms, go into different directions and occasionally tend to be somewhat
repetitious. But these "explorations" nevertheless move at a high level
of insight and scholarship, and they reward the reader with some of
those precious moments of Aha! in which the scales fall from your eyes
and you suddenly realize how much Kant still has to tell us today.
Source: Amazon
customer review (Ulrich, 2011d), slightly edited, originally
adapted from W. Ulrich (2011b): "What is good professional
practice? Part 2: The quest for practical reason." Ulrich's Bimonthly,
May-June 2011.
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Kant's rational
ethics: a review of Immanuel Kant's (1786) Groundwork
of the Metaphysics of Morals
Kant's Groundwork, despite its forbidding
name and demanding content, is perhaps the most eloquent and
thought-provoking book on the foundations of rational ethics (or more
precisely, moral reasoning) ever published. It certainly is the most
influential and revolutionary essay ever about the subject.
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Unfortunately though, Kant's Groundwork is also one of the most difficult texts of moral
philosophy ever written and for this reason lends itself to different
interpretations and translations. I recommend relying on the classical
translation by H.J. Paton (1964), which comes with a useful "Analysis of
the Argument" by the translator (pp. 13-60). In addition, I find B.E.A.
Liddell's (1970) modern version of the Grundlegung quite helpful.
Kant begins his argument with these famous words, which immediately
get us to the heart of the matter:
It is impossible to conceive
anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as
good without qualification, except a good will.... A good will is not
good because of what it effects or accomplishes – because of its fitness
for attaining some proposed end; it is good through its willing alone -
that is, good in itself. (Kant 1786, B1-3)
The crux of the problem of grounding ethics – the core problem of
practical reason – consists in the question of how reason can identify
and justify an action as "good" (i.e., as the right thing to do). There
are only two ways in which this is conceivable, Kant tells us: either,
because the action serves to accomplish some other good that is
presupposed to be good, or else because this way of acting is good in
itself, that is, it has an unconditional quality of being right, in the
sense that it may be said to be good under all circumstances. Only this
second way can furnish a sufficient foundation for ethics; for anything
else would mean to try to ground ethics in mere expediency, that is, in
an action's usefulness with a view to some other good. That would not
only beg the question of what constitutes good action; it would indeed
make ethics redundant. Expediency – instrumental efficacy – serves
whatever ends and means we choose, regardless of whether we are guided
by a good will. Against such plain relativism, Kant maintains that there
must be some less subjective and self-serving form of reasoning about
the ends and means of justified action. In my words: "Drop the ego!" is
perhaps the most basic intuition underlying all ethics, including
rational ethics and its quest for grounding good will in reason. This is
how I would basically translate Kant's central concept of "good will"
into contemporary terms.
This intuition of holding back the ego (which is not the same as
denying it) makes it understandable why classical ethics was preoccupied
with psychological and educational questions of character and thus was
conceived primarily in terms of virtue ethics. To this preoccupation
with character – the classical example is Aristotle's (1976) Nicomachean
Ethics, although rational deliberation does play a role in it (cf. Ulrich,
2009a) – the Medieval scholastics later added religion
(i.e., faith) as a basis for explaining the binding character of the
moral idea, which in effect moved ethics even further away from a
grounding in reason. But just as a theological grounding of ethics is
helpful only for those who believe, as it presupposes faith without
being able to create it, virtue ethics as a methodological (though not
as an educational) approach similarly tends to presuppose what it aims
to produce: moral character and good will. As a theory of good practice,
it ultimately relies on an appeal to the good will (or in Aristotle's
framework, to the good character) of agents; for whether or not an agent
will in a given situation act virtuously depends on his being
goodwilled – an act of faith that cannot be grounded any further but at
best be encouraged through education and custom.
Kant's solution to this difficulty is ingenious: he places the
origin of a good will within the nature (or concept) of reason itself.
To avoid a possible misunderstanding, by reason's nature he does not
mean its empirical state or development in the individual but rather,
those general structures and requirements which characterize it by inner
necessity (i.e., a priori), in the sense that reason cannot operate without
them ; for example, reason cannot help but regard itself as free (1786, B101). In other words, he refers to the nature of pure reason – the
sheer idea of reasonableness regardless of its empirical occurrence in
individuals. Unlike all previous ethics, including Aristotle, Kant does
not assume that the binding force of the moral idea needs to reside in
some external psychological or religious condition such as character,
faith, or virtuous action. Rather, he understands it as residing in one
of the most fundamental conditions of reason itself, the requirement of
consequent (or consistent) thought. Living up to its own intrinsic
requirements is what Kant calls a "pure" interest of reason or "interest
of pure reason" – an interest that has no other aim than preserving the
possibility of reason itself.
The implication of this new concept of pure reason is powerful
indeed: in its practical no less than in its theoretical employment,
reason is itself in charge of the conditions of its successful
operation. We can only recognize as true, both in an empirical and in a
moral sense, what our mind creates itself; or in the famous words of the
Introduction to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason
(Kant, 1787, Bxiii): "Reason has insight only into that which it produces
after a plan of its own." It is to this shift of perspective that Kant
referred as the "Copernican revolution" of speculative philosophy, or as
we would rather say today, of epistemology. Copernicus was the first
astronomer to recognize very clearly that counter to the observed
(phenomenal) movements of the planets around the earth, their true
(noumenal) movements were ellipses around the sun. He was able to
achieve this revolution of our worldview because he "dared, in a manner
contradictory of the senses, but yet true, to seek the observed
movements, not in the heavenly bodies, but in the spectator." (1787,
Bxxii note). A similar shift of perspective now is to inform Kant's
revolution of practical philosophy. Kant himself does not say so – he
refers to the Copernican revolution only in his critique of theoretical
reason – but I would argue that the notion of a Copernican revolution of
ethics provides a very immediate and helpful key to the core of Kant's
concept of rational ethics: the reason why we ought to act morally is
not because some external authority obliges us but simply because we
recognize such action to be reasonable. The moral force resides in our
will to be reasonable!
For a moment though, Kant appears to lose sight of this consequence
of his own "Copernican" approach when in the last chapter of the
Groundwork (1786, B113ff), we find him searching for some mysterious
absolute source of the binding force of the moral idea, a source that
would explain why pure reason, before and beyond all empirical motives,
is compelled to be moral. Such a force, if it really existed, would need
to be independent of all human willing and reasoning and thus external
to our mind, if not external to all nature (transcendent) – an
implication that runs counter to Kant's core idea of grounding ethics in
reason. Lest we fall into this trap of searching for an absolute,
transcendent source of morality beyond all human willing and reasoning, I
propose we better understand "pure" reason as a mere limiting concept;
as an admittedly unreal (nonempirical) ideal-type of reason that serves
Kant to undertake his great experiment of thought, the experiment of
submitting reason in its practical (moral) no less than in its
theoretical (empirical) employment to its own tribunal. Thus seen,
Kant's ultimate and vain effort of finding an absolute source of
universal moral obligation is a remarkable testimony to his relentless
self-critical determination to push his inquiry to its utmost limits,
even if such an effort is ultimately bound to fail:
But how pure reason can be practical in itself without further
motives drawn from some other source; that is, how the bare principle of
the universal validity of all its maxims ... can by itself ... supply a
motive and create an interest which could be called purely moral; or in
other words, how pure reason can be practical - all human reason is
totally incapable of explaining this, and all the effort and labour to
seek such an explanation is wasted. (Kant, 1786, B124f)
But Kant's effort is far from wasted. Without apparently being fully
aware of it, he actually uncovers that there is no need at all for such
an explanation. The fact that a reasonable agent wants to act morally
(i.e., to act out of good will) is quite sufficient for saying he ought
to do so; for anything else would undermine the integrity of reason. It
belongs to the peculiar force of reason in its "pure" form, that
whatever it makes us want, we ought to do. Hence, if as a reasonable
being I want to act morally, I ought to do it; and conversely, if reason
tells me I ought to do it, as a reasonable being I want it. The moral
"ought" is really a call to reason:
"I ought" is properly an
"I will"
which holds necessarily for every rational being. (Kant, 1786, B102).
This,
then, is the core idea of a rational ethics as Kant conceives it: the
force of the moral idea resides at bottom in the power of reason, and
that must be quite good enough for us as reasonable beings. The moral
idea is an immanent rather than a transcendent idea of reason. It is in
this sense that it is "necessary" (indispensable) and "categorical"
(unconditional) for any rational agent.
We arrive, then, at the most fundamental contribution that Kant has
made to practical philosophy, I mean his formalization of the moral idea
in terms of the principle of moral universalization or, as he calls it,
the categorical imperative: "Act according to a maxim that you could
want to become a universal law" (B52 and B81, my
simplified transl.). Or still simpler: "Act only on a premise that can
be everyone's premise" (my free transl.).
As is well known, Kant proposes a variety of different formulations
of the categorical imperative; but their fundamental concern is the
same. It says that to judge the moral quality of an action, we should
first ask ourselves what is the underpinning maxim. In Kant's language, a
maxim is a subjective rule or norm of action (i.e., in the terms of my
simplified translation above, a personal premise), while a principle is
an objective, because generally binding or "necessitating" rule or norm
of action (i.e., a premise that everyone may be expected to make the
basis of their actions). Kant's point in distinguishing the two is that
he does not want us to presuppose that our individual premises are
naturally in harmony with principles that everyone could hold; quite the
contrary, the problem of practical reason emerges from the divergence
of the two perspectives (cf. B37-39 and B102f). It is
because individual and collective premises do not usually converge that
Kant asks us to consider what our personal premises are and to what
extent they might be the premises of all others concerned. Insofar, the
categorical imperative, counter to what is often assumed, cannot be said
to be idealistic.
Once we are clear in our mind as to what is the underpinning maxim
of an action, the consequent next issue is whether this maxim could hold
as a principle of action, in the precise sense just defined. To answer
this question, we may assess it against the categorical imperative in
its different formulations. If our maxim runs counter to any of these
imperatives, it is not an adequate principle, for it cannot be properly
universalized. This makes it understandable why Kant calls his three
variations "equivalent" despite their apparent differences.
Kant's preferred way of describing the idea of moral
universalization is by analogy with "the law." He wavers a bit between
the law of the state (legal norms), in the so-called "Formula of
Universal Law" (B51f), and the law of nature (natural laws) in
the "Formula of the Law of Nature" (B52). In accordance with the
political roots of Kant's concept of reason (see the reviews of Hans
Saner's Kant's Political Thought and Onora O'Neill's
Constructions of Reason above), I suggest to take legal norms as the basic
metaphor and natural laws as a derived, more illustrative metaphor (for
metaphors they are both, just like the concept of "duty" that Kant
derives from it and which similarly stands for an unconditional
obligation legislated by our own will). As Kant sees it, the principle
of moral universalization obligates us not unlike the way a legal norm
obligates everyone under its jurisdiction. The difference is that a
legal norm obliges us only conditionally, namely, to the extent that we
belong to the community of individuals that have given themselves such
legislation (and further, to be precise, to the extent that there is no
applicable legislation of superior authority that poses different
demands). By contrast, a moral norm (or now, for Kant: a "moral law")
applies unconditionally or categorically for any rational agent – it is
the ultimate source of obligation beyond which we cannot refer to any
other, supposedly superior source of obligation.
My own preferred way of thinking of the unconditional moral thrust
of the universalization principle is in terms of never treating others
merely as a means for one's own ends: "Act in such a way that you always
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any
other, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end"
(the "Formula of the End in Itself," B66f). As I tend to translate
it for myself: "Do not instrumentalize other people!" or even simpler:
"Respect other people!" To be sure, only in combination with the other
two Formulas does this imperative of non-instrumentalization fully
capture the moral thrust of "universalization"; but for me the notion of
non-instrumentalization embodies a humanistic core that comes closest
to a truly universal norm of human conduct for our epoch. Furthermore,
to overcome any anthropocentric bias one might object against, we may
apply it not only to people but equally to animals and all living
nature: "Do not instrumentalize other living beings!"
Despite all simplification – a core difficulty remains: We do not
and cannot usually act in ways that do justice to everyone.
Universalization is an ideal rather than a practical premise. Nor does
the universalization principle tell us anything about what our premises
should be; necessarily so, as these depend on the situation. Hence,
while the suggested reformulations make Kant's intent a bit easier to
grasp, they do not tell us how to act accordingly. Kant is therefore
often accused of the impractical and abstract, apparently merely formal
character of his notion of rational ethics. Yes, it is true, his
categorical imperative is not a norm that we can immediately put into
practice. But it is the nature of the problem rather than Kant's failure
to do justice to it that makes it so difficult. Expecting an
immediately practical norm – a recipe for moral action – would be to
misunderstand the nature of the problem and worse, it would leave no
room for moral reasoning. Moral reasoning is about moral imperfection,
not about moral perfection. That is, it is precisely because moral
perfection is not usually achievable by human agents that moral
reasoning is important. Moral reasoning means to handle the unavoidable
moral imperfection of all our claims and actions "with reason," and
Kant's Groundwork explains what that implies. No other author before
and after Kant has thought more thoroughly and rigorously about the
problem. And nobody else has arrived at a more fundamental and important
conclusion: there exists a deep, inextricable link between morally
tenable action and consistent reasoning! This is the great lesson that
Kant's practical philosophy can teach us – a lesson that certainly is as
pertinent today as it has ever been.
If you would like to read more about this lesson, you may wish to
consult the source indicated at the bottom. However, this review is not
meant to promote my own writings on practical philosophy, much less to
impose my view of the eminent relevance of Kant's practical philosophy
for our epoch; rather, it is meant to encourage you to go to the source
and read Kant himself. The Groundwork probably remains the best place
to start exploring this great lesson of which I am talking and which our
epoch, it seems to me, has all but forgotten. I would certainly
recommend Paton's translation, as in my view it remains the best edition
in English language. It is difficult reading, to be
sure, but I do not think it is beyond what the so-called general
intelligent reader (though perhaps with a dose of not so general
perseverance) can handle. For moral reasoning is not and cannot be the
privilege of philosophers, certainly not the way Kant understands it.
Try it. Read it. Reflect on it. And try again. And if at times you find
its language indigestible and its content complicated (rightly so), the
above comments and the personal reading they express are meant to put
you back on track, by reminding you of the core idea that matters, the
deep link between reasonableness and morality. Acting morally, Kant
teaches us, means to try and act on principles that we can share with
all others who may be
concerned about our ways of acting. Kant's categorical imperative, then,
is asking for no more than what every reasonable agent is capable of;
but, and this is the difference it makes, it also asks for no less.
Source: Amazon
customer review (Ulrich, 2011e), slightly edited, originally
adapted from W. Ulrich (2009b): "Practical reason and
rational ethics: Kant." Reflections on reflective practice (5/7).
Ulrich's Bimonthly, March-April 2009.
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References
Aristotle
(1976). The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics. Translated
by J.A.K. Thomson, Revised With Notes and Appendices
by H. Tredennick, Introduction and Bibliography by J. Barnes. London:
Penguin, 1976 (orig. London: Allen & Urwin, 1953).
Jaspers,
K. (1962). The Great Philosophers,
Vol. 1, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.,
pp. 230-381 (orig. Die
grossen Philosophen, Vol. 1, Munich, Germany: Piper, 1957).
Kant,
I. (1784). What is enlightenment? In L.W. Beck
(ed.), Kant’s
Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy, Chicago, IL:
Chicago University Press, 1949, pp. 286-292. German orig.: Beantwortung der Frage:
Was ist Aufklärung? Berlinische Monatszeitschrift, VI,
December, pp. 481-494. Reprinted in: W. Weischedel (ed.):
Werkausgabe Vol. XI, Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie,
Politik und Pädagogik 1, Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Suhrkamp
1977, pp. 51-61.
Kant,
I. (1786). Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. 2nd ed.
[B] (1st ed. [A] 1785). Transl. by H.J. Paton. New York:
Harper Torchbooks, 1964. German orig.: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik
der Sitten, 1st ed. [A] and 2nd ed. [B], in: W. Weischedel
(ed.), Werkausgabe Vol. VII, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft,
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Frankfurt am Main, Germany:
Suhrkamp, 1977 (orig. 1968), pp. 9-102.
Kant,
I. (1787). Critique of Pure Reason. 2nd ed. [B] (1st ed.
[A] 1781). Transl. by N.K. Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press,
1965 (orig. Macmillan, New York, 1929). German orig.: Kritik der
reinen Vernunft, 1st ed. [A] 1781, 2nd ed. [B] 1787, in: W. Weischedel
(ed.), Werkausgabe Vols. III and IV, Kritik der reinen Vernunft
(2 vols.), Frankfurt am Main, Germany:
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von
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Picture
data Photograph by
Adrian Sulc, available under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share
Alike 3.0 Unported License, reproduced here in slightly edited form
(so-called derivative work). Source: German Wikipedia, entry
"Landsgemeinde." Digital
photograph taken on 7 May 2006, around 1:40 p.m., in
Glarus, Switzerland. ISO 64, exposure mode
program, aperture f/5.6,
exposure time 1/400 seconds, focal length 6.33 mm (equivalent to 38 mm with a conventional 35 mm camera). Original resolution of
download 2592
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(Mouse over for detail).
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September-October,
2011
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The
public use of reason: Swiss "Landsgemeinde"
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„Reason
has no dictatorial authority; its verdict is always simply the agreement
of free citizens, of whom each one must be permitted to express,
without let or hindrance, his objections or even his veto.”
(I.
Kant,
Critique of Pure Reason, 1787, B766f)
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Last
updated 22 Jun 2014 (title layout), 12 Oct 2011 (text);
first published 1 Sep
2011) http://wulrich.com/bimonthly_september2011.html
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