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November-December 2014
The Rational, the Moral, and the General: An Exploration
Part 5: Ideas in Ancient Indian Thought / Analysis

An "Eastern" perspective: three ancient Indian ideas (continued) In the previous essay, we familiarized ourselves with the world of ideas of the Vedic tradition of ancient Indian philosophy and particularly with the Upanishads. The present second essay focuses on three concepts that play an important role in the Upanishads and also appear particularly interesting from a methodological point of view: brahman, atman, and jagat. Like earlier essays in this series, this one and its sequels are again structured into "Intermediate Reflections," to emphasize the exploratory character of the considerations in question. The first of these (and sixth overall), which makes up the present essay, analyzes the meaning of the three concepts as they are employed in the Upanishads. A subsequent reflection, which will be offered in the next Bimonthly, will discuss a specific example in the form of one of the most famous verses of the Upanishads. Two later reflections, planned for the final part of the series, will be dedicated to a complementary, language-analytical view of the Upanishads and to the question of what we can learn from Upanishadic thought, and particularly from the three core ideas we analyzed, about the proper use of general ideas today.

Sixth intermediate reflection:
Three essential ideas of ancient Indian thought

A caveat  Before we consider the etymology and meaning of the three concepts of brahman, atman, and jagat, a word of caution is in order. Being thoroughly grounded in a Western, Kantian tradition of thought, I do not assume that with some fragmentary (though careful) reading of English translations of ancient Indian texts, combined with some introductory accounts and commentaries, it is possible to gain a sufficient understanding of the entirely different tradition of thought in which they originate, the Vedic tradition. I accept the cautionary words of Müller (1879), who in the Preface to his translation of the Upanishads notes that there are three basic obstacles to understanding these ancient "sacred texts of the East," as he calls them, from a modern Western perspective:

In short, we must never forget that deep-seated differences of culture, language, and epoch create a distance to these ancient texts that is difficult to overcome, certainly for a Western mind. As a result of all three difficulties, particularly the first, Müller notes that the Upanishads, along with their bright and illuminating sides, also have their "dark" (1879, p. xi) and at times "almost unintelligible" (1879, p. xiv) sides. They can tell us much about "the dawn of religious consciousness of man," something that "must always remain one of the most inspiring and hallowing sights in the whole history of the world" (1879, p. xi); but there is also "much that is strange and startling, … tedious … or repulsive, or, lastly, … difficult to construe and to understand." (1879, p. xii) If an eminent scholar like Müller feels compelled to avow of such difficulties and limitations in studying the Upanishads, it should be clear from the outset (and I want to leave no doubts) that my reading of some of these texts can only provide a very limited understanding; limited, that is, by my current interest in the role of general ideas within the Western tradition of rational ethics. My interest is a methodological rather than a metaphysical one, much less a religious one. The aim is to develop the notion of a "critically contextualist" handling of general ideas, and it is within this context that what I'll say about the three Upanishadic concepts of "brahman," "atman," and "jagat" should be understood and used. For once, the (limited) end of my undertaking hopefully justifies the (equally limited) means. With this cautionary remark in mind, let us now turn to the three selected concepts.

Three essential Upanishadic ideas: brahman, atman, and jagat

"Brahman" The major theme of all Vedanta texts and particularly of the Upanishads is the human endeavor of seeking knowledge of brahman, the ultimate, unchanging, and infinite reality that lies beyond all limitations of the phenomenal world, although it also manifests itself in it as well as in the human individual's innermost consciousness and spirituality, the "self." Brahman thus embodies the notion of both a transcendent and an immanent reality. As a transcendent reality, its essence is prior to and "beyond all distinctions or forms" (Easwaran, 2007, p. 339); accordingly we cannot grasp it in our perceptions and descriptions of the world. As an immanent reality, it nevertheless permeates or, as the Upanishads put it, “dwells in” these perceptions and descriptions; accordingly we cannot properly understand what they mean unless we understand them as imperfect and fragmentary expressions of that other, larger or higher reality that is not accessible to us in any direct and objective way.

In the more analytical terms used earlier, we might also understand brahman to embody the universe of second-order knowledge, the conceptual tools and efforts without which we cannot adequately understand our first-order knowledge, that is, more accurately, the manifold particular universes within which the individual’s perceptions, thoughts, and actions move at any time. Among such second-order devices I would count the main subject of this series of essays, general ideas and principles of reason, along with categories of knowable things, modalities of meaningful statements, forms of valid inferences or arguments, and other concepts that enable us to think and talk clearly about our first-order knowledge and its limitations.

Root meanings  The word “brahman” (from the Sanskrit root brh-, "to swell, expand, grow, increase") is basically a neuter noun that stands for an abstract concept of the universe – the ground of all being – rather than for a personification of its divine originator. However, the latter interpretation can also be found (e.g., in the Isha Upanishad) and the word can then, as in a few other specific meanings, take the masculine gender. In between an entirely impersonal and a personified notion lies a third frequent understanding of brahman, as the one universal spirit or soul that is thought to inhere the entire universe and thus also the human spirit. Forth and finally, since there is no sharp distinction between the knowledge that an enlightened person is seeking to acquire and the sources of such knowledge, the term brahman can also be found historically to stand for the sacred texts or, in the previous oral tradition, the sacred words that reveal the knowledge in question. If there is a common denominator of these various, partly metaphysical and partly religious meanings, we might see it in the notion that brahman is always that which needs to be studied on the path to enlightenment – yet another reference to second-order knowledge, in the analytical terms adopted in the previous essay.

This is obviously a highly simplified account of the etymology of the brahman concept, given that the major Sanskrit-English dictionary of Monier-Williams (1899, p. 737f, and 1872, pp. 689 and 692f; cf. Cologne Project, 1997/2008 and 2013/14, also Monier-Williams et al., 2008) lists no less than some 27 meanings of brahman. Table 1 offers a selection and also highlights some of the meanings of most interest here.

Derived meanings The neuter noun brahman should not be confused with its masculine versions, which are also written "brahmin" and "Brahmana." A brahmin or a brahmán (as a masculine noun) is "a knower of Vedic texts" (Monier-Williams, 1899, p. 738; Macdonnell, 1929, p. 193); a devout man, priest or spiritual teacher (guru) "versed in sacred texts" (1872, p. 689); a seeker on the path to knowledge of brahman (brahmavidya) who usually is also a member of the brahmanic caste. The term can also stand for the caste itself, as "the class of men who are the repositories and communicators of sacred knowledge" (1899, p. 738), in which case it is used in the neuter gender. Further, the noun brahma (except as part of compounds) should be distinguished from brahman; in the neuter gender it stands for a personification of brahman that is conceived in a rather abstract way, as a universal consciousness or "universal spirit" that manifests itself in the world and in the human individual. There are also a number of derivative meanings (partly used in composite terms such as bramavidya or bramacarya, the study and practice of brahmanic knowledge) in which the term often takes the masculine or (rarely) the feminine gender and designates either the "sacred knowledge" of the Vedas or the person who possesses it. In contemporary, post-Vedic (and thus also post-Vedantic) Hindu religion, finally, brahma is now often also understood as referring to a personal creator-God and as such is worshipped as the main god in the divine trinity (or trimurti) of Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva, an understanding that is not, however, characteristic of Upanishadic thought.

Personal reading  The concept of primary interest to us is the abstract, impersonal notion of brahman as an invisible reality that lies beyond, yet informs, all we can perceive and say about the world, a "source from which all created things emanate" (Monier-Williams, 1899, p. 737, similarly 1872, p. 689) and which accordingly we would need to understand so as to ensure reliable knowledge and proper action. Navlakha (2000) nicely summarizes this non-religious, philosophical understanding:

Brahman as the absolute reality is purely impersonal, and is not to be confused with a personal God. The significance of brahman is metaphysical, not theological. Brahman is the featureless absolute, which unless a contextual necessity otherwise demands, is most appropriately referred to as 'It'. [Which is to say, the] brahman of the Upanishads is also not to be seen as the Creator God, as in Judaeo-Christian tradition. There is no creation as such in Vedanta. The universe is evolved out of brahman. [… ] Thus brahman is the one and only cause of the coming into existence of the universe. Brahman is whole and unfolds itself out in the form of the universe, out of its own substance, and as a means of knowing itself. […] Thus there is nothing, not even the minutest part of the material world, that is not wholly brahman. Within and without, it is all brahman. (Navlakha, 2000, p. xviiif)

For our present purpose, I take it indeed that "the significance of brahman is "metaphysical, not theological." It is the notion of a "universe" that lies both "within and without" our awareness of the world. We cannot grasp it in any direct way, but it informs our personal world and at the same time takes us beyond it. This universe is "whole" in that no-one (whether a religious believer or not) can claim to stand outside of it, and "featureless" in that whatever ideas we make ourselves of it, they are our own constructions rather than being objectively given. It is a deeply metaphysical (and thus not unproblematic) notion, but one we cannot easily dispense with altogether. Such appreciation on the part of a Kantian thinker for a metaphysical notion may appear surprising at first glance; but the point is of course that I share Navlakha's plea for a metaphysical rather than just religious understanding. As we said earlier, what matters is not that we avoid metaphysics (an impossible feat) but how we handle it. Well-understood metaphysics invites critique. This becomes clear as soon as we understand the phrase "all created things" to include our individual and social constructions of reality, our propositions about, and actions in, this world of ours, along with the ideational universe that informs them. The critique required then includes methodological reflection – reflection, that is, about what "really" is to count as true knowledge and rational action and for what reasons, in general (theoretically) as well as in specific contexts of thought and action (practically).

In this respect, parallels may well be drawn between Upanishadic and Kantian thought. Neither can do without metaphysical assumptions; both lend themselves to epistemological and methodological considerations that are far from being irrelevant to our epoch, in that they are apt to question prevailing conceptions of knowledge and rationality. I will discuss two examples in a moment, concerning the unsatisfactory ways in which these conceptions deal with the issues of holism and of subjectivity; but first it may be useful to briefly consider how metaphysical assumptions can give rise to methodological reflection.

Metaphysics and methodology  From a methodological point of view, there are some particularly interesting parallels here between Kant's concepts of pure reason and a non-religious concept of brahman. In both cases we face ideas that exceed the reach of ordinary human knowledge and insofar are bound to remain problematic; at the same time, again in both cases, we recognize that reasonable thought cannot do without some ideas of this kind. Both can therefore also provide impetus for a more than merely superficial critique of knowledge. For example, as we found in our earlier discussion of Kant's understanding of general ideas (see Ulrich, 2014a, "Third intermediate reflection"), we cannot think of a series of conditions that would explain any specific phenomenon of interest, without also thinking of an ultimate, unconditioned condition. As Kant (1787, B444) puts it, "for a given conditioned, the whole series of conditions subordinated to each other is likewise given"; but that "whole series" (i.e., totality) of conditions is itself unconditioned, as otherwise it would depend on some further condition and thus could not furnish a complete explanation (cf. 1787, B379, B383f, B444 and B445n). In short, explanations that really explain anything will always reach beyond the experiential world of conditioned phenomena. Of necessity they include general ideas that refer us to some unconditioned whole of conditions, which is what Kant means by pure concepts of reason. "Concepts of reason contain the unconditioned." (1787, B367). Likewise, in the Upanishads, when brahman is said to stand for the "ground of all being" or "source from which all created things emanate" (Monier-Williams, 1899, p. 738), or is described as the "one," "ultimate" and "absolute" (i.e., unconditioned) reality that lies behind people's multiple realities, such a notion amounts no less to an unavoidable idea of reason than does Kant's notion of a totality of conditions that is itself unconditioned.

Metaphysics and methodology are close sibilings here. The methodological significance of brahman for the practice of reason shines through in many metaphysical characterizations, both in the Upanishads themselves and in the secondary literature. As an illustration from the Upanishads, there is this famous prayer in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad in which the devotee seeks guidance on the search for reality and self-realization:

Lead me from the unreal to the real!
Lead me from darkness to light!
Lead me from death to immortality!

(Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, 1.3.28, as transl. by Müller and Navlakha, 2000, p. 76, similarly Olivelle, 1996, p. 12f)

That is to say, truth is not of this world; reality is not to be found in the phenomenal world. Our human "real world" is deceptive, a source of darkness rather than light. It obscures rather than illuminates that basic source of insight that is called brahman and which is the only reliable source of orientation for proper thought and action.

This Upanishadic explanation of the real world's deceptiveness is metaphysical, but not therefore methodologically irrelevant. In fact, its methodological implications are largely equivalent to those of Kant's similar conception of a noumenal (i.e., intelligible, ideational) world as distinguished from the phenomenal (observable, experiential) world. Both pairs of concepts are about our notion of reality, that is, they rely on metaphysical assumptions that obviously remain open to challenge. Both frameworks also handle their assumptions in a critically self-reflective fashion; neither claims that the metaphysical is knowable. Rather, the metaphysical assumptions in question function as calls to a discipline of critical self-reflection on the part of the knowing subject. They represent critical reminders, not presumptions of knowledge. Interestingly, the two frameworks share this critical orientation although they differ in the ways they understand and handle their metaphysical underpinnings: while for the Upanishadic thinkers, brahman is a symbol of the objective world that is ineffable but real, as opposed to the world's deceptiveness, Kant's Critique does not of course permit any reification of the noumenal world; he understands it as a transcendental (i.e., methodological) rather than transcendent (i.e., metaphysical) concept. Kant thus puts the relationship of the noumenal (metaphysical) and the phenomenal (experiential) – of "that" and "this" world – on its head: it is not the abolute and universal (and for some, the esoteric) but the empirical and particular (the exoteric) which for Kant constitutes "reality." Still, the methodological challenge remains: for Kant, too, there is no such thing as a direct access to reality, for the empirical is always already infomred by our cognitive apparatus or, in Kant's more precise terms, by reasons's a priori categories and ideas. Both frameworks, then, live up to the demand of reason that we formulated above: "well-understood metaphysics invites critique."

As a second illustration, this time from the secondary literature, let us consider one of those many descriptions of brahman that are reminiscent of Kant's recognition of the unavoidability of the idea of a totality of conditions that is itself unconditioned (the basic principle of reason). In his Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy, Puligandla (1977, p. 222) describes brahman as an "unchanging reality amidst and beyond the world" (my italics). The "amidst" is apt to remind us that whenever we try to explain some real-world phenomena, we have always already presupposed that there is a complete series of conditions – perhaps also some fundamental, unifying force or principle – that would indeed allow us to explain the conditioned nature of things the ways we customarily do it and rely upon, whether in science or philosophy, in everyday argumentation or practical action. Whether such a reliable, sufficient ground of explanation exists indeed and how it would have to be defined and proven (i.e., explained, an impossibility by definition), we ultimately have no way to tell. But then again, methodology, unlike metaphysics, can do without pretending such metaphysical knowledge. It is quite sufficient for methodological purposes to recognize that what we can know empirically (the phenomenal world) is not identical with reality and conversely, that the real lies at least partly beyond the phenomenal and therefore also beyond knowledge. Recognizing a lack of knowledge can be a basis for compelling methodological reflections and conclusions.

Neither in Upanishadic nor in Kantian thought we depend on an ontological proof of some last conditions to deal appropriately with the conditioned nature of all we can observe, think, and claim to know. What matters is to recognize that without assuming (which is not the same as proving) a whole series of conditions that is complete, we cannot think and talk clearly about our knowledge of the world and its limitations. But since at the same time we can never demonstrate the reality of a sufficient set of conditions, our practices of inquiry and argumentation have to learn to handle the situation accordingly and to be careful about their claims and ways of supporting them. The Upanishadic way of envisioning such an assumed, sufficient set of conditions is brahman, and its way of handling the situation is by "seeking to know brahman" – or, to put it more carefully, by seeking to get closer to knowing brahman – for instance, through meditative and mystical means; through a discipline of self-reflection and self-limitation; and ultimately through one's entire practice of life.

As is to be expected in view of brahman's ineffable nature, the Upanishads and their commentators suggest many different descriptions of it. Still, if we are to believe the Encyclopaedia Britannica, "they concur in the definition of brahman as eternal, conscious, irreducible, infinite, omnipresent, spiritual source of the universe of finiteness and change." (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2013b) In the light of what we just said, such a definition must look excessively metaphysical. To do justice to the Encyclopaedia, it mirrors the language of the Upanishads and of most commentators. No faithful account of the Upanishads can entirely avoid explaining them in their own terms, so readers will also find some metaphysical language in my continuing account. As the discussion thus far should have illustrated, this circumstance need not stop us from focusing on methodological considerations. Unlike metaphysical considerations, which are about the nature of reality (i.e., ontology), the core concern of methodological questioning as I understand it is the proper use of reason for achieving practical or theoretical ends (i.e., rationality). Instead of complaining about the metaphysical character of the Upanishads, we can make a difference by analyzing what they have to tell us about the proper use of reason. Why not try to do this from a critical, contemporary perspective, while still trying to remain faithful to the language, spirit and wisdom of these ancient texts?

The proper use of reason and the quest for practical excellence  The proposed methodological interest in the Upanishads is quite compatible, I think, with their essential orientation towards the practical: in Upanishadic thought, the study of brahman matters as much for mastering our lives as for purely speculative reasons. Remember what we said in the introductory essay about the importance of concepts such as svadharma (one's individual dharma or "law) and karma (from karman = work, action, performance; one's record of good deeds which is effective as cause of one's future fate). Their essential, practical concern is to guide us in developing right thought and conduct on the path to individual self-realization. Similar observations could be made about the implications of such concepts for professional self-realization, for example, by cultivating high standards of excellence in one's practices of inquiry, consultancy, and other uses of professional expertise. The quest for practical excellence requires no less an effort of self-reflection and self-limitation, along with clear and consistent reasoning, than does the search for theoretical understanding.

As always, such demands are easier formulated than put into practice. In practice, they face us with considerable difficulties. Specifically, as we have emphasized with reference to Kant, the proper use of reason depends on considering all the circumstances that might be relevant, not just those that present themselves immediately and/or conform to our private interests. Whether for practical or theoretical ends – a distinction that the Upanishads do not draw as sharply as we tend to do it nowadays – the need for maintaining the integrity of reason entails a need for comprehensiveness with respect to the conditions or circumstances we take into account. Any other kind of account of situations and what might be done about them is not only potentially deceptive but also arbitrary, in that it relies on selections of relevant circumstances that remain unconsidered, if not undeclared and unsubstantiated. On the other hand, complete rationality is obviously beyond our capabilities, both in thought and in action. We are well advised to strive for it, but not to claim it. This is the basic philosophical dilemma with which the Upanishadic demand of "seeking to know brahman" confronts us: the simultaneous need for, and unavailability of, an objective and comprehensive grasp of reality beyond the ways it manifests itself to us or interests us privately, whether in everyday life or in situations of professional intervention. In Upanishadic terms, to understand this world of ours we must also strive to comprehend that other world which lies beyond it but is part of the total reality.

The better one understands this dilemma involved in the proper use of reason, and thus also in the search for practical excellence, the more one will appreciate the often mystic and poetic (rather than strictly philosophical) approach of the Upanishads. To understand our daily world of experience and action, they tell us, we need to develop a discipline of seeking distance (the discipline involved in seeking to know brahman). Distance, that is, from our usual ways of being situated in the world, which prevent us from seeing "situations" (i.e., individual or collective situatedness) as clearly and objectively as proper thought and action would require. What at first glance may look like an escape – a mere way of avoiding a philosophical difficulty – then becomes understandable as a methodically pertinent response: its point is practicing detachment from the world as it is apparently given, or from situations as they present themselves to us and raise in us egocentric and short-sighted concerns about them. Thus understood, the mystic and poetic-metaphysical language of the Upanishads carries a deeply philosophical message indeed. In essence, though perhaps not always in formulation and elaboration, this message is akin to that of Kant: knowledge, unless it is subject to the proper use of reason, is as much a source of error as it is a source of certainty.²⁰⁾

The problem of holism  One of the traditional ways of framing the dilemma in Western philosophy is in terms of the problem of holism. Whatever we know, think, and say about the world, it is insufficient as measured by the latter's holistic nature. This methodological implication comes to the fore in the beautiful, at first rather mystical Invocation (i.e., an incantation, the chanting of magical words or formulas at the outset of a prayer or meditation) that introduces several of the Upanishads that belong to the Yajur Veda, among them the Brihadaranyaka, Isha, and Shvetashvatara Upanishads. I cite their identical invocation here, first in Sanskrit and then in three slightly different translations, all of which are customary in the literature. Note again the previously discussed, careful use of the terms "this" and "that" in all three versions:

om purnamadah purnamidam purnaat purnamudachyate
purnasya purnaamadaya purnameva vashishyate
om shanti shanti shanti

(Source: Swami J. [n.d.], http://www.swamij.com/upanishad-isha-purna.htm

The key word purna is the perfect participle of the verb pur, which appears to be related to the English verb "to pour" and means as much as "poured out," "filled" or "full," and hence "complete," "whole," "entire," and more figuratively also "accomplished," "contented," "powerful," and so on (see Apte, 1890/2014, p. 715, and 1965/2008, pp. 14 and 139). In the following translations of the invocation, the initial and final magical words 'om' and 'shanti' are not repeated:

All this is full. All that is full.
From fullness, fullness comes.
When fullness is taken from fullness, fullness still remains.”

(Invocations to the Isha, Brihadaranyaka and Shvetashvatara Upanishads, as transl. by Easwaran, 2007, pp. 56, 93, and 158; similarly transl. by Nikhilananda, 1949, p. 200, and 2003, pp. 86 and 254; note that in the Sanskrit text, "all that" comes before "all this," as is the case in the following translations)

That is whole, this is whole.
This whole proceeds from that whole.
On taking away this whole from that whole, it remains whole.

(Invocation to the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, as transl. by Müller/Navlakha, 2000, p. xix)

That is infinite, this is infinite;
From that infinite this infinite comes.
From that infinite, this infinite removed or added, infinite remains infinite.

(Invocation to the Isha Upanishad, as cited, along with a selection of other customary translations, in the Yoga site of Swami J [n.d.].)

Indeed, in view of the infinite and transcendent nature of "that" world of brahman, which nevertheless inheres and conditions "this" finite but infinitely variable world of of ours, need we not wonder how we may claim to understand anything without understanding the ways in which it relates to that larger, full reality of which it is a part? As both the Upanishads and Kant's ideas of reason make us understand, human reason needs this holistic notion of an all-inclusive whole as a reference point in relation to which it can situate its own perennially conditioned nature, its amounting to so much less than a comprehensive and objective grasp of things. At the same time, any such notion is bound to remain a problematic idea of reason. Holistic knowledge and understanding is a claim that cannot be redeemed argumentatively, whether based on logic or empirical inquiry or both. Logic tells us that we need it, but not what it is; and inquiry fails as the whole reaches beyond the empirical.

The Upanishadic thinkers understood this dilemma very clearly, some two and a half thousand years ago, before the disciplines of logic and epistemology were available to them. Their way of putting it was metaphysical and metaphorical, by means of the two great Upanishadic symbols (or metaphors) of human striving, atman, as the embodiment of individual self-knowledge and self-realization (a concept to which we will turn a little latert), and brahman as the embodiment of proper universal knowledge, that is, understanding of the unity and perfection of the universe. Expressed in these terms, the problem of holism consists in the difficulty that atman cannot find brahman empirically in "this" world, through the means of inquiry, nor logically, through the means of inference. For the whole is not only beyond the empirical, it is also, as the Upanishads teach us, "one without a second," that is, unique (Chandogya, 6.2.1-2) and therefore beyond logic. There is no logic of uniqueness, no stringent inference from what we know empirically (i.e., particulars) to what is unique (i.e., universals). Both epistemologically and analytically, the universal lies beyond human knowledge. Still, reason cannot do without the notion of universal qualities and principles. It cannot renounce the quest for a full understanding of reality in such terms. Human striving for knowledge of brahman is therefore a meaningful and indispensable quest, although we should never assume that we have actually achieved it.

This, then, is the Upanishadic way of describing the methodological dilemma with which the problem of holism confronts us. To this day it has remained a classical dilemma in many fields of philosophy such as language analysis and semiotics, hermeneutics, epistemology, and practical philosophy, and also in my work on critical systems heuristics (CSH). In the terms of the Upanishads: atman needs to seek knowledge of brahman and yet must avoid any presumption of knowledge. Or, as I like to put it in the terms of CSH: "Holistic thinking – the quest for comprehensiveness – is a meaningful effort but not a meaningful claim." (Ulrich, 2012a, p. 1236; similarly in 2012b, p. 1314 and, as applied to the moral idea, in 2013a, p. 38) This situation has motivated my call for a “critical turn” of the contemporary understanding of competent inquiry and rational practice. The essential aim then becomes ensuring sufficient critique rather than sufficient justification of theoretical or practical claims. This is feasible because, as we said above, recognizing a lack of knowledge can be a basis for compelling methodological provisions. The methodological consequence is a need for what I call a “critical systems approach” to research and professional practice, that is, a framework that would provide methodological support to critically comprehensive thinking or, as I originally defined it in CSH, an approach that aims to "secure at least a critical solution to the problem of practical reason" (Ulrich, 1983, pp. 25, 34-37, 177, and passim).

The problem (and richness) of subjectivity A second methodological implication of the metaphysical concept of brahman concerns the importance of subjectivity. Once we have understood that human thought cannot do without assuming some ultimate, unconditional ground of all that exits – a totality of conditions that exists in an unconditional, absolute, perhaps objective way – we also begin to understand how limited and subjective all our perceptions of this world of ours are bound to be, amounting at best to glimpses of that underlying larger, infinite reality. It follows that whatever knowledge of things we can aspire to possess, it will be so much less than objective, as it can just grasp aspects of that which is "really" the case. The objective is elusive, for it would be all-inclusive.

Ganeri (2001, p. 1) succinctly speaks of brahman as "the Upanishadic symbol for objectivity itself," as opposed to "the subjectivity that goes along with being situated in the world." As the Mundaka Upanishad puts it, brahman stands for that all-encompassing, infinite reality in which everything else is rooted and "through which, if it is known, everything else becomes known" (Mundaka Upanishad, 1.1.3, as transl: by Müller, 1897/2000, p. 47, and Müller/Navlakha, 2000, p. xi; note that the latter source wrongly refers to Mundaka 1.1.4). As I would put it, the Upanishads can inspire in us the humility of accepting that there are limits to what we can hope to know and understand, due to our being situated in this world. Such awareness can encourage mutual tolerance, as well as reflective practice in the sense of paying attention to the ways in which people's individual situatedness may shape their views and values. Multiple, differing views also embody a richness of views that would not be attainable otherwise, and thus have intrinsic value in the quest for comprehensiveness, for seeking to better know brahman. Methodologically speaking, then, the situation is not quite as bad as it looks metaphysically. Although there are always limits to what as individuals we can claim to know, no specific limits are beyond questioning and expansion; and to this end, we can always listen and talk to others.

In the Upanishadic conception of inquiry, brahman furnishes the standard for such questioning. As the Upanishads admonish us time and again, we can "really" know and understand things only inasmuch as we know and understand them in their relation to brahman. Brahman, in the metaphysical terms of the Upanishads, is the conception of a reality that, because it is "self-existent" (Monier-Williams, 1899, p. 737f), is independent of any condition external to it. It thus mirrors, in our own discourse-theoretical terms, the ideal of a self-contained account of reality that could do without any reference to conditions outside its own universe of discourse and thus would be entirely true and reliable. As an ideal, it does not lend itself to realization; but it certainly provides impetus for critical thought – about the ways our accounts of reality fail to be self-contained and, worse, about our usual failure to limit our claims accordingly.

This is a conception of knowledge that is important indeed for our understanding of general ideas of reason. The parallels we encountered earlier between the Upanishadic concept of brahman as an absolute, all-inclusive, and infinite reality on the one hand, and Kant's concept of a totality of conditions (or an infinite series of conditions) that reason cannot help but presuppose on the other hand, are relevant here. Both concepts confront us with unavoidable limitations of human knowledge. Both therefore also imply the need for a discipline of self-reflection and self-limitation. But of course, there is also an important difference, in that the two traditions of thought have developed this discipline in entirely different directions – meditative spirituality and ascetism in the one tradition, critique of reason in the other. The deeper, underlying difference is that Kant makes us understand the totality of conditions as a methodological rather than metaphysical concept or, in his terms, as a transcendental rather than transcendent idea. Although a conventional, metaphysical and spiritual reading may well remain of primary importance to most people in studying the Upanishads, the mentioned parallels nevertheless suggest to me that a metaphysical reading can and should lead on to a critical study of what these ancient texts have to tell us about present-day notions of knowledge, science, and rationality, as well as about the roles we give these notions in modern societies. For example, such a reading might encourage a critique of science that reaches deeper than current notions of reflective practice in science and professional practice. Such critique in turn might provide new impetus for the necessary discourse on how contemporary conceptions of science-theory, research philosophy, theory of knowledge, and practical philosophy could be developed so as to overcome the crisis of rationality to which I briefly referred at the outset (Ulrich, 2013c, p. 1).

With a view to such a methodological reading and study of the Upanishads, I would argue – drawing on our previous examinations of the nature and use of ideas of reason in Parts 2 and 3 – that brahman is properly understood as a limiting concept, that is, as a projected endpoint towards which we can direct reflection on what we take to represent valid knowledge and rational practice. We have discussed the notion of ideas as limiting concepts or projected endpoints of thought earlier (see Ulrich, 2014a, p. 7 and note 5, and 2014b, pp. 23-28); suffice it to recall that reason needs such notions as reference points for its critical business, however problematic they are bound to remain due to their exceeding the reach of possible knowledge. They thus pose a double challenge to reason. Reason needs to employ them for critical ends while at the same time learning to handle them critically, that is, to keep a critical stance towards any claims based on their use. Again, as with the striking parallels we observed before, I see no essential methodological difference in this regard between the Upanishads' brahman and Kant's ideas of reason. Consequently, a further conjecture offers itself: we might try to embed Upanishadic reflection on knowledge as inspired by the notion of brahman – "brahmanic reflection" as it were – in the same kind of double or cyclical movement of critical thought with which we earlier associated the pragmatic use or "approximation" of Kant's ideas of reason, equally understood as limiting concepts. The idea is that in this way we might gain a deeper understanding of both, the movement of critical thought in question as well as the methodological implications of the "brahmanic reflection" just suggested. So much for a brief outlook. At present we are not yet prepared for such a discussion, as we first need to familiarize ourselves with the two other Upanishadid ideas that we selected for examination, atman and jagat.

"Atman" A second major theme is atman, a counter-concept to brahman inasmuch as it focuses on the individual that seeks to know or experience brahman, rather than on brahman itself. Atman stands for the subjective side of the quest for knowing brahman. If brahman is the Upanishadic symbol for objectivity, atman is the symbol for subjectivity. Or, in the terms we used in the introductory essay, atman embodies the emerging knowing subject of the Upanishads, whose search for understanding what is real and reliable in this ever-changing world – where to find that basic, unchanging reality called brahman – leads it to discover its own consciousness and self-reflection. "Atman, or the Self, is the consciousness, the knowing subject, within us." (Nikhilananda, 1949, p. 52). As the Upanishadic thinkers understood centuries before the early thinkers of the Occident (e.g., the pre-Socratic philosophers of nature, such as Anaxagoras and Democritus, and later Plato and Aristotle), the key to understanding our (for ever imperfect) grasp of the objective world lies in ourselves, in our consciousness and, as a contemporary Western perspective might want to add, in our individual and collective unconscious or subconscious (see Jung, 1966, 1968a). Early on the ancient Indian sages understood that both brahman and atman – the objective and the subjective principle – are indispensable notions for reflecting on the sources and nature of human knowledge or error, even if both notions are ultimately beyond human grasp. Likewise, they recognized that neither notion is independent of the other; each manifests itself in the other but cannot be reduced to it. "The Absolute of the Upanishads manifests itself as the subject as well as the object and transcends them both." (Sharma, 2000, p. 25).

Root meanings  The word atman quite obviously contains the Sanskrit root of the contemporary German verb atmen = to breath (also compare the German masculine noun der Atem = the breath, a word that in contemporary German is still also used in metaphoric or spiritual expressions such as der Atem Gottes, meaning the creative presence of God's spirit]. The Sanskrit word in turn is variously derived from the two Sanskrit roots "an" (= to breathe) and "at" (= to move), two root meanings that come together in the act of breathing in and out. Note that for phonological or declensional reasons, the initial "a" is suppressed in some uses, yielding 'tman. This happens frequently when the term appears in compound words following a vowel. Employing the phonetically reduced form along with the complete form may help in consulting the Sanskrit dictionaries, but otherwise need not concern us here.

Table 2 lists the entries of Monier-Williams (1899) for both forms. Readers wishing to verify these entries may like to know that the on-line search tools of the Cologne Project (1997/2008 and 2013/14) and Monier-Williams et al. (2008) currently only list tman and under this entry do not include all the meanings given in the original dictionary for atman; the latter are accessible through the online facsimile edition listed in the reference section under Monier-Williams (1899). Easier to use and more complete in this respect are some of the other Sanskrit dictionaries, particularly Apte (1965/2008) and, with some reservations regarding completeness, Böhtlingk and Roth (1855, p. 3-3f) and Böthlingk and Schmidt (1879/1928, p. 3-045). For reasons of consistency, Table 2, like the previous Table 1 (for "brahman") and the later Table 3 (for "jagat"), relies on Monier-Williams and focuses on the root meanings of "atman." Some of Apte's additional translations will be mentioned in the subsequent text. As in the case of Table 1, I have again highlighted some of the meanings of special interest to us.

Derived meanings  In addition, Apte's (1965/2008) Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary lists the following (among other) uses of the term “atman,” all of which relate to both cognitive and emotional qualities, to the mind and the soul: "thinking faculty, the faculty of thought and reason" (p. 323); "spirit, vitality, courage" (p. 323); "mental quality" (p. 323); further, in derived and compound phrases, atman also stands for qualities or efforts such as "striving to get knowledge (as an ascetic), seeking spiritual knowledge" (p. 324); "dependent on oneself or on his own mind, self-dependence" (p. 324); "self-control, self-government" (p. 325); "knowing one's own self (family etc.), knowledge of the soul, spiritual knowledge" (p. 325); "practicing one's own duties or occupation, one's own power or ability, to the best of one's power" (p. 325); and, apparently accompanying such qualities, forms of personal conduct such as "self-purification" (p. 325), but also "self-praise" and "self-restraint" (p. 325).

Personal reading  The etymological root meaning of atman, so much is clear, refers to the activity of breathing – the vital breath – as a source of vitality that keeps us alive and moving and also allows us to grow and develop as individuals, to unfold our nature and essential character (compare the compound word jivatman, also spelled givatman, from jivá = "living, existing, alive" and tman, thus yielding "the living or personal or individual soul," cf. Monier-Williams, 1899, p. 422f, facsimile edn. only). Atman is thus also the source of our becoming what we have the potential to be spiritually and intellectually, if only we undertake the required effort of learning, by seeking to know brahman and thereby also to better know ourselves, that is, the individual self of which both our soul and our intellect are constitutive.

Müller's (1879, e.g., pp. xxx) preferred translation of atman is indeed the "individual self" or simply the "self," meaning the essential core of a human subject that lies behind the empirical individual as it manifests itself in the phenomenal world, the aham (cf. the German ich, "I") or "ego, with all its accidents and limitations, such as sex, sense, language, country, and religion." Atman, the individual self, thus distinguishes itself from both the empirical ego (aham) on the one hand and the universal or highest self (brahman) on the other hand. Atman is neither aham nor brahman; rather, it is on the way from aham to brahman, developing its contingent, empirical self towards its essential, divine self. With respect to the latter, Müller emphasizes that atman is always "a merely temporary reflex of the Eternal Self" (1879, p. xxxii; cf. his full discussion on pp. xxviii-xxxii). Atman's fundamental task is to realize itself – its individual self – in the double sense of achieving awareness (recognizing it) and growth (developing it), so that this individual self can become a fuller reflex of that higher, universal Self of which it is only an imperfect reflection.

The core topic of the Upanishads, as I understand it, is accordingly "to explain the true relation between brahman, the supreme being, and [atman,] the soul of man" (Müller, 1904/2013, p. 20). Atman's self-realization, in the double sense just explained, is gained through the effort to get to know brahman. The Upanishads therefore also refer to brahman as paramatman (or parama-atman, from paramá = most distant, highest, best, most excellent, superior, with all the heart, and tman, yielding "the supreme spirit," Monier-Williams, 1899, p. 588): paramatman is the ideal towards which jivatman, the living self, is to strive, a process of realizing one's individual nature and potential that has as its endpoint the convergence of atman with brahman, or atman's becoming atman-brahman. When this happens (in the ideal, that is), atman has found "its very self," "that [self] which should be perceived" or realized (Olivelle's apt translation of "atman" in the Mandukya Upanishad, see 1996, p. 289f, see verses 7, 8 and 12; italics added).

The distinction, and ideal convergence, of atman and brahman is also related to the fundamental notion in Hindu thought of a perpetual cycle of rebirth and transmigration of souls (samsara): atman can only free itself from samsara by moving closer to brahman, that is, by realizing its own highest self. In connection with the notion of samsara, atman's self is "the eternal core of the personality that after death either transmigrates to a new life or attains release (moksha) from the bonds of existence" (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2013a). Which one of the two options will come true depends on the degree to which atman realizes its individual self in terms of both awareness and growth.

Atman or the search for personal growth We are, then, talking about the individual self as-it-has-the-potential-to-be rather than as-it-actually-is; about a person's vital self; about the ultimate source of its being spiritually, emotionally and intellectually alive and growing. Hamilton (2001, p. 28 and passim) similarly speaks of atman as embodying "the nature of one's essential self or soul," and Ganeri (2007, p. 3) of a "healthy self" towards which atman is to strive. Partly similar notions of personal growth are quite familiar to the Western tradition of thought. I am thinking of Carl Rogers' (1961) process of becoming and particularly of C.G. Jung's (1968b) process of individuation, a process through which a person's unconscious and conscious become one in the Self, whereby the latter concept (the Self) is understood as the archetype of psychic wholeness or totality. The difference is that in the Hindu tradition, this process reaches beyond all the limitations and contingencies of a person's life and takes on a truly cosmic dimension: the individual soul or consciousness is expected to become one with the whole universe as if individual awareness could ever include the whole of reality or, in Vedanta terms, as if atman could ever be one with brahman so as indeed to become atman-brahman.

Atman or the quest for realizing the ideal in the real  Atman's striving to become one with brahman: what a great image for the eternal tension between realism and idealism in the human quest for coming to terms with the world and, inseparable from it, for becoming (or realizing) onself! Remarkably, in this Upanishadic image the tension can be resolved in favor of a meaningful convergence – of the human condition as it is and human development as it might be. Such convergence is conceivable in the Upanishadic framework as it sees the ultimate ground of the person (one's self-concept) in close interaction with the cosmic principles (brahman) that pervade the universe and thus also shape our awareness of the world and of ourselves. The tension between the real and the ideal is thus reconciled in the notion of a fundamental union of individual (or subjective) and universal (or objective) principles.

Kant's later attempt, in the first Critique, to explain how the human mind can grasp and understand the world at all, or in his terms, how the mind's a priori categories can be constitutive of empirical knowledge, lead him to a similar solution: the answer must be that there exists an ultimate convergence of the human mind's internal structure and principles with those of the universe (see Kant's highly differentiated analysis in the "Analytic of Principles," 1787, B169-315, esp. B193-197). The principles governing the world must be the same as those governing the human mind! For purely methodological reasons, Kant is thus compelled to postulate an ultimate unity of the cognitive conditions that account for the intelligibility of the world with the ontological conditions that account for its reality, a postulate he calls the "highest principle of all synthetic judgments" (1787, B197):

We assert that the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are likewise conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and that for this reason they have objective validity in a synthetic a priori judgment. (Kant, 1787, B197)

If as humans we can grasp reality at all, infinite as it is and reaching beyond our experience, it is because it is already in us, as an intrinsic part of our cognitive apparatus. In the language of the Vedanta: atman can hope at least partly to grasp the universal reality that is called "brahman" because brahman is already in atman's soul, is part of its essential nature. "The real behind empirical nature is the universal spirit within." (Mohanty, 2000, p. 2). Atmavidya (the seach for understanding oneself) and brahmavidya (the search for understanding universal reality) go hand in hand.

From cultivated understanding to cultivated practice  Shifting the focus from the realm of theoretical (speculative) reason to that of practical (moral) reason, I find a similar parallelism between the deepest ideas of the traditions of Western rational ethics and ancient Indian thought. Just as Kant's "enlarged thought," the rational effort of taking into account the implications of one's subjective maxim of action for all others and thus to cultivate a sensus communis (see the earlier discussion in Ulrich, 2009b, p. 10f, and 2009d, p. 38), converges with the quest for cultivating one's moral self, so cultivated understanding of the world and individual self-cultivation also converge in the ancient Indian tradition. In Vedanta terms as well as in Buddhist terms, which in this regard do not differ, "philosophical inquiry and the practices of truth are also arts of the soul, ways of cultivating impartiality, self-control, steadiness of mind, toleration, and non-violence." (Ganeri, 2007, p. 4, added italics).

But of course, effort and achievement are not the same thing. We are talking here about an ongoing process of cultivating one's knowledge, character, and practice, rather than about an accomplishment. Despite the promise of brahman's residing in the individual, atman is only and for ever on the way to self-knowledge and self-realization. The situation resembles that of a student challenged by the teacher to never stop learning; or, in the previously quoted terms of Müller, of a pupil who is called upon to learn to know his Self rather than just himself, that is, to understand his individual self as "a merely temporary reflex of the Eternal Self" (Müller, 1879, p. xxxii). Once we realize that self-knowledge (atmavidya) is quite impossible without knowledge of that highest expression of Self called brahman (brahmavidya), and vice-versa, the challenge is unavoidable:

The highest aim of all thought and study with the Brahman of the Upanishads was to recognize his own self as a mere limited reflection of the Highest Self, to know his self in the Highest Self, and through that knowledge to return to it, and regain his identity with it. Here to know was to be, to know the Atman was to be the Atman, and the reward of that highest knowledge after death was freedom from new births, or immortality.
    That Highest Self which had become to the ancient Brahmans the goal of all their mental efforts, was looked upon at the same time as the starting-point of all phenomenal existence, the root of the world, the only thing that could truly be said to be, to be real and true. As the root of all that exists, the Atman was identified with the Brahman. (Müller, 1879, p. xxx)

Accordingly, as Müller sums up the gist of the Upanishads, the question that may guide us in reading these bewildering, mythical, partly dark and almost unintelligible, yet partly also bright and illuminating texts is this:

The question is, whether there is or whether there is not, hidden in every one of the sacred books, something that could lift up the human heart from this earth to a higher world, something that could make man feel the omnipresence of a higher Power, something that could make him shrink from evil and incline to good, something to sustain him in the short journey through life, with its bright moments of happiness, and its long hours of terrible distress. (Müller, 1879, p. xxxviii)

The human being's striving beyond the fragmentary universe within which it moves in everyday thought and practice, towards something deeper or higher, towards something that could "lift the heart up"; that's what well-understood self-knowledge (atmavidya) is all about from a Vedantic perspective. It leads us directly to the third selected idea that I find so interesting in the Upanishads' account of the general (or universal) in all human cognition and practice, the concept of jagat.

"Jagat" At first glance, it may look as if this one were the easiest of the three ideas to grasp, as the term is still used today in many regional Indian languages for referring to the experiential world in which we live. On closer inspection though, it is perhaps the most complex and interesting of the three concepts, at least from a methodological (rather than spiritual) point of view. The reason is, I believe it can make a significant difference to our competence of "enlarged thinking," or more specifically, to our understanding of the general in the particular and vice-versa and accordingly, to our skills in dealing constructively and critically with the eternal tension (or dialectic) in human thought and practice mentioned above, between the real and the ideal – the idealist and the realist sides of our grasp of reality. But let us see.

Root meanings  The Sanskrit root term contained in the second syllable of "jagat" is ga, which refers to moving, going, not too different from the English go; whence comes the Sanskrit verb gam, = to go, move, or approach; to arrive at, to accomplish or attain (see Wilson, 1819/ 2011, p. 282). The prefix ja in the first syllable means as much as "born or descended from, produced or caused by, born or produced in or at or upon, growing in, living at," therefore also "son of" or "father of," or "belonging to, connected with, peculiar to" (Monier-Williams, 1899, p. 407); it can also mean "speedy, swift" (the only meaning given by Wilson, 1819/2011, p. 336, whereas Monier-Williams lists it almost last of the many meanings he gives) or "victorious, eaten" (Monier-Williams, 1899, p. 407), two meanings that point to the term's connotation of chase or hunt (Jagd in German). The prefix may also be related to the similar term ya, which among other meanings refers to that which moves or to "who goes, a goer, a mover" or also "air, wind" (Wilson, 1819/2011, p. 677, similarly Monier-Williams, 1899, p. 838). So jagat is everything that is moving or movable, undergoing variation, in flux, "especially in the sense that no fixed description of it will ever be correct" (D.P. Dash, 2013a). Here is, once again, a representative selection of meanings from the Monier-Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Table 3):

Against the background of the discussion thus far, it is interesting to note that jagat refers not only to the "world," "earth" or "universe" in general but can also take the specific meaning of "this world [of ours]" (Monier-Williams, 1899, p. 408). Jagat is the world as it manifests itself to the individual (atman) as a perceived or imagined reality, a perception that is in constant flux and does not usually capture the full, objective reality (brahman). Further, in addition to the manifest physical world, jagat may also refer specifically to "the world of the soul, [or of an individual's] body" (Apte, 1965/2008, p. 722; cf. 1890/2014, p. 503). Jagat can thus refer to different realms of the universe, such as heaven and earth. The compound nouns trijagat and jagat-traya designate the Vedantic conception of three worlds, either as "(1) the heaven, the atmosphere and the earth" or as "(2) the heaven, the earth, and the lower world" (Apte, 1965/2008. p. 789; similarly Böthlingk and Roth, 1855, p. 3-428, and Böthlingk and Schmidt, 1879/1928, p. 3-49). As a last hint, Apte also lists jagat as a grammatical object of the verbal noun nisam (lit. = not speaking, silent, observing), which refers to the act of "seeing, beholding, [having] sight [of]"; accordingly the phrase nisam jagat stands for "observing the [visible] world" and, as a result, having a certain "sight" of the world (p. 924, cf. 1890//2014, p. 638).

Derived meanings: the rich etymology of "jagat"  While the Sanskrit-English dictionaries on which I have drawn have their strength in a scholarly documentation of actual occurrences of Sanskrit terms in the ancient literature, they are less strong when it comes to explaining how old Sanskrit terms have found their way into the contemporary vocabulary of Indo-European and other languages. "Jagat" is such a term. It continues to be used in several Asian languages, including Modern Standard Hindi, in meanings related to land, earth, world, or universe, with a number of different derived connotations.²²⁾ Likewise, in the European languages (esp. in Dutch and German) one can find numerous contemporary words and entire word families that appear to be related to the ancient Sanskrit jagat. They often go back to the Old-Germanic root jag, which apparently contains the Sanskrit root terms ja and gam (as explained above) and means as much as "moving fast, chasing." Here are three examples of such word families, all of which are of particular interest to our present discussion.

(1) The German noun Jagd (= the hunt) derives directly from the Middle High German noun jaget or jagat. This etymological connection makes the combination of the two above-listed, at first glance unrelated, root meanings of the prefix ja understandable, of "speedy, swift" along with "victorious, eaten." Interestingly, the German noun originally referred not only to the activity of hunting but also to the parties involved or admitted (a meaning it still has today, although it is now rarely used in this sense), as well as to the area in which hunting was permitted. The corresponding German verb is jagen (= to hunt, figuratively also to move fast or to chase something or somebody). Similar forms exist in other North-European languages (e.g. the Dutch verb jagen, from Middle Dutch jaghen, Old Dutch jagon; likewise Swedish jaga or Swiss-German jage). The Dutch noun for Jagd is jacht (from Middle Dutch jaght), which is obviously related to the German and Dutch term for a sailing yacht, Jacht (= yacht, originally a fast moving boat or "hunting boat").

(2) The Swiss-German noun Hag (= fence, originally meaning as much as a thorn hedge that encloses a piece of land or forest) goes back to the Old High German hac and further to the Old Germanic (Proto-Germanic) hagatusjon, with many derivatives such as hagaz (= able, skilled), hag or haga (= to beat, push, thrust, cf. the contemporary English verb "to hack,"), and häkse (= a witch, cf. Middle English hagge, Dutch heks, German Hexe). Although the link is not definitively proven, both the form and the meaning of these and other words with the root term hag are strikingly close to jag[at]; they all connote some aspects of fast movement or hunting (e.g., chasing, stinging, hitting, capturing, fencing in). These connotations are still very apparent, for example, in the contemporary German verbs hacken (= to chop, hack; also abhacken = to chop off) and einhagen (= to hedge, to fence in), as well as in the German nouns Hecke (= a hedge, related to the Old English haga = an enclosure, a fenced-in area, and to the Middle English hawe as in hawthorn) and Gehege (= an enclosure, preserve, a fenced area of natural preservation or also an artificial habitat for animals as in the zoo).

(3) In other derivatives, the root meanings of chasing, capturing, enclosing, and delimiting take on a strong connotation of protection, as in the German verb hegen (orig. = to hedge), which now means as much as to care for, look after, cultivate, or foster (as in the phrase hegen und pflegen, to lavish care and attention on somebody or something). Figuratively used it means, for example, to nurture a hope (eine Hoffnung hegen), to entertain an expectation or a doubt (eine Erwartung hegen, einen Zweifel hegen), or to pursue an intention or plan (eine Absicht hegen, einen Plan hegen). Another derivation appears to be Hain, an old-fashioned German noun that is now chiefly used in poetic language for a grove but which originally just meant a piece of land surrounded by trees or bushes, yielding a natural delimitation for an orchard or garden, a resting place, or a small farm or other kind of dwelling. This explains why the root hag is also still frequently found today as a component in the names of plants that are characteristic of such places (e.g. Hagedorn = hawthorn, from Old English hagathorn), or Hagebutte = rose hip), as well as in many old place names (e.g., Hagen and Im obern Hag in Germany, Den Haag in the Netherlands, or Hagnau in Switzerland).

To judge from the numerous etymological sources that I have consulted, ranging from the Oxford English Dictionary to Wiktionary for English and from the Duden to the Kluge and the Wahrig dictionaries for German, it appears that the link between jagat and the first-mentioned word family around Jagd is firmly established, whereas the precise history of the modern words mentioned under points (2) and (3) lies partly in the dark. Even so, the extent to which the root meanings of these terms agree with those of the ancient Sanskrit word jagat is striking. We may sum up these root meanings as follows:

(1) the activity of movement or chase; an object that moves or undergoes change;

(2) a piece of land or site of a dwelling, or that which delimits it;

(3) an element of care, attention, interest or cultivation; this world of ours or a delimited part of it about which we care.²¹⁾

A second observation that I find striking is this. As a common denominator, all three root meanings have to do with the core notion of something bounded or limited that changes and can be changed but which is also being cared for – a core notion that I associate with my methodological interest, in my work on critical systems heuristics (CSH), in the role of boundary judgments and hence, of boundary discourse and boundary critique as tools for cultivated understanding (for an introduction see, e.g., Ulrich 1996, 2006a, 2001, and 2005). However, for the time being, let us stick to the etymology of jagat.

Personal reading  Considering the various meanings of jagat, I conclude that it may stand for virtually any object-realm of experience or awareness (and, in the case of humans, also of thought, discourse, and action) that constitutes the "world" or "universe" within which an individual's attention moves at any specific time. Characteristic of this world is that it is "moving" or changing, in the double sense that it takes on variable forms or states and thus may also be seen from multiple perspectives, so that there is no definitive description of it. Equally characteristic is that it represents a particular, partial set of the total universe of phenomena that in principle could come into sight or might be the focus of attention, and that (to use Müller's earlier-cited description of the atman's self as distinguished from the universal or higher Self) it is only a "temporary reflex" of the full reality behind the considered phenomena. Moreover, as we just observed, an active element of bounding (or boundary judgments) on the part of a human observer plays a role in each of the three word families that we have considered. The basic cognitive (logical, observational, linguistic) act involved is that of making a distinction between "within" and "without."

This active element suggests that one of the associations that go with "jagat" concerns a subject's authorship and/or ownership of it. A jagat is always some subject's jagat; it is the world as an individual perceives and experiences in its current situation. In a sense, even animals – all living being, not only humans – are the authors of their jagat; we call it "habitat" (or living space) in the case of animals and "daily life world" (or realm of experience, universe of discourse, world view, etc.) in the case of people. The subject, whether an animal or a person, can to a certain extent chose, change or modify its habitat. Humans, as subjects endowed with reason, cannot avoid thinking about and questioning their perception of and situation in the world.

As a consequence of that individual ownership, but also of the infinite variety of things and aspects that make up "the world" – the total universe of things we might want to consider as parts of our individual worlds – there is an element of selection involved. We cannot usually to justice to all and every circumstance that might potentially be of interest. By implication, in talking to others we have to make it clear what parts or aspects of "the world" we are concerned or talking about; as a result of exchange with others, we may revise our individual jagat. Atman's view or conception of the world, like that of itself, is always only a "temporary reflex" of the total universe. Further, due to this moving and changing character, the concept of jagat also connotes the idea of an ongoing process of change in which a subject's jagat can take on different states or stages of development and appreciation.

As I suggest to understand the term jagat, it connotes all these mentioned aspects of its being a variable object-domain; its being authored and owned by an individual; its having the selected and temporary nature of a subject's world; its being a possible object of reflection and learning, revision and development. As knowing subjects, we find ourselves in the situation of atman: we are challenged to develop not only our awareness of self – "the knowing subject within us" (Nikhilananda, 1949, p. 52) – but also that of the world around us, the world within we live, our individual jagat. We can "realize" the jagat-like nature of our world in the sense of both making ourselves aware of it and, consequently, developing it.

From an epistemological and methodological point of view, we may structure these various connotations of "jagat" a bit more systematically into three basic types of reference to the world involved in observing the world, in thinking and talking about it, and in acting in it:

(i) Jagat refers to some object(s) of cognition (the perceived) – "the world within which a subject moves," understood as a variable object-realm of perception and awareness. Characteristically, there is no definitive description of the object-domain or, to put it differently, there are no stable objects of cognition, due to the fluent and perspectival character of what can be known and said about this world of ours. Also characteristically, that which can be known or said, despite its unstable character, is of concern to some individual(s) in some context of ordinary existence and practice, whether it is an object of observation or care such as the wind, the forces of nature, a plant or an animal, or a whole species or group of species; or a human individual on its way to self (and Self), or some human collective with its social life-world and conventions, perhaps also humanity as a whole or even a divine being with an all-encompassing, universal consciousness or "world-soul." Another way to describe the nature of this first type of reference to the world is by pointing to its contextual character: we perceive and talk of objects depending on the contexts in which we find ourselves or about which we care.

(ii) Jagat refers to some subject(s) of cognition (the perceiver) – "that which moves and changes" (e.g., its location, appearance, or view), understood as a bearer of knowledge and awareness, perhaps also as a source of ideas, insights and errors, as well as an agent, in its moving within the object-domain in question. Characteristically this subject, through its changing states of awareness as well as its changing needs and interests, is the author and owner (natha, or naatha, = "protector, patron, possessor, owner, lord," cf. Monier-Williams, 1899, p. 534, and "author," cf. Sanskrit and Tamil Dictionaries, 2005) of its own world (jagat), the specific universe within which its perceptions, thoughts, and actions move. In the case of an animal, the jagat in question will be its natural habitat, perhaps also the larger ecosystem of which this habitat is a part. In the case of humans, it may be a dwelling or the site of a house where people live; a fenced area of land where cattle is kept or crops are grown; a larger geographical region or a social context; the three jagats of earth, heaven, and the lower world; the whole cosmos; or any section of the real-world of interest at a specific moment. The object of cognition (or variable object-realm) referred to under (i) above thus becomes the subject's self-created universe of discourse, an ever-changing, self-delimited context of interest or concern within which people move as observers, speakers, or agents.

The human subject, thus conceived as observer, narrator, or agent, becomes jagannath (from jagat and natha), "the author of the considered or narrated world" – a concept that we still encounter in India today, for example, in the form of the masculine first name Jagannath as well as, in the Indian state of Odisha (formerly Orissa) and other Indian states, as the name of a Hindu deity (a title of Krishna, the eighth avatar of Vishnu), then meaning as much as "the lord (or protector) of the universe." The term "jagannath" is also at the origin of the English loanword juggernaut, which according to my constant companion, the Complete English Oxford Dictionary, refers to an "idol of this deity at Puri, Orissa, annually dragged in procession on an enormous car, under the wheels of which many devotees are said to have formerly thrown themselves to be crushed" (see the picture on the right hand; source: in the public domain, made available by the Project Gutenberg). In contemporary language it is now also used to denote any particularly large vehicle or machine, or simply as a synonym for "Moloch."

The double association of jagat with jagannath and juggernaut is not without its dangers. While it is apt to remind us of jagat's belonging to some author, and thus of its subjective and creative, self-authored and dynamic nature as "the moving universe within which we move," it also abets a one-sidedly religious reading (especially in popular reception). Its use in the ancient scriptures is then easily misunderstood to refer to the divine author of "that" world only (i.e., to God or some ancient Hindu deity), rather than also (and perhaps primarily) to the human authors of "this" world. Such an understanding of jagat risks obscuring its philosophical and methodological significance. A major example is provided by its use in the Isha Upanishad, one of the principal Upanishads associated with the Yajur Veda, to which we will turn in the subsequent "Seventh Intermediate Reflection."

(iii) Finally, by implication, jagat also refers to a state of cognition (the perception) – "the state of awareness of the world, which an unreflective subject wrongly considers as the world." Characteristically, again, there is no stable state of awareness; for awareness is always an intermediate state in an ongoing process of transformation, a current state of consciousness and understanding in terms of which a human subject can describe its world provisionally, although any such description is always to be understood as a merely temporary account that fails to capture the variability and possible development of both the subject and the object of cognition and which therefore, as soon as we take it for granted, risks being false or arbitrary. It is, to use Müller's (1879, p. xxxii) phrase once more, but a "temporary reflex" of the full reality that as such cannot be an object of human cognition. Which is to say, whatever we choose to say about the world is bound to be false or insufficient and unreliable, as is any one perspective or universe of discourse we rely upon for defining situations and acting in them. A devastating but compelling insight that is also captured in a famous Vedantic aphorism, ascribed to Adi Shankara, the major 8th/9th century commentator of the Upanishads and founder of the Advaita Vedanta school of Vedanta thought (a school of thought that emphasizes the unity of all reality and the ultimate convergence of atman and brahman):

brahman satyam, jagat mithya.
"Brahman is the real reality, the world is deceptive."
(Bowker, 2000, p. 96)

In methodological rather than metaphysical terms, we might put it this way: "One perceives the reality of one's own world," and "one thinks the thoughts of one's own universe of thought." The good news is that we can choose to heed this admonishment ¬ the Upanishadic way of developing our skills as knowing and acting subjects.

Concluding comment  We are reaching the end of this introductory analysis of the three selected Upanishadic ideas, brahman, atman, and jagat. Is there any concise way to sum it up? If so, perhaps the most noteworthy finding consists in the rather striking parallels that we have encountered between these Upanisadic ideas and the "Western" ideas of reason that Kant examined most profoundly in his critique of reason and which remain indispensable today with a view to ensuring to reason its three basic virtues – unity of thought, morality of action, and rationality of argumentation.²³⁾ The parallels in question include:

(a) the general character of these ideas: they guide us beyond the limits of the empirical world;

(b) their unavoidable, although at the same time problematic, character: reason cannot do without them, but at the same time it cannot demonstrate that they have any objective validity and thus it also cannot rely on them for validating the generalizations they suggest to us;

(c) their unconditional character, in the sense that they refer us to the notion of an unconditioned totality (or a complete series) of conditions, a notion that is implied in all sufficient explanation or understanding of things yet exceeds the limits of possible knowledge: which is to say, all these ideas confront us with the limitations of human knowledge and reason;

(d) their character as limiting concepts: they embody projected endpoints of thought that we need for systematic thinking, although we can only approximate but never reach these endpoints;

(e) their confronting us with fundamental tension between the demands of reason and what it can achieve in reality: they remind us of the perennial clash of idealism and realism in human thought and practice;

(f) their anticipated convergence of the real (empirical) and the ideal (universal) in the constitution of human knowledge: inquiry into the nature of the world cannot avoid postulating that the ontological conditions that account for its reality and the cognitive conditions that account for its intelligibility;

(g) and finally, their doubly challenging character with a view to critical inquiry and practice: reason needs to learn to employ them for critical purposes while at the same time handling them critically, that is, refraining from any positive validity claims based on their use.

In view of these shared characteristics, I propose that all these ideas are best understood as ideas that lend themselves to merely critical employment. They do not warrant any kinds of generalizing claims about the world. Borrowing an apt phrase of Ryle (1949, p. 141; also 2000, p. 135, and 2009, p. 123), we might say that ideas of reason represent no inference-licences for claiming knowledge and rationality beyond the limits of contextual assumptions. Rather, they challenge us to deal carefully with such assumptions. This is possible inasmuch as contextual assumptions, although unavoidable, are variable; we can therefore change them so as to do justice to a situation, we can share and discuss them with others; and we can carefully qualify and limit the claims that depend on them.

General ideas of reason, meaning both Upanishadic and Kantian ideas, are in this respect similar to ideals: human inquiry and practice will never completely "realize" their intent, that is, understand it and make it real, but they can at least try to approximate it and to do justice to it partly, in some well-reasoned ways. Their counter-factual nature then does not make ideas of reason useless, no more than ideals. Quite the contrary, it provides distance to "normal" knowledge and practice and in this way provides impetus for approximating their intent in ways that are critically reflected, systematic, and arguable. This is precisely the kind of use that we had in mind when in a previous essay of this series (see Ulrich, 2014b), we explored the "approximation" of general ideas through what we first described as a "double movement of critical thought" and then understood as a "cycle of critical contextualization," that is, a process of systematic clarification of contextual assumptions by means of iterative decontextualization (or universalization) and (re-)contextualization (or specification) of the assumptions and implications of claims.

At the end of this examination of the notions of brahman, atman, and jagat, we can thus note that we have encountered similar intentions as well as similar limitations among Upanishadic and Kantian ideas. From a methodological rather than metaphysical or religious perspective, none of these ideas is adequately understood if we take them to guide us to secure knowledge and rational practice. Neither certainty of knowledge nor of rationality of practice is within their reach. They nevertheless retain an indispensable role for reason, in that they offer us a deeper understanding of the limitations of human knowledge, thought, and practice and thus can also guide us in dealing systematically with these limitations. There is a deep affinity between Upanishadic and Kantian ideas in this respect: they touch upon ultimate limitations and challenges of the human quest for understanding the world we live in and for improving our lives. Therein I locate their shared, lasting relevance for our epoch, and the reason why they continue to fascinate so many people world-wide.

In the continuation of this exploration, in two subsequent Bimonthlies, we will first illustrate the analysis made thus far by applying it to a major Upanishadic text, and subsequently will situate the understanding gained of the three core concepts of brahman, atman and jagat within our developing framework of critical pragmatism. As this is the last Bimonthly essay of the year, I take the opportunity to thank you for visiting my site and following thies series of essays, and to wish you and your families a happy end of the year.

[WEITER, ev. hier abbrechen mit Hinweis auf nächsten Teil]

SOME CONCLUSIONS FOR END OF ISHA-DISCUSSION (OR ENTIRE SERIES)

Reflective practice remains key: The quest for reflective inquiry and practice cannot do without general ideas such as the systems idea, the moral idea; and the guarantor idea, even though (or better, precisely because) they inevitably point beyond the limitations of our universes of discourse. We would, however, misunderstand them if, in the terms of our earlier discussions of argumentation theory (see esp. Ulrich, 2009d), we would employ them as inference-licences for claiming knowledge and rationality beyond the limits of our contextual assumptions. As the Upanishads remind us, the universalizing thrust of such ideas must not have us forget about the jagat-like, selective and unstable nature of all we can think and say about this world of ours, and thus also about the precarious nature of all references to general ideas and the claims we can thus support. Yet at the same time we have nuderstood that when it comes to acting rationally and responsibly in this world of ours, we cannot think and judge properly without reference to general ideas either.

To err is human: practice shows that all too often we do indeed forget the jagat-like nature of our frameworks or in any case tend to take the resulting narratives and claims for granted, as it is so convenient to presuppose we are right and the others are wrong. Thus ignored or taken for granted, our narratives and claims indeed risk becoming sources of error. For example, the findings and conclusions we stipulate risk to distort our view of situations; the notions of rationality and improvement and on which we rely risk to become sources of inadequate practice; and the assumed universes of discourse risk to exclude people who may be affected by those findings, conclusions, and claims to rationality. The Upanishadic sages had a deep understanding of the situation, different as their language, imagery, and concerns were from those of the world we lived in today. We may still learn from them. We might still try to practice Upanishadic reflection.

Towards Upanishadic reflection: In Upanishadic terms (with suggested Western terms added in parentheses), no notion of jagat (an individual's ongoing framing and reframing of the world, i.e., relevant contexts of reflection and action) will ever do justice to brahman (the projected or envisioned notion of objective and complete reality that ideally would furnish the overall context of reflection and action), as little as to atman (the individual's own deep subjectivity). In the methodological terms of the "critical pragmatism" that I advocate (my short label for critically-contextualist pragmatism), it is precisely when it comes to the pursuit of well-understood objectivity that overt and self-reflecting subjectivity is key: in a critically arguable notion of "good" practice, the subjective (perspectival, contextual, pragmatic) and the objective (impartial, universal, good) come together in one and the same notion of rational practice, "without a second." There is no objectivity in any serious sense that would not take into account the subjective side of things. Subjectivity is part of the human condition and permeates it throughout, due to the contextual nature of all human knowledge and volition. It thus is also part of all real-world practice of thought, inquiry, and action. The question is only how deep, in each and all specific contexts of thought, inquiry, or action, our understanding of its sources and implications reaches. For objectivity-taken-seriously, there is no way round finding ideas and methods conducive to reconciling different perspectives and contextual assumptions, in ways that are intersubjectively shareable and arguable. Which brings us back to the central theme of this series of articles, the notion of "critical contextualism" and its core underlying idea – that the way to bring more reason into this world is by learning to manage the perennial tension between the contextual and the universal in all human thought and practice.

Seventh intermediate reflection:
The example of the Isha Upanishad, or:
A professional's Upanishadic wisdom

The example of the Isha Upanishad  To illustrate the suggested understanding of jagat and to discuss the way it relates to our understanding of brahman and atman, so as to possibly identify in the depth of Upanishadic wisdom some ideas and methods that would be conducive to critically contextualist practice, I propose we turn to what may be its most famous occurrence in all the ancient Indian scriptures, namely, in the first verse of the Isha Upanishad (also called the Ishavasya or Vagasaneyi-Samhita Upanishad, the latter name being the one used in Müller's translation of 1879). It is, to my knowledge, the only occurrence where it plays a major role in the Upanishads. But this one occurrence is considered so important that Mahatma Gandhi once famously remarked about it: "If all the Upanishads and all the other scriptures happened all of a sudden to be reduced to ashes, and if only the first verse in the Ishopanishad [= Isha Upanishad] were left in the memory of the Hindus, Hinduism would live for ever." (Easwaran, 2007, p. 53)

Transliteration and translation  Here is this famous verse, first in Sanskrit language and Devanagari script:

(Source: Wikisource.org )

Transliterated to Roman script:

om isa vasyamidam sarvam yatkincha jagatyam jagat
tena tyaktena bhunjitha ma grdhah kasyasviddhanam

Source: http://www.swargarohan.org/isavasya/01 (cf. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isha_Upanishad)

or to phonetic script as used in this essay:

om isha vasyam idam sarvam yat kim ca jagatyaam jagat,
tena tyaktena bhunjitha maa griddham kasya svid dhanam

(adapted from: http://sanskrit-texts.blogspot.ch/2006/05/isha-upanishad.html )

Note: Experience with the earlier listed Sanskrit dictionaries suggests to me that dropping the letters in brackets and separating some of the compound words, as indicated in the following rendering, may occasionally help in finding relevant dictionary entries:

om is[h]a va[a]sya[m] ida[m] sarva[m] yat kim ca jagatya[am] jagat,
tena tyaktena bhunjit[h]a ma[a] gr[i]ddha[m] kasya svid dhana[m]

and hence, simplified:

om isa vasya ida sarva yat kim ca jagatya jagat,
tena tyaktena bhunjita ma grddha kasya svid dhana

To make sure we do not rely on any of the available translations without a proper understanding of its possible bias or (to some extent inevitable) arbitrariness in the sense that there are options, I will this time translate this verse from the ground up, as it were, by having us gain an overview of the multiple meanings of all the Sanskrit terms involved before choosing any specific translation. Here is a list of the major meanings of all terms, compiled from the Sanskrit dictionaries mentioned at the outset in the "Sources" box (see the Legend at the end of the list for the short references used):

om = mystical utterance during meditation, holy word that signifies brahman

isha (or isa, isah) = originally: possessing strength, completely mastering, acting like a master, being master or lord of; being capable, powerful, supreme, owning; a master, speaker, author; speech, utterance, words; later also: supreme being, supreme spirit, personified as the Lord, the highest self (A393; MW169,2)

vasya[m] = to be covered, clothed or enveloped in, pervaded by, dwelling in (A1421, cf. 141)

ida[m] = known, present; this earthly world, this universe; this, here (MW165,3; A383)

sarva[m] = all, every, any; whole, entire; complete; [with negation] not any, none (A1655; B7-084; B/addenda 360.1; also see Olivelle, 1996, p. 297 note 4.9-10); hence the Upanishadic formula: sarvam idam brahma = "this whole world is brahman" = all [this world] is ultimately one

yat kim ca (or yatki kim ca) = what further, whatsoever, whatever aligns itself or joins; composed of kim= what? how? whether? etc. (indicating a question mode), ca= further, and also, as well as, moreover (B2-065 and 2-202f, MW282,3), and yat= to join, unite, bring into order, align oneself (in Vedic use; otherwise also = to endeavor, strife after, be eager or anxious for) (B5-119; A1299)

jagatya[am] = in the jagats, [moving] in this world, on earth (A408,1; B2-246f)

jagat = world, moving, movable, locomotive, living; that which moves or is alive, is in everybody's sight, air, wind, earth; this world; heaven and the lower world, the worlds, the universe; people, mankind; a field [of plants], site [of a house], etc.; (MW408,1; A720; B2-246; cf. Table 2)

tena = so, therefore; thus, in that manner, in that direction; on that account, for that reason (B3-042; Mac112, MW454,3 and 455,1)

tyaktena = renouncing this, it, composed of tyakt = to derelict, abandon, leave, and ena, in Vedic use = [a course, way] to be obtained (A5, Mac112)

bhunjitha (or bhujitha) = to enjoy, indulge, from bhuj = to enjoy , embrace, use , possess, consume; to make use of , utilize , exploit, govern (MW759,2; Mac203) and jita = won , acquired, conquered, subdued; overcome or enslaved by, "under the dominion of lust; given up , discontinued (MW420,3)

ma = a particle of prohibition or negation: "no," "not," "don't,""be not," "let there not be"; that not, lest, may it not be; "and not," "nor" (MW 804,1f); also 1st person pron. basis (cf. "me"); time; poison; a magic formula (MW 771,1f); moon, measure, authority, light, knowledge, binding, fettering, tying, death (Wil630); disturbing (B/addenda 287.3)

grddha = desirous of , eagerly longing for (MW361,2)

kasya = whose? composed of ka- = interrogative particle (cf. kim, under yat kim ca), often in connection with svid) and sya = 3rd person pron. basis (MW240,2f; MW1273,1)

svid = (a particle of interrogation or inquiry, often implying 'doubt' or 'surprise', and translatable by "'[what/who] do you think?,"'can it be?", indeed?; also rendering a preceding interrogative indefinite, e.g. "whoever," "whatever," "any [one]," "anywhere" (A1743; MW1284,3)

dhana[m] = prize [of a context, or contest itself, a thing raced for, etc.]; wealth, riches, movable property, treasure, capital (MW508,2; B3-140; property of any description, thing, substance, wealth (Wil436)

Legend: The sources of translation are indicated for each word by the following short references: A =Apte, 1965/2008; B = Böthlingk and Schmidt, 1879/1928; Mac = Macdonell, 1929; MW = Monier-Williams, 1899 (often usefully searched via Monier-Williams et al., 2008); and Wil = Wilson, 1819/2011. The short references are followed by page numbers and, in the case of MW, with column numbers added after a comma. Page numbers are useful for searching the scanned, original layout editions that are now in the public domain and available online of most dictionaries, as listed in the References section of this essay.

Discussion (1): The religious bent of the prevailing translations  In Müller's (1879, pp. 311-320) original translation, this yielded the following text:

All this, whatsoever that moves on earth
        is to be hidden in the Lord (Self).
When thou hast surrendered all this,
        then thou mayest enjoy.
        Do not covet the wealth of any man.

        (Isha, 1.1, as transl. by Müller, 1879, p. 311; line-breaks and indents added)

In the revised text (Müller and Navlakha, 2000), we find:

All this, whatsoever that moves in this moving universe
         is encompassed by the Self.
When thou hast surrendered all that [i.e., the material wealth],
         and wilt seek not what others [continue to] possess,
         then thou mayest truly enjoy.

         (Isha, 1.1, as transl. by Müller and Navlakha, 2000, p. 17; the brackets are Navlakha's, the indents are mine. Note that the phrase translated "surrendered all that" stands for what in the terms adopted here should read: "surrendered all this [material world].")

The revision represents a clear improvement. While Müller originally translated “jagat” as “whatsoever that moves on earth” and wavered in his translation of “isha” between “the Lord” and “Self,” the revision replaces “earth” by “universe” and drops reference to “the Lord.” This is precisely how I suggest we should understand the two terms. “Universe” and “Self” are more general and neutral terms than references to the Earth and to the Lord. They do not preclude a traditional metaphysical and religious understanding, but they also do not impose it. They thus avoid an unnecessary narrowing down of the possible meaning and significance of the two terms, along with their mistaken reification and with a tendency to religious effusiveness that stands in the way of careful philosophical analysis. Narrowness of interpretation, hasty reification, and religious effusiveness: none of these three prevalent tendencies in the Isha’s reception is warranted as measured by the etymological root meanings we listed.

The historical reception of the Isha, though, has taken a different road. Exemplary for it is Nikhilananda's (1949) translation, the second oldest that I have consulted, which is remarkable for its attempt to draw on Shankaras's commentary of the early 9th century CE, one of the oldest testimony we have of the Isha’s history of reception. Nikhilananda's translation is of particular interest since, as noted earlier, it comes with a literal extract from Shankara’s work and, based on it, with explanations of all the key phrases is uses:

All this – whatever exists in this changing universe –
        should be covered by the Lord.
Protect the Self by renunciation.
        Lust not after any man's wealth.

        (Isha, 1.1, as transl. by Nikhilananda, 1949,  p. 201)

The explanations given are these:

ALL THIS: That is to say, the universe consisting of ever changing names and forms, held together by the law of causation.

SHOULD BE ETC: This universe, from the standpoint of Absolute Reality, is nothing but the Lord. That it is perceived as a material entity is due to ignorance. One should view the universe, through the knowledge of non-duality, as Atman alone.

LORD: He who is the Supreme Lord and the inmost Self of all. He is Brahman and identical with Atman.

PROTECT: That is to say, liberate the Self from the grief, delusion, and other evil traits of samsara in which It has been entangled on account of ignorance. To be attached to matter amounts to killing the Self.

RENUNCIATION: The scripture describes the discipline of renunciation of the longing for offspring, wealth, and the heavenly worlds for him alone who devotes himself entirely to contemplation of the Self as the Lord. Such an aspirant has no further need of worldly duties. It is renunciation that leads to the Knowledge of the Self and protects Its immutability, eternity, and immortality.

LUST NOT ETC: That is to say, a sannyasin [holy man who has vowed renunciation], who has renounced all desires, should not be attached to what he has or long for the property of someone else. Or the sentence may mean that a sannyasisn should not covet wealth at all. For where is the real wealth in the transitory world that he should desire? The illuminated person renounces the illusory names and forms because he regards the whole universe as Atman alone. He does not long for what is unreal.

(Shankara's comments on the Isha, as quoted in Nikhilananda, 1949, p. 201)

Shankara’s comments have clearly been influential, and Nikhilananda’s conforming translation may have contributed to that. All subsequent translations of which I am aware appear to follow Shankara's reading, with the only partial exception of the revised Müller/Navlakha translation. Three examples must suffice:

All this is for habitation by the Lord, whatsoever is individual universe
        of movement in the universal motion.
By that renounced though shouldst enjoy;
        lust not after any man's possession.

        (Isha, 1.1, as transl. by Aurobindo, 1996, pp. 19 and 29, PDF version p. 5;
        my indents)

This whole world is to be dwelt in by the Lord
        whatever living being there is in the world.
So you should eat what has been abandoned;
        and do not covet anyone’s wealth.

         (Isha, 1.1., as transl. by Olivelle, 1996, p. 249)

The Lord is enshrined in the hearts of all.
        The Lord is supreme Reality.
Rejoice in him through renunciation.
        Covet nothing. All belongs to the Lord..

        (Isha, 1.1., as transl. by Easwaran, 2007, p. 57, my indents)

Following Shankara, these translations all have a strikingly theistic bent and moreover, they tend to impose religious obligations and restriction. One must wonder to what extent such a one-sidedly religious reading is warranted by the relevant history of ideas (which unfortunately is poorly documented) and to what extent it must be called arbitrary, a possibility that can be seen positive inasmuch as it leaves the door open for a more philosophical reading.

It seems to me that a predominantly religious reading of the Isha Upanishad may be called authentic in two main respects. The first characterizes all Upanishads, the second is specific to the Isha and a very few other Upanishads.

First, and basically, a mainly religious reading of the Upanishads may be called authentic inasmuch as the Hindu tradition of thought has never distinguished as sharply between philosophy and religion as does "Western" thought. In the West, at latest since Kant's powerful critique of metaphysics, we are accustomed to the idea that expressions of religious faith and mystic experience have their legitimate place in the human quest for meaning and orientation but not in rational inquiry and philosophical argumentation. In India's tradition of thought, today as in the past, there is no such strict separation between religion and philosophy. Both are equally involved in the quest for understanding the meaning of life, perhaps because such understanding is expected to translate into corresponding religious and worldly practices, which then together determine one's karma and prospect for salvation from continuous rebirth (moksha). Given the enormous importance of these ideas for the individual's fate, the prevailing religious reading of the Upanishads, especially (but not only) in their popular reception, becomes understandable. Such understanding does not, however, preclude a more philosophical reading. We can acknowledge the authentic nature of the Isha's religious reception without ignoring its further reaching, philosophical and indeed, emancipatory significance.

Second, and more specifically, the Isha is generally assumed to be one of the oldest Upanishads, due to its traditional Vedic writing style as well as to the circumstance that unlike most other Upanishads, it is part of the Samhitas (the early Mantra portion of the Vedas) rather than of the later Aranyakas (see, e.g., Nikhilananda, 1949, p. 195).²⁴⁾ Accordingly close the Isha remains to the religious language and imagery of the Veda. Only thus may it have had a chance to reach its audience in the first place. How, if not in rather concealed and indirect form, could it have dared at that time, and within the context of the Samhitas, to hint at its epoch's subjugation of individual thought and spirituality under the control of religious doctrine and brahmanic authority? How else could it have encouraged people to start freeing themselves from such subjugation and to dare thinking (asking questions) rather than just believing (practicing worship) – thinking, that is, about those fundamental metaphysical and existential-practical questions that the Upanishads, to all our knowledge, were first to raise in the history of mankind and for which the religious concepts of brahman and atman – and likewise, I would argue, the concept of jagat – were and remain important: What are adequate ways to understand the universe (brahman)? "Who are we, and might have the potential to be, as human individuals (atman)? How should we conceive of our place in this overwhelming world of ours (jagat)?

To be sure, the Isha merely hints at these questions. For the reasons just mentioned, it still could not articulate them more explicitly. The historical development of Vedic consciousness and spirituality, which led from the mantras of the Samhitas, via the doctrines and rules of the Brahmanas and the meditations of the Aranyakas, to the philosophical awakening of the Upanishads, did not happen overnight. But it happened. As one of the oldest Upanishads, the Isha stands at the turning point of this awakening. It marks an early beginning of the Upanishadic "rebellion" against the older focus on religious doctrines and rules of which we have spoken. With this rebellion, a new theme emerged on the Vedic agenda: the rise of spiritual autonomy. Its sibling: the courage to ask philosophical questions, and thus the rise of philosophical reflection.

In conclusion, we have reasons to consider the Isha's historical position and the philosophical significance it gains in that context, along with its popular religious reception. We can examine the former without denying or "renouncing" the latter. We can appreciate the Isha’s richness without taking sides.

Discussion (2): Towards a more philosophical reading  Remarkably, the Isha itself, unlike so many of its translators, does not take sides. It speaks of the tension between "this" and "that" world in the neutral terms of a subject (atman) that grapples with both its self-constructed, limited and unstable, individual universe (jagat) and the larger, total universe that lies before and beyond any individual grasp (brahman). In fact, it does so without any explicit use of the words atman and brahman, which more than the concept of jagat might prompt a one-sidedly religious reading. While it explicitly refers to jagat, a term that has no predominantly religious connotations at all, its references to atman and brahman remain implicit in the talk of "this" and "that" world. So both its theme and its language remain neutral and are as relevant to ordinary life practice and professional practice (including research practice) as they are to religious practice. What a philosophical exclamation mark! The wording of the Isha’s first verse is indeed like a door opener. It opens the door for us and invites us to enter and marvel at the philosophical depth of Upanishadic thought. It lends itself to systematic thought about this world of ours and ways to understand it, no less than to spiritual reflection about that other world beyond it.

Once again we can only admire such careful choice of language, in the Isha no less than in the other Upanishadic texts we already have briefly considered, the Chandogya, the Mundaka, and the invocations to all the Upanishads associated with the Yajur Veda. That which makes the Isa stand out, despite its shared careful wording, is its unique, explicit use of the concept of jagat. The Isha thus manages to bring together the three essential ideas that interest us in this essay – brahman, atman, and jagat – in a neutral manner, as impetus to philosophical reflection and possible methodological development no less than to religious practice or spiritual meditation. The Isha exemplifies what it stipulates: cultivated understanding of reality in terms of multiple and varying universes, which in the end we nevertheless have to understand as one.

The key to a philosophically adequate understanding of the Isha is indeed to be found in the Ishais careful wording itself. I mean its reference, in its first line, to jagatyaam jagat, which literally means "jagat [moving] in the jagats." The phrase is apt to remind us that whatever real-world context or universe of thought and discourse we personally move in at a time, it represents but one of an indefinite number of conceivable options for describing reality as such, which as an all-encompassing reality lies beyond human grasp. In simpler terms, whatever description of reality we rely on, it is bound to be false. It is part of the human condition as we understand it today that all our views of the world, as well as our attempts to understand it and to act properly in it, are very limited, conditioned as they are by the individual universes of which we ourselves are the authors. Our accounts of what is “really” the case, and what might be done about it, tell as much about us as about reality! Consequently, inasmuch as we claim that they represent true and relevant accounts of reality as such, we tend to claim more than what we can safely claim to know or to get right. In Upanishadic terms, we are for ever caught in a lifelong quest for better knowing and understanding our-selves – our inmost, individual Self, the author or creative principle in us that shapes our perceived reality (atman) – no less than for understanding the larger, ultimate reality of which we are a part and which shapes all perceivable reality – the creative principle beyond this world of ours that permeates everything alive and conscious in this world (brahman).

Combining both an Upanishadic and a contemporary reading, the question that interests me (but about which I have found close to nothing in the literature) concerns the methodological significance of the Isha’s reference to jagat. The important point, it seems to me, is that whether we are aware of the situation or not, we cannot avoid presupposing some (for us) (more or less) manageable universe of thought that defines our individual “real world” – the jagat within which our perceptions and concerns move and which accordingly shapes the “facts” and “values” we take to be relevant. To the extent we are not fully aware of the situation (and we usually are not), this assumed “real world” risks to be a source of error and misunderstanding or at least, of a one-sided, because merely partial, understanding of reality. It consequently is also likely to become an obstacle to mutual understanding among people, given that all of us are caught in their own partial universes and thus don’t talk of the same “real world” even when they think they do. From a contemporary perspective, the Isha thus lends itself to a discourse-theoretical understanding, or rather: it calls for it.

Discussion (3): A discourse-theoretical view  We noted above that Indian philosophical thought has traditionally and to this day remained close to its religious and spiritual roots. But there are remarkable exceptions, for example in the form of India's earlier mentioned tradition of linguistic reflection and analysis. It is difficult to see why such linguistic analysis should be inappropriate as applied to the Upanisahds, and it has indeed been done. A similar observation applies to analysis informed by classical or contemporary philosophical conceptions of Western thought. We have already noted that there are some astonishing parallels between Upanishadic and Kantian thought; there are also well-known connections with the thought of later German idealists (e.g., Fichte, Schopenhauer). I now suggest there are equally interesting and relevant connections to be explored with discourse-theoretical conceptions of contemporary practical philosophy and argumentation theory, as we have explored them on earlier occasions (e.g., Ulrich, 2009b, c, d; 2010a, b; 2013a, c).

In discourse-theoretical terms, the Isha's message looks as relevant today as it has probably ever been in the past: whatever particular universe of discourse we take to be meaningful for talking about "this" world of ours (or about the specific concerns that people have in "their" words), we should not confuse it with "that" other universe "without a second" that alone would represent the true and sufficient universe of discourse and which therefore would be the same for everyone ("one only"). This would be the one universe of discourse that in principle everyone would be able to share but which in practice no one of us (i.e., no one of this world) can ever credibly claim to know and master, to have made their own. And yet, if we are to achieve genuine mutual understanding, we must find ways to share our individual worlds, otherwise we risk talking past one another. And further, inasmuch as there are always options for defining the appropriate universe of discourse, we will need some shareable ways of distinguishing between more or less adequate universes of discourse, depending on the specific issues at hand.

A related consideration that is relevant in this context is the difference between discourses on theory and practice or, in Upanishadic terms, between the path of knowledge and the path of action. The path of knowledge needs to abstract from the particular situations in which we find ourselves and must try to establish general (or "theoretical") principles, for example, laws of nature in dealing with natural phenomena, or moral principles in dealing with human affairs). The path of action, by contrast, demands a focus on the specific situation at hand, so as to understand its particular aspects and requirements. There is a tension of focus between theory and practice with which we are all familiar through our own efforts, whether as researchers or practitioners, to bring the two together. Even so, theory and practice need one another. Good theory is known to be conducive to good practice, and good practice entails lessons for good theory. We do not as a rule understand a particular situation of action well unless we know to appreciate it in the light of more general insights and principles as theoretical reasoning affords it, including both theory of nature and theory of morality.

Once again we thus encounter the tension that interests us in this essay, between the universal and the individual (or unique); the general and the particular; the abstract and the concrete; the objective and the subjective; and now also: between the paths of knowledge and of action. The common denominator in terms of which we can understand these various tensions is a basic, unavoidable tension between divergent universes of discourse, informed as they are by different degrees of "theoretical" vs. "practical" orientation.

Discourse-theoretically no less than metaphysically, we are dealing here with two sides of the same coin rather than with a meaningful alternative. The message is that either we find a systematic balance between the universes of discourse involved or else we will fail. The example of discourse ethics comes to mind (see the conclusions drawn in Ulrich, 2013a and c): due to its one-sided focus on the requirements of a discourse theory of morality, it lost sight of the different requirements of discursive moral practice. Shankara (or Shankaracharya), the 8th/9th century Hindu sage and Vedanta scholar, knew better: in his commentary on the Isha, he left no doubts about the conflicting nature of the two paths of knowledge and action but at the same time, he demanded that Upanishadic thinking needs to bring them together. As Swami Nikhilananda, one of the Isha's translators and commentators of our present epoch who tries to take up Shankara's understanding, explains:

We are following the commentary of Shankaracharya, according to whom the path of action and the path of knowledge cannot be pursued by a person at one and the same time. The goal of the former is the attainment of happiness in the relative world, here or hereafter, and the goal of the latter, the realization of Immortality through the knowledge of the identity of Brahman and Atman. But action, if performed following the instructions of the Vedas, ultimately prepares one for the cultivation of knowledge. The Isha Upanishad refers to both disciplines. (Nikhilananda, 1949, p. 195, commenting on the Isha Upanishad)

Both paths, those of action and those of knowledge, can lead us towards illumination (vidya) and redemption (moksha). The path of action, to which belongs the traditional Vedic focus on the practice of religious rituals of worship and sacrifice, and the path of knowledge, which the Upanishads first encourage us to take in the history of the Veda and probably of all human thought, pose different requirements and are not entirely compatible, but they nonetheless also support one another. In the above quote, it is sufficient to replace "person" by "speaker" to make its discourse-theoretical relevance clear: we cannot speak simultaneously about theory and practice, for the universes of knowledge and of action diverge. Discourse on practice, then, needs to work with two types of discourse universes, one representing the path of knowledge and the other, the path of action; or else it will do justice to neither. Again the example of discourse ethics is helpful: it pursues the path of knowledge so one-sidedly that in the end, it not only fails to be practicable but it also fails to inform us about the nature of moral practice. What is the merit of a moral theory that does not inform us about moral practice?

I find a similar consideration regarding the relationship of theory and practice in the work of J. Dash (2011). It relates to the Bhagavad Gita rather than to the Upanishads, but since both collections of sacred texts belong to the Vedanta, I trust it is not entirely mistaken to consider it here. Dash analyzes the Gita from a language-analytical perspective that is quite relevant for a discourse-theoretical approach, although his focus is on individual learning and growth rather than on intersubjective discourse. Interestingly, the language-analytical problem of how adequate predication of grammatical subjects is possible for practical or pragmatic ends – or, in the terms of the present essay, how practical statements or proposals need to be formulated so as to be meaningful and valid – leads him to a notion of rational practice that appears to be quite compatible with that of my work on critical systems heuristics and on critical pragmatism. In both approaches, a crucial requirement of good practice consists in a "wide and intelligent grasp of the context" (J. Dash, 2011, p. 114). Pragmatic excellence (or "performance"), as Dash puts it succinctly, depends on a quest for awareness (or "knowledge") of general aspects and principles that always reaches beyond what one already grasps, that is, in my terms, the universe of discourse one masters. It thus requires a sustained intellectual effort and, as I am tempted to add, a conforming discursive effort:

One's efforts to achieve results, better than the last time, will contribute to a progressive transcendence of one's earlier grasp. This leads to gradual growth of one's skill and expertise, and consequently, to a continuous progressive elimination of one's instinctive narrowness (amanitvam) and to a resultant expansion of the sweep of the intellect (buddhi-visuddhi) and sharpness of focus. (J. Dash, 2011, p. 114f)

Pragmatic excellence, that is, depends on our adequate handling of the eternal tension between the particular ("one's instinctive narrowness," or in my reading: the insufficiently reflected limitations of one's self-constructed jagat) and the general ("a progressive elimination of one's instinctive narrowness," through a "progressive transcendence of one's earlier grasp"). Language-analytically speaking, this tension mirrors itself in the words we use to speak about practice, that is, in the more or less accurate and conclusive ways in which we employ "universals" (i.e., qualities that a class of particulars have in common and which insofar are "general") for "predicating" (describing) particulars (specific grammatical subjects). We cannot avoid employing universals for describing and identifying particulars, but we can handle the resulting tension between particular subjects and general descriptions more or less carefully. Discourse-theoretically speaking, we are called upon to surface the changing discourse universes we presuppose and to maintain the tension between them, rather than to blur their differences or even to conceal their conflicting nature. Only thus can our claims be accurate and conclusive; accurate, that is, with respect to the particulars to which they refer, and conclusive with respect to their generalizing thrust (their supposed validity for all comparable cases or situations). The philosophical methods that Dash foresees for bringing about or analyzing such accuracy and conclusiveness are epistemology (the theory of inquiry) and logic (the theory of inferences, and in my reading also argumentation theory along the lines of Toulmin, 2003). As I see it, these two methods come together in discourse theory (the theory of conclusive discourse, with its two main variants of theoretical and practical discourses). It follows that philosophical methods of analysis such as language analysis, epistemology, and logic, and in my reading also argumentation theory and discourse theory, all have a legitimate role to play in grasping the message of the Vedanta scriptures:

The philosophical method, which culminates in achievement of a clear grasp of the [nature and implications] of conclusive excellence, is the logico-epistemic analysis of statements in use. (J. Dash, 2011, p. 116)

The essential message of both a language-analytical and a discourse-theoretical perspective, as the two philosophical methods on which we focus here, is that there always is a human author (or speaker) behind any description of what is the case or what conclusions ought to be drawn from it. But human authorship is always caught in the tension between the general and the particular. Language-analytically speaking, the class of particulars one can accurately predicate is never all-inclusive, due not only to limited epistemological reach of human awareness but also to logical impossibility (the all-inclusive is a totality that is unique, so that no predication is possible at all). Discourse-theoretically speaking, the meaning and validity of any claim is bound by the speaker's universe of discourse, that is, by the particular contextual assumptions that inform the speaker's relevant "facts" (observations) and "values" (concerns) and related arguments.

In sum, we are always in danger of claiming too much. People may be doing better or worse in this regard, but there are epistemological and logical difficulties that not even the most sincere effort can overcome. Even so our claims, and the arguments we use to support them, cannot help but assume that we can overcome them, which in practice means that we always tend to formulate them as if we could indeed argue them conclusively. For example, in real-world practice of inquiry and decision-making, the situation regularly causes the consulting experts, interested parties, and responsible decision-makers, who all need to convince the other parties that they are able and do their best to ensure rational action – "rational" for all, that is – to claim too much. They achieve this by, let's say, not trying all too hard to lay open in full detail the ways their claims are conditioned by a particular universe of discourse, nor do they invest too much effort in making sure everyone understands what that means in terms of whose problem will ultimately be tackled and whose not, and likewise, whose rationality will define the solution and whose not. So they end up, more or less consciously, with observations and arguments, judgments of fact and value, and proposals for improvement, that all fail to sufficiently specify and limit the validity claims involved.

Claiming too much is, unfortunately, very easy. (Ulrich, 2000, p. 264) People do it all the time, whether they are engaged in everyday practice or in professional practice or in public action (exercising their political rights, working in the public service, engaging in citizens’ movements, etc.). The only way to control or at least minimize this danger is by making sure that everyone's claims, except perhaps within a purely private realm, are subject to careful scrutiny. Beginning with our own claims, we can make it a habit to explicitly and carefully qualify the real-world contexts for which they are meant to be meaningful and valid, and then to limit the claims accordingly. When however we face others who appear to claim too much (and chances are they do), there is no way round developing adequate discursive tools and skills by which those failing to properly limit their claims can be convicted of claiming too much. Models of discourse are needed to this end which are simple enough to be accessible to ordinary people, yet are stringent enough to support compelling critical argumentation. A crucial point of attack, the Isha suggests to me, should be seen in the way we handle the co-existence of divergent universes of discourse.

The art of not claiming too much  We might then see in the Isha Upanishad an early testimony of how the ancient Indian sages understood the art of not claiming too much. It requires, in our present terms, an effort of attending to the limited nature of the universes of discourse on which we rely at any moment. It requires an on-going determination to lay open this limited nature to everyone concerned, and to adapt one's claims and actions so that those concerned can still agree. It's an effort that demands, and admits of, systematic training. It therefore leads to a discipline of carefully delimiting and declaring the universes of discourse within which we move, our changing "jagats." The task of developing such a discipline is a central concern of my work on critical systems heuristics (CSH). I will not enter upon this topic in any detail here, as introductory accounts can be found elsewhere (see, e.g., Ulrich, 1987, p. 281f, 1993, pp. 599-605; 2000, pp. 257-260; and for more extensive philosophical discussion, Ulrich, 1983, Ch. 5, esp. pp. 301-310). I just mention it to point out that conceptual frameworks and tools to support this discipline can be, and indeed have been, developed.

In such a framework, the Isha's call for "renunciation" acquires a meaning that is quite different from its normal, religiously motivated understanding. Its secular implication is not at all a life of "renouncement" in the sense of the quoted translations (i.e., of giving up or "surrendering" enjoyment or even suffering deprivation). It is, rather, a self-reflecting and self-limiting stance regarding the ways we pursue and argue our aims and concerns in life and handle our related claims. What the Isha really asks us to "renounce" is the constant temptation of claiming too much, by not adequately qualifying and limiting our claims with respect to what they presuppose and what consequences they may have for others. Such "renunciation" does not demand that we free ourselves from natural, existential needs for food and shelter, and perhaps also for a little bit of safety and comfort in life, but only that we overcome the very prevalent lack of reflection and responsibility to which Kant (1793, B157f) would refer as a lack of "enlarged thought," a failure to always look at things from the perspective of others and to care about how they might have to bear the consequences of this failure. There is, then, both a reflective methodological side and an intrinsic moral side to a thus conceived, discursive orientation of rational practice. "Intrinsic" because we do not just arbitrarily "add" a moral touch to this notion of rational practice: that we should not claim too much is indeed an intrinsically moral side of rational practice, in that our claims tend to affect people who, without being asked, will have to live with the consequences. Morally as well as methodologically speaking, the notion that anyone ought to suffer and live a life of deprivation before things can get better makes no sense and is dispensable in such a secular rather than religious framework. On the contrary, with a view to becoming competent speakers and agents we will all do well to engage in real-world practice and learning and getting to know the world – living life to the full, that is – so as to develop a rich sense of reality and to cultivate the essential skills of careful observation (perception), critical thought (inference), and attentive communication (testimony), along with a keen moral awareness and attitude of caring (in parentheses, I have added the respective Upanishadic sources of knowledge mentioned earlier).

Upanishadic discourse  An Upanishadic notion of good and rational discourse, then, involves self-restraint motivated and controlled by a quest for inner awareness and mutual understanding, along with faith in and caring about the people involved or affected. It will seek to understand and reconcile people's differing concerns before and as a condition of claiming rationality for any specific views or proposals. In such a reconciliatory stance resides, from an Upanishadic point of view, the real power of discursive practice. Remember the earlier-quoted verse from the Chandogya:

The act done with knowledge, with inner awareness and faith, grows in power.

(Chandogya, 1.1.10, as transl. by Easwaran, 2007, p. 125)

The Isha and the Chandogya meet in their shared understanding of knowledge as a moral stance. From a secular rather than religious perspective, both can be read as pleas for a balanced life of activity and enjoyment, theoretical reflection and practical engagement, rather than just "renouncement." Nagler (2007) captures the point well, in words that fit our discussion here, although he articulates them in a slightly different context of discussing the Katha Upanishad's central value of nonviolence, that is, of resolving differences of views and values on the basis of self-controlled efforts of reason and discourse rather than of other-controlled power and doctrines (my terms):

One of the critical "secrets" of the Upanishads is that renunciation is the opposite of deprivation. When the senses (indryas) are untrained they run wild, leading to a state of conditioning that is the opposite of freedom (Katha 1.1.5.-6). Joy comes from putting faculties back on track under the guidance of the Self. This is precisely why the Upanishads teach renunciation. Not only are joy and renunciation not contradictory; they positively require each other. Taken together they form the key value of Hinduism, as Mahatma Gandhi taught us when he took for his own mahavakya [=magic formula] those three opening words of the Isha Upanishad: tena tyaktena bhunjitha, "Renounce and enjoy." (Nagler, 2007, p. 321f, italics on other than Sanskrit words and explanation in brackets added)

A final thought on the Isha and on my experience of reading it  Through an idea history that unfortunately is poorly documented, the Isha's Upanishadic core theme of striking a balance between "this" and "that" world, so as to allow them to "become one" in our minds as a source of critical reflection and right thinking, has historically been turned into a call for renunciation rather than reconciliation. As far as I can see and judge from countless hours of working with Sanskrit dictionaries and studying diverse translations of the Isha, along with learned commentaries on the Upanishads, an adequate secular translation and commented interpretation of these sources of ancient wisdom is sadly missing today. It seems to me that the presently available, religiously oriented translations obscure the Upanishads' message and relevance to us today, rather than clarifying it and making it widely accessible.

Specifically regarding the Isha's first verse, my impression is that neither its specific wording nor the larger Upanishadic context to which it belongs require such a narrowly religious reading as I have encountered it throughout, with relatively minor variations. Even Müller and Navlakha (2000) do not entirely avoid the trap in their careful translation of the Isha's first verse (as quoted above). While all translations except Easwaran's are correct in predicating idam sarvam (this world of ours) with the key phrase jagatyaam jagat (is moving in this moving universe), Müller and Navlakha are the only translators who subsequently avoid translating the further predication of idam sarvam with isha vasyam as intending the one-sidedly theist meaning of being "inhabited (or dwelt in) by the Lord" (Aurobindo's and Olivelle's translations) or "hidden in the Lord (Self)" (Müller's original translation). I do not find Müller and Navlakha's alternative translation by means of the formula "is encompassed by the Self" particularly clear, much less the best I could imagine from a discourse-theoretical perspective; but at least it avoids a narrowly religious predication. It leaves the door open for a secular and philosophical reading, according to which this first verse of the Isha basically just states that (in my terms) "this" world of ours is always "shaped by its author, the individual Self." Whether or to what extent the author is to be identified with atman or with brahman or even with a personified God, or else simply with a human speaker or agent, remains then left to the reader and can be decided depending on the context, and this is good so. Given the etymological root meanings of the word isha as "possessing strength" or "mastering" or "owning" something, or being a "master, speaker, author," I cannot see why such a less one-sidedly religious translation should be arbitrary or inaccurate: On the contrary, it seems to me rather more accurate and in any case less arbitrary than any narrow reference to a personal God along the lines of the Christian, Biblical God ("the Lord"). The overall result of such a less narrow reading, too, makes perfect sense: the verse then amounts to admonishing us that all we may perceive as this world of ours and can say about it is just an unstable and fragmentary universe of discourse (or jagat) that we construct four ourselves, but which we should never confuse with that other reality behind and beyond it that would amount to the proper universe of discourse. From a discourse-theoretical perspective, such a translation hits the nail on its head; but it also leaves open a more religious reading to those who prefer.

So far, so good. But then, Müller and Navlakha go on and mistranslate the message captured in the last crucial term, tyaktena (a composite term consisting of the etymological root terms tyakt = "to derelict, abandon, leave" and ena = "[a course, way] to be obtained") as a mere call to "surrender [material wealth]." While they are careful enough to point out, by using brackets, that the reference to "material wealth" is added by them rather than being original, they apparently found no better English term than "surrender" for expressing the Isha's demand for self-restraint and not claiming too much, tyaktena. Similarly, Nikhilananda's and Aurobindo's earlier-cited translations call for "renouncement" and Olivelle's for "abandonment" of others' "wealth" or "possessions." It seems to me that such translations obscure the Isha's profound and multi-faceted wisdom rather than expressing it in a way that would provide room and impetus for different strands of thought, as well as for relating it to our present epoch. The Isha thus appears to boil down (or at least risks being misunderstood thus) to a mere call for religious devotion and yes, for "surrender," rather than for autonomous and critical thinking. Genuine thinking never surrenders to any other demand than its own intrinsic demands of critical reason. Nor must it ever surrender to any external authority, not even a brahmanic authority. It has no choice but insisting on its autonomy, which includes its right to rebel and say "no," perhaps even to provoke rather than to surrender – an insight that stands at the beginning of the Upanishads history of ideas, which for the rest lays largely in the dark (but so much we know because if it were otherwise, the Upanishads would not exist).

In looking back and reflecting on my reading experience with the Upanishadic texts, I cannot help thinking of Martin Heidegger's thought-provoking account of what thinking has the potential to be:

Thinking is thinking when it answers to what is most thought-provoking. In our thought-provoking time, what is most thought-provoking shows itself in the fact that we are still not thinking. (Heidegger, 1968, p. 28).

It may be time for a new reception of that ancient first verse of the Isha, one that would be more thought-provoking and thereby more faithful to the spirit of the Upanishads. Such a translation would need to leave room for multiple, richer and less one-sided readings and translations than those prevailing today. And for interpretations that would surely also be more immediately relevant to our contemporary human condition, and thereby more accessible to contemporary readers. All this and more stands to be gained; it should be done.

To be sure, my sketch of a discourse-theoretical reading hints at just one of many conceivable options to be pursued for a contemporary reception. I am thinking of the huge diversity of contemporary philosophical strands that might serve as sources of interpretation and discussion. Likewise, it might be stimulating to try and analyze the Upanishads in the light of different practical and cultural or institutional contexts, ranging from professional to organizational, managerial and political contexts, all of which might benefit from engaging in "Upanishadic discourse."

The potential for a more contemporary reception looks huge indeed. If I have not been able to provide more than a hint at it, it is that I am all too well aware of the limitations of my preparation for the job. They make it clear to me that I need to leave such work to the specialists, in particular, to linguists and discourse theorists steeped in Sanskrit, together with scholars of Upanishadic thought. Or is such self-restraint perhaps entirely mistaken, as the Upanishads are too important to be left to the specialists? Or conversely, are possibly even the few conjectures that I have been able to offer already too much and imprudent, in that the only way to be faithful to the Upanishadic spirit (and in any case to be on the safe side) would have been to remain silent, if not withdrawing to the forest?

I suspect that as an author coming from the worlds of Kant and of contemporary practical philosophy, along with social science and systems methodology, and having moreover only just begun to discover and explore a new and bewildering land of thought, I may have tended to be somewhat quick and effusive in writing home about my first impressions. I am hardly called upon to say what is the correct reading of the Isha, if there is any such thing in the first place (a claim I would rather tend to challenge). I might indeed have better been silent or gone to the forest. (My very insufficient excuses are that silence does not lend itself well to writing as a way of communicating with others, and that moreover I still have my little office at home rather than in the neighboring forest.) Perhaps I am moving on firmer ground, however, when I express my belief that from a Western perspective, it is truly regrettable that the contemporary, secular relevance of Upanishadic thought (or at least its potential for having such relevance) has remained and risks remaining largely unrecognized and underestimated in the West, due to a reception that seems to presuppose a spiritual life of year-long meditation, religious devotion and renouncement of secular concerns as a condition for adequate understanding. To speak with Aristotle (1985) and Santayana (1905/06), I can see no reason why Upanishadic thought should not be considered compatible with, and indeed conducive to, a secular life of reason, and to practical engagement with the world that would be guided by it.

The notion of "Upanishadic discourse" proposed above might provide some impetus for change in this direction, in favor of some new and fresh, rationally and methodologically rather than spiritually and religiously oriented interpretations. This is not to deny everyone's right to see in the Upanishads a source of personal spirituality. Spirituality is an important resource, also in the West, where we probably have a shortage of it these days. But spirituality alone is philosophically and methodologically insufficient. A life of reason is not conceivable without the kind of discipline of thought and method to which I have variously referred, if only in passing.

The professional's Isha  In conclusion, with a view to a philosophical rather than religious understanding and also to my particular interest in the theme of professional competence, I would like to try and propose a professional's reading of the Isha. It would read the first verse of the Isha Upanishad along the following lines:

(1) From a secular perspective, that which the Isha invites us to "renounce" or avoid is not living life to the full but rather, the presumption of knowledge and understanding that results from lacking awareness of the particular universe of thought and action within which each of us moves at any time, and of the way it conditions and limits the meaning and validity of our claims.

(2) A basic and frequent form that the presumption of knowledge takes is that of claiming too much. Claiming more than we can justify is wide-spread among professionals; its characteristic form is that of overgeneralizing, that is, arguing (and apparently justifying) claims in terms of general ideas without declaring their precise, limited range of application in the situation at hand. Such overgeneralizing is particularly easy when one's professional status of authority or expertise lets such claims remain unchallenged. It happens whenever professionals either are unaware of the limited contexts to which their claims apply (i.e., for which they are both meaningful and valid) or else, as is often the case, deliberately conceal them behind a facade of expertise and routine.

(3) Since any such presumption of knowledge or expertise is inimical to sound professional inquiry and responsible action – and to reflective practice quite generally – it is important that professionals be careful and reflective about the specific universe of discourse within they move in every specific situation. In Upanishadic terms, it is vital that they carefully reflect on and overtly declare the specific jagat that in any situation shapes their professional "findings" and "conclusions," their "facts" and "values," and their notions of the "larger systems" of concern and of the total universe of options for defining the reference systems of their "rationality."

(4) It is by recognizing the particular rather than general nature any assumed universe of discourse, along with the ways one's "facts" and "values" depend on them and in turn condition their claims, that professionals will get closer to grasping the universe of people's multiple realities (the total universe of discourse).

(5) Although comprehensive knowledge and understanding is beyond human achievement, recognizing the limited nature of one's universe of discourse and action is not. This provides the rationale and starting point for developing an Upanishadic discipline of self-limiting reflection and discourse on professional practice.

Here, then, is my proposed "professional" reading of the Isha's first verse:

Eighth intermediate reflection:
A language-analytical perspective

Readers may wonder (and they should) whether the suggested, secular and discursive reading of the Upanishads from a professional's point of view has anything to do with their "true" (authentic) meaning or is rather just a kind of wishful thinking, of seeking in the Upanishads some support for my own ideas which isn't really there. As a matter of principle, it is always a legitimate question whether anyone can credibly claim today, some 2,500 later, what the authors of these ancient scriptures meant to tell their contemporaries. I have accordingly emphasized the tentative and personal nature of my reading, out of the conviction that nobody has a monopoly of interpretation and that in fact, the age of these texts demands rather than forbids attempts of contemporary, secular interpretation.

Still, I agree there are traps involved in any such attempt unless it is supported by some competent advice, that is, by scholars who are more familiar than I am with the bewildering land of Hindu philosophy. Lacking familiarity is both a chance and a risk – it allows us to approach a tradition in a free and unprejudiced manner, but it also may lead us astray. As always, it's the right combination that matters, the striking of a sound balance between one's own authentic thought (i.e., thought that is issue driven rather than convention driven and in this sense is autonomous) and respect for an authentic reception of the bequeathed meaning of such old texts. I am fortunate to have the advice of an appreciate colleague of Indian origin, D.P. Dash (2013a-d, subsequently also simply called DP), who has many years of reading and discussing the Upanishadic texts in his own family. In fact, this present essay has partly been inspired by exchanges that I have had with him on the topic of Eastern thought for some two years now, beginning originally with a shared reading and subsequent discussion of Hesse's (1951) Siddhartha (a novel on the life of Gautama, viz. Buddha) and soon thereafter turning to the Vedanta tradition of thought. Our discussion eventually (among other aspects) focused on the language-analytical tradition of India, which offers a badly needed alternative to a merely spiritual and esoteric reading of the old texts. It was in this context, if I remember correctly, that DP first drew my attention to a concept that captured my interest particularly, the concept of jagat. As DP wrote to me at that time (and I have already quoted part of his remark earlier in this essay):

In Sanskrit, one of the words for the universe is jagat – everything that is in movement, is undergoing variation, is in flux, especially in the sense that no fixed description of it will ever be correct. Thus, it is posed as an intellectual challenge: How are we to talk about jagat – the variable and moving perceptual field that surrounds us? (Dash, 2013a, italics added)

This is indeed the essential question that interests me as a result of my excursion into ancient Indian wisdom: How are we to talk about jagat? I have proposed above that one way to do this is by taking a discourse-theoretical approach, and I have rather freely tried my hands at such an approach from a secular and professional point of view. DP and I agree, however, that a serious study of the question must reach deeper and indeed might need to go back to the language-analytical tradition in India that starts with Panini's Ashtadhyayi, the earlier-mentioned Sanskrit grammar from approximately the 5th century BCE that figures as the hallmark of that tradition and is still used today.

By a "language-analytical" approach I understand a perspective, again in agreement with my colleague, that is careful and explicit about the ways it uses words and sentences to communicate ideas. Such an approach has happily been gaining ground among Indian Vedanta scholars in recent decades; compare, in particular, Misra (1990); Matilal (1991, 1998, 2002; 2005); Mohanty (1992, 2000); Ganeri (1999, 2001); and J. Dash (2011); with special regard for logical and epistemological issues, also see Phillips (1996 and 2011). I have consulted all these writings, to various extents, so as to gain a first-hand impression of the kind of work they embody and also to convince me of the relevance and value of this work. I am indeed impressed by the sophistication and specifically Indian flavor of this work, but it remains an impression that I would not confuse with thorough understanding, given my lacking overview and specific knowledge of that specifically Indian strand of language analysis. It interests me, however, because it might help not only to correct the one-sidedness of the prevailing reception of the Upanishads but also to build a bridge to Western scholars and even to ordinary professionals and lay people interested in learning about them. Further, beyond such "strategic" concerns of scholarship, another fundamental consideration is that philosophical practice by its very aim and nature, unlike religious-spiritual practice and also unlike empirical science, is at bottom always conceptual analysis, that is, analysis that aims to gain a thorough understanding of ideas and the ways we formulate them. Which is precisely what this series of explorative essays on the nature and relevance of general ideas of reason is about.

I have therefore invited DP to contribute to the present essay a short text on the way he would propose to understand and practice (or live) a language-analytical approach to the Upanishads, in the form of a separate "Intermediate Reflection." I am indebted to him for accepting my invitation and offering the following, short text. I have found it meaningful to place it at this stage, before I try to formulate some concluding conjectures about this excursion into ancient Indian ideas.

Towards a language-analytical view of the Upanishads
Contributed by D.P. Dash

[DP, please insert here your thoughts about the nature and relevance of a language-analytical perspective on the Upanishads, in whatever form you find interesting and adequate.]

__

Ninth intermediate reflection:
Universalism and contextualism in ancient Indian thought –
Some concluding conjectures

[DP, for your info: this is a final part that is still uncompleted. I plan to work on it while you are working on your above contribution (hopefully, if you accept my invitation) and to complete it after having your contribution; possibly, lest the present essay get all too long, I'll use it as introductory part of a planned last essay of this series.]

[WEITER WU]

[Previous arg., check form above at the end of intro to brahman:]: brahman is properly understood as a limiting concept, a projected endpoint = "approx." of Kantian ideas of reason, which we embedded in a double or cyclical movement of critical thought--> NOW also with brahman, atman, and jagat --> a cyclical movement of thought that leads from brahman to atman (the second essential idea to which we now turn) and back, and through which the two become one, an integrated conception of (human) reality as atman-brahman. + jagat playing a particular role! [Note, wohl nur noch Endnote:]:There is again an interesting parallel with Kant's thinking here, in this case with his notion of a noumenal (intelligible) world as distinguished from the phenomenal (observable) world. Both pairs of concepts are about our notion of reality. However, while for the Upanishadic thinker brahman is a symbol of the objective that is ineffable but real, Kant's Critique of Reason does not of course permit any reification of the noumenal world; he understands it as a transcendental (i.e., methodological), rather than transcendent (i.e., metaphysical), concept. Kant thus puts the relationship of the noumenal and the phenomenal – of "that" world and "this" world, and indirectly perhaps also of brahman and atman – on its head: it is not the absolute and infinite (and for some, the esoteric) but the empirical and particular (the exoteric) which for Kant constitutes "reality." Even so, the methodological challenge remains the same: also for Kant there is no such thing as a direct access to reality, as the empirical is always already informed by reason's a priori categories and ideas, that is, by our cognitive apparatus. In linguistic terms, we cannot describe and understand particular (empirical) phenomena without reference to universal (ideational, or "noumenal") qualities or principles. [OLD Consequently, it is not this visible world of ours which, as the Upanishads see it, is a projection of brahman but rather, as we said above, brahman is a projected, but as such necessary reference point for human thought. The methodological (rather than metaphysical) issue of how we can hope to know and understand the world and our place in it remains the same./The methodological implication remains the same:

 [Later: We might then understand this cycle of reflection as leading from brahman to atman (the second essential idea to which we now turn) and back, so that the critical throughts they inspire can mutually support one another and can ultimately become one, an integrated critique of claims to knowledge and rationality in the light of as atman-brahman. [/OLD: an integrated conception of (human) reality as atman-brahman.] There is again an interesting parallel with Kant's thinking here, in this case with his notion of a noumenal (intelligible) world as distinguished from the phenomenal (observable) world. Both pairs of concepts are about our notion of reality. However, while for the Upanishadic thinker brahman is a symbol of the objective that is ineffable but real, Kant's Critique of Reason does not of course permit any reification of the noumenal world; he understands it as a transcendental (i.e., methodological), rather than transcendent (i.e., metaphysical), concept. Kant thus puts the relationship of the noumenal and the phenomenal – of "that" world and "this" world, and indirectly perhaps also of brahman and atman – on its head: it is not the absolute and infinite (and for some, the esoteric) but the empirical and particular (the exoteric) which for Kant constitutes "reality," we just cannot describe and understand particular phenomena without reference to universal qualities or principles. Consequently, it is not this visible world of ours which, as the Upanishads see it, is a projection of brahman but rather, as we already noted, brahman is a projected, but as such necessary reference point for human thought. The issue of how we can hope to know and understand the world and our place in it remains the same. ]

[Nur zur Erinnerung hier, für ev. späteren Gebrauch: The pairs of opposites we earlier (in Part 3) considered were those of the particular and the general, the contextual and the universal, or the "situation" and the "larger picture"; we might now add the new pair of atman and brahman. {In particular, we might think of atman and brahman as the two endpoints of a movment of thought that leads back and forth between them, with jagat playing an additional role that will be of particular methodological relevance to us.}]

[NEU ev. nur noch als endnote] Note again an interesting parallel between Upanishadic and Kantian thinking here, in that Kant's opposition of the noumenal (intelligible) world to the phenomenal (observable) world echoes the Upanishadic opposition between "that" and "this" world, as embodied by brahman and atman. In both traditions of throught, we face an ultimately untenable but heuristically (temporarily, as it were) useful opposition, which is why both equally emphasize the need for bringing the two opposites together so as to ensure the "unity of reason" (Kant) and the "unity of brahman and atman" (Upanishads), respectively. In the Upanishads' terms, the quest for unity is a movement (or effort, discipline) of thought through which the two notions of atman and brahman are to become one, an integrated conception of (human) reality as atman-brahman. Both pairs of concepts can thus be said to be about our notion of reality; both admonish us, in their won ways, that the real contains the unreal, the particular the universal. There is no such thing as purely empirical concepts. A generalizing, cognitive element is always already built into all we can perceive, think, and say about the world, only the role of the cognitive element may vary. In language-analytical terms, we cannot describe (or predicate) the particular without involving universals (general categories and the general qualities that define them). Yet precisely such oppositions (between sensory experience and concepts, data and theories, observation and conceptualization, particular and general statements, facts and values, etc.) appear to play a basic role in contemporary theories of knowledge and science, which again suggests that the Upanishads have something to tell us in this regard.

Once again, however, there is also a difference between the trwo traditions of thought that we should not overlook. While for the Upanishadic thinker brahman is a symbol of the universal that is ineffable but nevertheless real, Kant's Critique of Reason does not of course permit any reification of the noumenal world. Accordingly he understands it, as we noted, as a transcendental (i.e., methodological) rather than transcendent (i.e., metaphysical), concept. From an Upanishadic perspective, Kant thus puts the relationship of the noumenal and the phenomenal – of "that" world and "this" world, and indirectly perhaps also of brahman and atman – on its head: it is not the absolute and infinite (and for some, the esoteric) but the empirical and particular (the exoteric) which for Kant constitutes "reality." The importance of the noumenal is a purely methodological one, in that we cannot adequately describe and understand particular phenomena without reference to universal qualities or principles. Consequently, it is not this visible world of ours which, as the Upanishads see it, is a projection of brahman but rather, as we said above, brahman is a projected reference point for human thought, although as such it is indispensable to human reason. The issue of how we can hope to know and understand the world and our place in it remains the same. [end of possible endnote]

Brahman, atman, and jagat, or the importance of "discursive" thought Let us now return to our discussion where we left it, just before introducing the first verse of the Isha. I suggested that from a Western perspective, and more specifically within the context of our present discussion on critical contextualism, we might understand jagat as an argument space that invites us to clarify and reflect upon, in a specific practical context, the ways we frame the relevant situation or universe of discourse and action. The important point, we noted, is the variable character of any such framing – the unavailability of any stable, definitive universe of discourse in the face of an infinite number of conceivable universes of discourse – and, as a consequence, the selectivity and partiality involved in all outcomes of perception, reflection, and discourse, for example, with regard to the "facts" and "values" that are taken to matter. In the terms of the previous essay in this series (Ulrich, 2014b, p. N), jagat is a blank space, a variable or (with Wittgenstein) an argument place that can and needs to be filled in with variable contents; from a critical point of view we have to understand it as an "argument space," a space calling for argumentation (substantiation and critique) as to what ought to be considered the relevant universe of discourse. [Rep./unnötig For example, very often when we find ourselves engaged in a cooperative or controversial process of opinion formation, of problem solving or decision-making, or of practical action, the different parties will tend to see different "facts" and "values" and accordingly will tend to arrive at diverging findings and conclusions – not because the ones are rational and the others are not but simply because they focus on different contexts for judging the issue.]

From a Western perspective, we might thus understand "jagat" as the variable argument space or context of concern within which individual subjects and their perceptions and states of awareness move at any time. Thus understood, jagat stands for a fundamentally – and critically – contextualist notion of ideas such as truth, rationality, and morality, a conception that calls for a systematically discursive approach in the original sense of the Latin verb discurrere, that is, of diverging, moving apart, systematically moving back and forth, in this case, between the two poles of the particular or individual (symbolized by atman) and the general or universal (symbolized by brahman). Etymologically speaking, such a discursive movement lies at the very bottom of the concept of "discourse," that is, systematic thought and argumentation. An ancient-Indian or Vedantic perspective enriches our understanding of the "movement" (or variability, instability) involved in that jagat, as we have interpreted it from a Western perspective, stands for a space and state of awareness that is bound to move between these two unavoidable – Upanishadic and Western – poles of thought: the personal, inner world of atman (the self, particular, and private), and the impersonal, outer world of brahman (the universal, general, and shared). When it comes to reflection on the conditioned nature of any "sight of the world" (i.e., of the relevant space or context), all consequent thought is bound to move towards and between these two opposite vantage points. Only together they capture the totality of all conditions that need to be considered, a totality that is itself unconditioned and thus represents the whole, the absolute, the only conceivable endpoint of all search for understanding.

Engaging in reflection on jagat, then, means basically to reflect on (apparently "given" or taken for granted) contextual assumptions, by systematically examining the way we and everyone else involved or concerned bounds the relevant context. But secondly, beyond such self-reflection, it also means to engage in an active process of searching for options, so as to open and reconstruct the relevant context. An iterative process of expanding and narrowing any (apparently) given context allows us to "see" the contextual assumptions in question differently. How do people's different concerns, and their related "facts" and "values," then look, and how might we consequently need or want to modify the underpinning contextual assumptions?

Such alternation between a generalizing and a specifying thrust of reflection is strongly reminiscent of the double movement of thought that we discussed in Part 3 of this exploration, when we explored the cycle of decontextualization and (re-)contextualization involved in systematic problem exploration (see Fig. 4). At the time of writing that earlier discussion, I had not started to write the present Part 2 and did not anticipate such a parallel with traditional Indian thought. However, there is also a new element that leads beyond our earlier, "Western" analysis of the general in the rational and moral. What I find new and valuable in the ancient-Indian concept of jagat is the way it relates the moving subject's "sight of the world" to the notions of atman and brahman, thus enriching and deepening our view of the double movement of thought to which we referred earlier.

Fig. 5: Atman, jagat, and brahman unfolding universe of discourse
Unfolding one's self-authored universe of discourse:
an "Indian" reading of the double movement of thought (see Fig. 3)

Jagat, the world within which a person moves, is conditioned by her awareness of both atman (self, the universe within) and brahman (cosmos, the universe without). At any moment in a person's development of the "universe within" and engagement with the outer world, the "universe without," jagat reflects the state of awareness that she has reached and the way she situates herself in "this world." The important point is, jagat is the subject's own "realization," a universe of discourse that is not "given" but which every human individual constructs through a constant process of (re-) orientation towards both the inner and the outer world – an "Indian" reading of the "double movement of thought" that we identified in Part 1 (compare Fig. 3).

[A personal interpretation  Of the three types of references to the world that we have associated with jagat, I am particularly interested in the first two, that is, in the notions of jagat as referring to a context of interest (an object of cognition, the observed or narrated world) and an individual's authorship of this context (a subject of cognition, a particular universe of discourse). In my work on CSH I use the concepts of "boundary judgments," "reference system," "context of application" and "boundary critique" (or "boundary discourse") to refer to these or similar issues: it is by boundary judgments that we frame real-world issues of concern and thereby become the authors of the contexts and contents – the "facts" and "values" – considered relevant / we take to be relevant for dealing with this issue.]

{[OLD, orig. Intro to Isha, ev. brauchbar hier] The Upanishadic concept of jagat thus stands for the variable section of this world that at any specific moment, whether consciously or not, we take to represent the relevant universe of discourse and of which we consequently should make ourselves fully aware. By contrast, the two concepts of atman and brahman then stand for the two opposite limiting concepts of such awareness in which the total, and infinite, universe of conceivable jagats (brahman) and we ourselves (with our infinite inner universe) as authors of any specific jagat (atman) would become fully transparent to us – the endpoints of all reflection on jagat that human reason cannot help but envision. As I see it, such an understanding allows us not only to transfer the three ideas back into our discourse on the ethical grounding of practical reason and more specifically, on discourse ethics; it also can help us in understanding what to my knowledge is the most famous Upanishadic verse n which we encounter the three ideas, the first verse of the Isha Upanishad. [Falls nicht unten:] One of the key phrases in this famous verse is jagatyaam jagat, literally meaning "jagat in the jagats," which we can then understand as referring to "whatever universe of discourse we select from the total universe," that is, as drawing our attention to our human authorship of "this" world of ours or whatever aspects of it we focus upon in contexts of action or argumentation. Let us, then, introduce this famous first verse of the Isha, before continuing this discussion.]

A further doubt that may arise is captured by the Indian poet and literary scholar A.K. Ramanujan's (1989), who in his essay "Is there an Indian way of thinking?" argues that there exists a type-difference between Indian and Western reasoning that due to its deeply cultural roots cannot easily be bridged.²⁵⁾ With respect to the two movements of thought suggested here, at least, I am not convinced there is such a cultural a type-difference. It seems to me, rather, that the two movements of thought embody logical and argumentative requirements of systematic reasoning that are quite independent of cultural background. While I would agree with Ramanujan that in India, unlike in the West, rationality and underlying general standards or ideas of reason tend to be seen as "context-sensitive" rather than "context-free," this cultural difference does not imply that the idea of rationality as such is different. I would argue that core notions of rationality such as logical consistency, theoretical coherence, instrumental efficacy, and argumentative conclusiveness or "sufficient reason" (i.e., consideration of everything relevant) remain the same. Instead, I would argue with Ganeri (2001, p. 3) that what is culturally conditioned (or embedded, as Ganeri puts it) is not the idea of rationality as such but only the way it is associated with cultural standards or ideals, such as Eastern spiritual ideals (e.g., the Upanishadic concept of liberation from samsara) or Western ideals of context-independent rationality (e.g., the Kantian concept of moral universalization). The same argument applies to the relevance of both contextualizing and universalizing reasoning, and consequently to the two critical movements of thought that I have suggested: regardless of culture, human reason cannot do without them. Both perspectives are essential, each needs the other. Full awareness of one's sight of the "world" depends on "realizing" (in the double sense of becoming aware, and developing) both the "universe within" (atman, the self, the unique) and the "universe without" (brahman, the cosmos, the universal). Either effort becomes one-sided and ultimately "unrealistic" if not supported by the other. Thus the perspective represented by atman, unless it is properly embedded in a simultaneous orientation towards the opposite, universalizing perspective of brahman, risks ending up as a one-sidedly "selfish" perspective in which everything revolves around the individuum's particular, private little world, at the expense of due attention to the concerns of all others. Likewise, the perspective represented by brahman, unless it, too, is properly embedded in a simultaneous orientation towards the opposite, down-to-earth, personal and practical perspective, risks ending up as an overly generalizing and effusive perspective in which big ideas and claims are pursued relating to the whole world (the principle of moral universalization comes to mind) or even to outer-wordly concerns, at the expense of due attention to the particular and unique concerns of each of the parties involved or affected here and now in real-world contexts of action. The former perspective entails deficits of rationality as well as morality, as both rational and moral justification involve references to the general; the latter perspective entails deficits of practicability and often also personal engagement and responsibility, as the general lies beyond the reach of human practice. In the terms of my work on critical systems heuristics (CSH), the quest for comprehensiveness that we can recognize in both Indian spirituality and Western rationality is a meaningful effort but not a meaningful claim. The claim to comprehensiveness is reserved to gods and heroes; under ordinary conditions of incomplete or imperfect rationality, the best we can claim as humans is to deal carefully – consciously and overtly – with the inevitable lack of comprehensiveness in all our assumptions and conclusions, so as to avoid claiming too much.

[weiter - avoid REP]

Jagat might then, in the terms used previously in this essay, be taken to function as a kind of place-holder concept or "blank space" for thinking and speaking about unstable objects, that is, issues that can be seen from multiple perspectives and in the light of differently framed contexts. For example, when the issue is some situation of human concern, say, an everyday situation that for some reason is considered unsatisfactory and in need of improvement, we might understand jagat to stand for:

(i) the nature and scope of that concern – what is "the problem," that is, what is the context for identifying relevant facts (observations, "perceptions") and values (concerns, "testimonies")? ;
(ii) as delimiting the group of people concerned – whose concerns are to be regarded as being part of the problem, that is, whose views and values are part of the picture and whose are not? and
(iii) the current state of the situation – what is the current stage of dealing with the concern, that is, of unfolding the situation and finding ways to improve it?

Any specific conception of jagat [(the world or universe of thought and action considered relevant)] captures a current, transient stage of progress of atman towards brahman, a process that may involve moves away from brahman rather than moving unidirectionally towards it. Since many intermediate stages are conceivable in atman's moving towards brahman and ultimately becoming one with it, it is clear that likewise, many intermediate states of awareness of the situation and conforming universes of thought and agency are conceivable. Understanding the awareness of situations in terms of "jagat" may remind us of the fluent, perspectival and changing nature of any description of what is at stake, and thus cautions us not to fix such descriptions too quickly or to raise overly generalizing claims about their meaning and validity. It will also remind us that so long as atman's self has not yet achieved unity with the highest, all-encompassing Self of brahman, its notion of the world or of any particular worldly context of thought and action reflects just "one little corner of the cosmic process," but we should not mistake this little corner for all there is and focus on what we like or dislike in it (Nagler, 2007, p. 321).

Properly understood, the concept of jagat is like a sign post that points towards the general or universal dimension that is always implicit in proper reasoning about situations or contexts of human concern, while at the same time reminding us of the unavoidably subjective and private, often unreflectingly self-ish orientation of human reasoning. While it is true that sound reasoning must attend to the specifics of the situation (including the individuals concerned about it) and take care to do justice to it, it must also reach beyond the situation and not mistake what we can know about it and claim to be true or right in its regard for the whole reality. Thinking in terms of jagat thus invites us to take a self-reflective stance and to embed our notion of the relevant context (or universe of thought and action) within a more encompassing and less ego-centered view, one that sees the relevant context from various and changing viewpoints. It direct us towards the general in the rational and the moral, a sum-total of contextual conditions that we cannot avoid presupposing but which is beyond our complete account and justification.

[Irgendwo hier ev. noch Critically--contextualist cycle, jetzt mit jagat im Zentrum, atman und brahman auf den beiden Seiten?]

So much for a first, tentative, and general interpretation of the concept of jagat. But once again, a caveat is in order. Given that the concept is some three thousand years old and stems from an entirely different universe of discourse, one must ask how legitimate it is to transplant the concept to an entirely different, contemporary context of professional practice. Readers may wonder (and they should) whether I am not overinterpreting the meaning of jagat as it suits me in my own little corner as it were, for use in the particular universe of discourse in which I currently move, that of communicative practice and discourse ethics. Yes indeed I probably am. I do not pretend to provide a disinterested, in any way objective or historically warranted account of jagat, nor would the occasion provide a proper context for such an attempt. I am interested in the concept with a view to gain a deeper understanding of the role of the general (along with the particular) in the rational and in the moral, the declared theme of this "excursion." The aim is to enrich the notion of a quest for the universal as we have encountered it in the European tradition of rational ethics, in the form of the principle of moral "universalization," by looking at the emergence of a similar quest for the universa" in an entirely different tradition such as that of ancient Indian philosophy (in which, I suspect, general and abstract ideas play an even more important role). Can we learn something from the ancient Upansihads about the proper role of the universal in good inquiry and action, that is, on how to handle the quest for the universal (and related claims) in meaningful and critically-reflective ways? With a view to this limited end, it should be clear that our excursion into ancient Indian philosophy is meant to be relevant only for the specific universe of discourse (or jagat) within which this discussion moves, the universe of ethically grounded, reflective professional practice. [language-analytical approach + Enträftung Einwand cultural type-difference here zusammen <--> zu langes Warten auf Isha Upanishad]

On the careful use of language, or: Where does learning reside? As our previous study of the work of some classical, "Western" moral theorist suggests to me, the Western mind (if there is such a thing), confronted with statements that contain general ideas or predicates, tends to quickly proceed to the "Kantian" question of how such statements are to be justified, as a guarantee for meaningfulness and relevance as it were. I suspect this focus on justification tends to have us miss the heuristic role of general ideas and statements in the process of thought, including for reflection on the conditioned nature of all thought. I suspect a Vedanta perspective will put the question differently, by asking: Where does learning reside?

Along with the two royal modes of learning, study and spirituality, I suspect Vedanta scholars will refer to the three earlier-mentioned sources of knowledge – perception, testimony, and inference – and the specific pramanas (tools or modes of learning) that support each of them. They will conclude that apart from mystical experience or ecstasy, which is not accessible to everyone, there are basically two ordinary ways of learning, an epistemological one (relying on perception and testimony) and a logical or analytical one (relying on inference). The epistemological answer says, in essence: the way to arrive at generalizing statements is by systematically enriching one's experiential basis, by expanding the universe of perceptions and testimonies that we take into account. The analytical answer says: perceptions and testimonies can only tell us only so much about reality. As they remain forever tied to the particular, the way to arrive at general knowledge is by means of inference, from the manifold but particular perceptions we experience or are told about to the underlying general principles. Perception and testimony are bound to be subjective; only in combination with generalizing reasoning – reasoning that asks for the ultimate grounds of the world's and our own existence and for the principles that should guide our actions – can they improve our grasp of reality in an objective sense. The gist of the true and right is the general.

But of course, truth in the ultimate, encompassing sense of the Vedanta is not for ordinary mortals, at least not for ordinary Western mortals including scientists, researchers, and professionals. It is only too obvious that human reasoning is hardly ever completely free of subjective emotions and pragmatic concerns as they arise in live, practical contexts of human thought and action (the specific universe or jagat within each individual moves). Even the most competent reasoning is, in Vedanta terms, "attached" rather than "detached." This may be true; but, as a Western mind will quickly point out, while such Socratic humility is quite appropriate on the part of researchers and professionals, it provides no excuse for not trying systematically to expand the universe of perceptions and testimonies that inform a researcher's or professional's findings and conclusions. Fortunately, a Vedanta perspective need not disagree; for it can explain why an effort of enlarging our consciousness is both meaningful and possible, even in a rigorously professional sense. The good news is, there is no fixed limit to the effort of enlarging the specific universe within which a professional inquiry or intervention moves. There is, accordingly, no fixed boundary for a systematic effort at generalizing reasoning; the only limitation consists in the fact that a claim to comprehensiveness remains illusory, as no definitive boundary will ever be reached.

In the Western hemisphere, we express this idea of unbounded thought and effort by saying, "the sky is the limit!" But in Vedanta terms, not even the sky is the limit! For beyond lies brahman, the larger, infinite reality that is the source of all that exists and of all consciousness we can attain of it, in the deep cosmological as well as psychological and moral sense of the Upanishads. If anything the sky may (temporarily) limit our jagat, although less so in the age of space exploration than 2,500 years ago; but in any case, we can always endeavor – and are always called upon – to expand our sight of "this world" (jagat), that is, to improve our awareness of the context within which we move as thinking and acting subjects. Good reasoning detaches itself from any seemingly given universe in which it finds itself temporarily, in the language-analytical sense of being careful about the ways in which it refers to this universe as well as in the discursive sense of keeping the universe of thought and action fluid. As J. Dash (2011, p. 114) puts it in his difficult but inspiring essay "In quest of excellence," a language-analytically underpinned Vedanta perspective on inquiry invites us to strive for an increasingly "wide and intelligent grasp of the context" within which we move and seek to understand things and do better, with all its contingencies and exigencies. This aim may seem elusive. But note that it does not demand the impossible, achieving perfection. It only challenges us to set off on this reflective path and then, never to stop moving. That this is possible becomes clear once we realize what we found above, that there are no fixed boundaries.

I (aham), author of my world From a language-analytical perspective, the etymological root meaning of the Sanskrit word for "I," aham (= akin to the German ich) is of interest here. Aham refers to a self-conscious and naturally self-centred "I" that conceives of itself as an individual speaking and acting in this world, as author of sentences and actions. "Here I stand and manifest my opinion," is the self-conscious assertion of this Sanskrit notion of the I, aham. (Compare some of the Sanskrit Dictionaries mentioned in the box "Recommended Sources," e.g., Monier-Williams, 1899, p. 124; Böthlingk and Roth, 1855, p. 5-1084; Böthlingk and Schmidt, 1879, p. 1-155; Macdonell, 1929, p. 36; also compare any good English dictionary that offers  etymological explanations, e.g., Webster's New World Dictionary). Etymology thus gives us a second clue as to why the quest for an increasingly "wide and intelligent grasp of the context" is not only necessary and meaningful but also possible. It is that we ourselves are the authors of the contexts within which we move and about which we talk. A conscious, careful and critical handling of this circumstance is what the quest for excellence in thought and action, as seen from a language-analytically informed Vedanta perspective, is all about.

[Ziel später als Conclusion: ---> How are we to talk about jagat, the world? At the end of this exploration, I cannot offer a definitive answer, but at least it has beomce clear that the question is fundamental and involves issues that reach beyond the conventional concerns of Western rationality, yet at the same time are not necessarily beyond what Western rationality can /might aspire to grasp. The key coneption that emerges is what we might call contextualist thinking / conscious contextualism / alert contextualism [---> critical contextualism].

How, then, are we to talk about jagat? It seems to me the concept of jagat offers itself for reflecting on the implications of this situation in which we find ourselves as authors of this world. The crucial question thus becomes the one my as my colleague formulated so concisely: "How are we to talk about jagat?" (D.P. Dash, 2013a) That is, how are we to talk adequately about the contextual assumptions of even the most carefully researched and reflected claims? The basic answer can only be: by not taking any notion of jagat for granted – a call to Socratic modesty. A further-leading answer will attend to the importance of not only making ourselves aware of what our notion of jagat is but of also undertaking a systematic effort of expanding it and deepening whatever awareness we have of its limitations and implications. In Vedanta terms, what matters is that we keep moving towards both atman and brahman. The former we do by cultivating our self-awareness, for example, with respect to the preconceptions and interests that condition our grasp of the specific universe (jagat) that we "see" and take to be relevant ("this world") for some professional or everyday issue; the latter, by cultivating our notion of the total universe ("that world") of which our present grasp of the relevant universe (jagat) is only an insufficient reflection, for example, by bringing in new testimonies and by reflecting on the ways our contextual assumptions fail to capture the issue in an unbiased manner.

Regardless of how advanced our awareness is, we can always do better. For this reason, despite the infinite and unfathomable nature of the total universe, the quest for learning and better understanding, for gaining a sense of ultimate reality, is not in vain and never hopeless. There is always room to move further; to rethink and rewrite the universe within which we move; to learn new skills and tools of knowledge (pramanas) and apply them to the best of our ability:

As a result, one's efforts to achieve results, better than the last time, will contribute to a progressive transcendence of one's earlier grasp. This leads to a gradual growth of one's skill and expertise, and consequently, to a continuous progressive elimination of one's instinctive narrowness (amanitvam) and to a resultant expansion of the sweep of the intellect (buddhi-visuddhi) and sharpness of focus. (J. Dash, 2001, p. 114f)

And further:

Analytical understanding of the logical nature of pragmatic predication shows that excellence in practical performances leaves scope, in principle, for greater excellence. (J. Dash, 2001, p. 122)

Whatever excellence there is, it leaves scope for greater excellence. The professional (or everyday-practical) quest for excellence here meets with the Vedantic quest for cultivating our consciousness. This is the key reflection that should guide us in dealing with the private little universe in which we move, our notion of jagat.

Despite the highly technical nature of J. Dash's analysis, and also despite the fact that it focuses on a text from the Baghavad Gita, I do not find it difficult to translate this idea and the underlying core concepts of striving for "awareness" (in relying on perceptions and testimonies) and "conclusive excellence" (in relying on inferences) into the framework and "professional" language of my work on critical systems heuristics (CSH) and its core principle of boundary critique: from a critical point of view, what matters for good research and practice, and indeed for right thought and action in general, is not so much comprehensive knowledge and understanding but rather, that we make ourselves and everyone concerned aware of the ways in which our "maps" or descriptions of the relevant reality fail to be sufficiently comprehensive. The challenge, in CSH terms, is the need for dealing responsibly with contextual selectivity. In most applied disciplines today, neither researchers and professionals nor their clients or the general public tend to be fully aware of the extent to which all claims to meaningfulness, validity, and relevance depend on contextual assumptions and how such assumptions might be handled adequately (see, e.g., my recent discussion of the issue in the field of operations research and management science, in Ulrich, 2012a, b, and 2013b).

A language-analytical reading of the Vedanta thus yields an understanding of the quest for excellence – for competent and responsible action – that combines well with the concern of boundary critique for the fundamentally contextualist nature of all rationality. It also appears to go well with the methodological core idea of CSH, that although contextual selectivity cannot be fully eliminated, we can always do better in monitoring it and unfolding its normative implications, by systematically examining how different the claims at issue look when we see them in the light of alternative "reference systems" or universes of discourse. The quest for excellence cannot do without such systematic efforts to enlarge our consciousness and shift the focus of attention. It might indeed be a first and fundamental step in overcoming our contemporary crisis of rationality if researchers, professionals, decision-makers and citizens everywhere would begin to realize how much they themselves (whether consciously or not) are the authors of the knowledge basis or "basis of awareness" that conditions what they take to be true, and right, and rational. Understanding the contextual nature of the clashing "facts" and "values," as well as "findings" and "conclusions," in terms of jagat, "that which moves and is subject to change," does not look like a bad idea to me. The notion of a variable universe of discourse is apt to remind us that it is always possible to move one's standpoint, to develop one's awareness of the relevant universe of discourse. Further, the concept also reminds us that such movement and development can go into two directions that both are meaningful and important, towards atman and brahman. Both developments are vital, neither is possible without the other. We cannot hope to gain a "detached" view of the whole relevant universe without understanding our own bias, as we cannot understand our own bias without a sense of the whole.

[DROP? - Anwendung auf moral reasonng, aber wenig prägnant. ev. nach oben verschieben, anschliessend an Einf. linguistic approach]

As a language-analytical perspective can teach us, the ever-present danger that people – all of us – ignore or neglect the conditioned, contextual nature of their claims, depending on where they stand in developing their notions of atman, jagat, and brahman as it were, is also (but not only) a consequence of how we speak about jagat and situate it in relation to our self-awareness (atman) and awareness of the total universe of conceivably relevant conditions (brahman). As an example, in Part 1 of this essay we considered some particular aspects of how we speak about moral issues: (i) moral statements usually come in the form of generalizing sentences about norms or principles of action, due to the fact that moral claims are meant to oblige everyone in a similar situation equally, regardless of particular interests and status; (ii) moral statements are often rather abstract and thus difficult to substantiate, due to the fact that they can only be argued by means of reference to the (equally abstract) principle of moral universalization or. to put it differently, due to their decontextualizing thrust; and (iii) moral statements have a fictional character in that they effectively urge us to argue and act as if this world of ours were a moral world in which all agents would be agents of good will and would act according to universalizable norms of action. This is not principally different from other substantial statements, which as we have noted establish a link between at least two terms, the one standing for a subject and the other for a predicate that describes that particular subject in terms of some more general characteristic. However, moral statements are special in that the generalizing (or universalizing) claim is absolute; moral reasoning needs to treat everyone equally without allowing any of the agents concerned to exempt themselves from the norms they expect others to respect. From a Vedanta perspective, it is immediately clear how precarious such moral talk is:

(i) A Vedanta perspective implies that unless a speaker's awareness of the relevant universe, jagat, converges with the total universe of conceivably relevant conditions, brahman, his or her claims cannot help but overgeneralize: In CSH terms: except under conditions of complete and perfect rationality, claims to moral universalization are bound (sic) to be false. The bounded nature of all human thought and argumentation certainly speaks against any easy-handed claims to understanding the total universe to which valid claims to moral universalization would need to live up.  

(ii) Awareness of the bounded character of all human thought may prevent us from raising such absolute or overgeneralizing claims. It will hopefully prompt us to consciously and carefully limit our claims to our current universe of moral reasoning, jagat, uncertain and unsettled (in flux, variable, conditional) as it is. But still, so long as our grasp of jagat does not converge with the total universe of conceivably relevant circumstances (brahman), and it usually will not, it is clear that all our moral claims will tend to overgeneralize, that is, any justifications will be false.

(iii) Recalling Kant's insight that moral universalization translates into a categorical imperative for agents of good will to place themselves in the position of all those possibly concerned by their action and to ask whether they then could still want their subjective rule or norm of action (their "maxim") to become a general principle (a "law"), how can we assume to have adequate empathy for the situation of others so long as we do not manage to detach our awareness from our ego, aham, in favour of a mature, self-conscious and self-reflecting atman? How, to use Kohlberg's (1981) happy phrase, can we practice universal role-taking without knowing ourselves? How, in a word, can we prevent moral argumentation to be moral fiction?]

It may be considerations such as these which prompted my colleague D.P. Dash, in a recent discussion, to suggest that: //This is how my colleague D.P. Dash commented on my reading the Upanishads in terms of my work on boundary critique, including some of the elements we have considered in this two-part exploration:

Several elements of your analysis -- the limited nature of thought, the "as if" roots of understanding, the ever-present possibility of falling victim to fictions/errors, and the search for rational thought and justifiable action) -- all seem to be direct consequences of jagat. On second thoughts, it seems to me, these are direct consequences of jagat and how we speak about our encounter with it (which is usually in sentences, that is, in the form of two or more ideas linked according to established conventions). Therefore, if dispute or misunderstanding becomes our focus, the spotlight should be on sentences.… Based on the notion of jagat, I would venture to say that [substantial arguments or, speaking with Kant,] synthetic sentences are always false, but they acquire social significance because of a particular kind of (coordinating) role they play. In this, I am moving away from the notion of "truth" or even "truth value" of statements; except for analytical sentences (tautologies), all sentences that refer to some aspect of jagat must be false (by definition of jagat). (D.P. Dash, 2013b, slightly edited)

Substantial arguments are false in as much as they incorporate a generalizing predicate or claim that reaches beyond the jagat that informs them – their universe of discourse or, in the usual terms of CSH, their implied context of application. This is the case whenever they refer to general ideas without proper qualification of their range of application. [Besser früher einführen: /As we have seen] Kant's (1787) transcendental ideas of theoretical reason (Man and the immortal soul as the unity of the thinking and acting subject; the World as the unity of the conditions of all appearances; and God as the unity of the conditions of all objects of thought and experience in general) are such ideas. In the realm of practical reason, Kant's (1786) guiding ideas of freedom of will or personal "autonomy," of a global moral community or "kingdom of ends," and of an absolutely good will or "good in itself," can be said to play a similar role as unavoidable presuppositions of rational thought and action.. In CSH, their place is taken by the three basic critically-heuristic or quasi-transcendental ideas (as distinguished from the twelve critically-heuristic categories), the systems idea, the moral idea, and the guarantor idea, with the latter including in practice the ideas of science and democracy (Ulrich, 1983, esp. pp. 257-264). In discourse ethics and its underlying framework of formal pragmatics, we found the ideas of communicative action or "rational motivation," of uncoerced discourse or "ideal speech," and of cogent argumentation in terms of the "discourse-ethical principle (D)" and the "principle of moral universalization (U)" to stand for such (pragmatically) unavoidable presuppositions (see Habermas, 1984, 1990b, 1993; Ulrich, 2009c, d, 2013a). And currently, we have encountered the ancient Indian concepts of atman, brahman, and jagat as three basic, general ideas that seek to capture the unavoidable orientation of human thought and action towards our inner reality as individuals (which is difficult for us to grasp in the same way in which the eye does not see itself), towards the outer reality of an infinite cosmos (which is difficult for us to grasp as it reaches beyond the scope of human perception and inquiry), and towards the changing but always specific world within which we move in all our thought and action (which is difficult for us to grasp as no fixed description of it will ever be correct, due to its always fluent, provisional and developing character).

What all these ideas share, it seems to me, is that they simultaneously embody unavoidable orientations (if not conditions) and unresolvable problems (if not illusions) of reason. In the case of the critically-heuristic ideas, for example, sound reasoning cannot avoid pursuing them as if their realization were possible, yet without proper caution we risk claiming too much. Or, in the case of the Vedanta, we cannot hope to understand the human condition without proper consciousness of atman, brahman, and jagat, yet all of three are difficult if not impossible to grasp – atman in that the eye does not see itself; brahman in that it reaches beyond the scope of human inquiry; and jagat in that no fixed description of it will ever be correct, due to its always fluent, provisional and developing character.

The question of how we are to talk about jagat, then, applies to all these and any other general ideas on which human reason compels us to rely, including the ideas the rational (reason) and the general (universe) themselves. In this situation, the traditional response of the Indian tradition has always been: by being silent, or by being humble (D.P. Dash, 2013a). Silence points us to the way of meditation and spirituality; humility, to the way of inquiry and philosophy. In Kant's work, philosophy has found a third answer that we can now understand as a development of Indian humility: by being critical, that is, by an understanding of reason that examines its own presuppositions and limitations and accordingly qualifies its claims – the way of reflective practice.

[--> I dare to conclude that a language-analytical approach is apt to support my reading of the Upanishads. See also the reply to A.K. Ramanujan (1989) objection of a basic type-difference between Indian and Western thought.]

[--> cite  + discuss (Dash, 2013b? s. Ausdrucke; J. Dash, 2011, p. xx?, s. markiertes PDF file) ]

[In an attempt to sum up this discussion of the Sanskrit concept of jagat and draw some conclusions, it seems to me that from a language-analytical and discursive perspective, a key notion in the Upanishads is that of aham, the self-assertive "I" that conceives of itself as an author of the universe of thought and action within which it moves and about which it speaks. //conceives of itself as an individual speaking and acting in this world, as author of sentences and actions. So what? It is a small and perhaps daring, but, I would suggest, methodologically crucial net step to conceive of aham as the author of jagat – this world in which any "I" moves and seeks to "realize" – understand and make real – both atman and brahman.

--> I am the author of my world, my universe of discourse and all the descriptions of it, the predicates I use. My notion of jagat cannot be better than my effort to be a good author of "my" world, that is, to grasp reality as objectively as I can and in terms of ultimate grounds and principles. The reality in question, of course, is both the universe within (atman) and the universe without (brahman).  without--> atman <-----> jagat <-----> brahman

-----

[OLD] I cannot answer the question for people who, like my just cited colleague D.P. Dash, have been born into the Indian culture and are familiar with its spirit and ideas, with its philosophy and practice. I can only try to answer the question from a "Western" perspective shaped by the "Hellenistic" tradition of rational ethics that reaches from Aristotle's (1985) and Kant's (1786, 1787) notions of "practical reason" to Mead's (1934) notion of "universal role-taking," Bayer's (1958) "moral point of view," Kohlberg's (1981) notions of "post-conventional morality" and of a personal moral competence grounded in it, and Habermas' (1990c, 1993) "discourse ethics," to mention some of the main sources that have influenced me. Against that background, the question of how we are to talk about jagat loses nothing of its urgency and difficulty: How are we to think and talk rationally about moral agency in a world that is so diverse, variable, and interconnected that we can at best see ourselves as being on the way to a limited grasp of all that would matter for "getting it right"?

The traditional answers of Hindu spirituality, D.P. tells me, amount to basically two options: (i) to be silent (an impractical option for many social purposes) or (ii) to be humble in the way we speak about the world and our place and deeds in it. The second option appears more promising with a view to enabling useful social communication and action, so long as we "do not lose sight of the fact that our expressions are utterly inadequate, almost trivial, considering the vast movements and variability surrounding us." (Dash, 2013).

In this situation, it is interesting to note that in contemporary Indian philosophy there is now a strand of thought that seeks to analyze the ancient Veda and Vedanta scriptures with language-analytical means. ==> Reading of jagat in famous first verse of the Upanishads (Dash, 2013e, contrasted with trad. spiritual reading by Aurobindo, 1996, pp. 19 and 29,; Müller, 1879, pp. xx<, analysis with reference to J. Dash, 2011) dann J. Dash einführen

==> Folgerung von language-analytical perspective: So much, then, I think we can say from both an Indian (or Hindu) and Western (or Hellenistic) perspective: in distinction to my Western understanding of atman and brahman, it makes understanding jagat not as an endpoint but rather, an intermediate state between these endpoints, a stopover as it were on the path towards brahman's world of ultimate reality (or, speaking with Kant, moral universalization) as well as on the path towards atman's world of deep subjectivity (or, speaking with Jung, 1968b, of individuation). Consequently, if such a reading is not entirely mistaken, it also makes sense to understand the three concepts of brahman, atman, and jagat as complementing one another systematically, in the sense of the earlier suggested notion of a double movement of thought. Fig. 4 shows an adapted version of the earlier graph by which I tried to capture the idea. [Abb., dann  auch --> cyclical movement of (C)].

                ("enjoy" the world given to you) ------------>

                (seeking to "realize" brahman) ------------>
                (i.e., to "enlarge" one's self) ------------>

               (decontextualizeing /understanding the objective) ----------------->
aham
(the "I" authoring its universe of thought and action)

{hier zeichnet: drei Linien von aham to atman/jagat/brahman, Sprektrum das sich öffnet}

   (the "universe within)       (the authored universe)         (the universe without)
        atman <------------------------- jágat ------------------------> brahman
       (the individual)                 (the individual's                        (the universal)

        ("Self")                     "realization" of the world                  ("Universe")
    in a particular, unfolding
      "universe of discourse")

       <------------ (recontextualizing /understanding the subjective)
                    <------------ (seeking to "realize" atman)
               <------------ (i.e., to "individuate" one's self) 
                <------------ ("renounce" claims beyond jagat])

Fig. 5/6: Atman, jagat, and brahman: unfolding universes of discourse
or a double movement of thought towards "realizing" atman and brahman,
or doing justice to both the individual and the universal in one's
personal universe of discourse (jagat)
noch anpassen an Fig. 3:

 [Bounded                                                                            [Unbounded
thought]   ^{<-------------------- "Context" ------------------->}    thought]    

                 <- - - - - - - (Critical movement 2)     

 <<<  (indefinite range of argumentative spaces)  >>>   

Fig. 3: A double movement of thought
Thinking through contexts of argumentation
in terms of a spectrum of argumentative spaces 

The example of Kant's Critique of Reason  In addition to the two traditional options of ancient Indian thought, silence and humility, Kant proposed a third option for facing the question of "how to talk about jagat" or about rational agency, respectively: by being careful about the ways in which we are using ideas, understood as concepts of pure reason. Critique of pure reason, that is!

"Jagat"  A third major theme --> moving from atman's world to brahman's world language-analytical interpret. DP Dash + J Dash

= general idea of a universe of discourse that includes all the relevant conditions for explaining the world as humans can experience it in their practical search for meaning and excellence; cite language-analytical readings of DPs und J.Dash]

--> jagat as a kind of variable (Leerstelle, place-holder) for designating the individual where it stands as a particular moment on its path to fulfilment

= three major concepts that embody "pure" concepts of reason, mere ideas, limiting concepts of human endeavor --> Kant

A second major theme is represented by the concept of Atman, the individual self which in distinction to Brahman is for ever changing, moving ..

[see Wiki pages "Atman" - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/tman_(Hinduism) and
"Upanishads," section "Philosophy," at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upanishads#Schools_of_Vedanta

"Karma" Another important Vorstellung der Wiedergeburt/Seelenwanderung, Karma =idea of causality as applied to human deeds and destiny, Erlösung = von grosser religöser Bedeutung aber weniger wichtig in unserem gegenwärtigen Zus'hang

Three basic kinds of interpretation:: religious, metaphysical, and methodological (transcendental, critically-heuristic, language-analytical)

 [Return from India:] --> new spotlight on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and on American pragmatism.

The example of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason  

The example of American pragmatism (Peirce, James, and Dewey)  

[OLD/anderswo/später zu critical practice : inasmuch as the general includes the future, we can never know in advance how well we approximate but we can at least control it later on, retrospectively. --> = one basis for critical handling. Wouldn't such a claim imply that we can (more or less completedy) anticipate not only all empirical consequences but also (more or less impartially) can assess the ways how the views and values, forms of life and corresponding ways of being concerned of all the interested parties may change in future? The required approximations can take place only by accumulating evidence from the past and the present; the future, by definition, is that which is not yet given empirically, so we can only try to anticipate it by means of some other generalizing assumptions.

Again, inasmuch as basic phenomena of nature are concerned, a scienctific approach will do; but with respect to the normative core of moral questions, which includes the value judgments just mentioned but also judgments as to what contexts ought to be considered for identifying relevant "facts," the situation is less clear. Value judgments cannot just be predicted; they need to be articulated by those concerned and inasmuch as they can be anticipated (or articulated and taken up) in due time, they need to be answered for. In short, they require responsible engagement with, and concern for, the future, rather than just prediction.

The earlier-mentioned need for expanding the context from which relevant premises are selected takes on a new, deeply normative dimension here. Kant has powerfully described this concern with his "categorical imperative," as a call on all agents of good will to put themselves in the place of all others who might conceivably be concerned; a call that implies an expansion of the relevant context to the entire community of all those possibly concerned, globally, now and in future. Among more contemporary authors, Herbert Mead (1934) has perhaps most beautifully characterized the same implication with his concept of "universal role-taking."  It is not easy to see how discursive approximations of the moral idea can do justice to this decontextualizing thrust of the moral idea. The moral idea stands and falls with its intrinsic demand for expanding the universe of discourse, so that all concerns have reasonable, participatory chances of being authentically articulated. Not only the universe of concerns to be considered grows, but equally the universe of those to be admitted, the community of moral discourse. ]

[jetzt oben] The future is only accessible to us through generalization. Generalization thus is also a form of prediction; general ideas include a predictive element. The general includes the future. But as meaningful as our ideas may be, the future of course resists reliable prediction, certainly when we deal with human affairs rather than just natural phenomena. It is proverbial that predictions are difficult, especially when they are about the future. One reason we now understand: they are difficult because they imply generalization.

We are, then, back to where we started: the question remains of how the abstract idea of moral universalization is to realized in practical argumentation. Say, there is an action proposal that we need to justify not only with respect to its instrumental efficacy but equally with respect to its moral defensibility. So we need to identify the norm of action it embodies and then to try and justify (read: "universalize") this norm. Which means, we need to demonstrate convincingly that the norm in question could serve as a general (i.e., moral) principle of action in all conceivable situations of the same kind. Let's assume, rather optimistically, that a considerable amount of observations on the situation at hand and on similar other situations has been assembled and they all appear to confirm the generalizable character of the claim. Let's equally assume that the claim meets with the approval of all the involved parties, those directly interested and others concerned that have been given a chance to participate and to voice their concerns. Let's even assume that absolutely no counter-evidence and no counter-arguments have come up (which is quite an unlikely assumption, as moral questions by definition arise when normative claims clash), and that all the parties effectively or potentially affected, here and there, now and in future, have actually been involved and their concerns have been taken seriously (again a precarious assumption, as it is hardly practicable to bring in people potentially affected in remote areas or in the future, including those not yet born or for other reasons unable to articulate their specific concerns). Generalization in moral matters is obviously a complicated matter, not only but also because it includes the future. Not only predictions but also justifications are particularly difficult when they concern the future!

Paradoxically, the claim to the moral generalizability of a norm of action is thus tacitly and unavoidably based on another kind of generalization, from the known to the unknown. There is no way round assuming, based on the available past and present evidence, that no unforeseen consequences, side-effects, and related concerns or counter-arguments or other forms of disapproval are to be expected in future. Strictly speaking, then, even consensual justifications reached under the most rigorous discursive standards are bound to remain mere claims to generalizability; extrapolations of present evidence to future evidence and of present consensus to future consensus. We don't know, we have to stipulate it; and such stipulation implies jumping over a moral along with a predictive gap of inference. In short, all discursive justifications of moral claims remain in principle open to challenge, both in the theoretical dimension of reason (by new empirical evidence, e.g., unforeseen consequences) and in the practical dimension of reason (by new moral considerations, e.g., due to previously neglected concerns or changing values). Moral claims, then, remain just that – moral claims.

{The close links between the rational, the moral, and the general remain a problem, for discourse ethics no less than for other theories of moral justification. [old/ ev. später als Folgerung: Perhaps tying rationality to justification is not a good idea in moral discourse, after all – a crucial issue that we will need to consider /that a useful discursive framework for ethically grounded practice will need to consider.  /It appears that the idea of tying rationality to justification is another basic assumption that a future, practicable framework for moral practice needs to reconsider.]}

The human condition  [That the general includes the future – the predictive element in moral universalization – is only one of the difficulties in working with general ideas or principles, and not necessarily the most difficult one in practice. It is a truism, of course, that predictions are difficult especially when they concern the future, but research practice has found ways to deal with the difficulty, even though as a matter of principle an inferential gap remains. There is no need, nor is it particularly helpful, to emphasize the predictive element in moral universalization any further. Just as unhelpful is the overused reference to our world's being increasingly "complex," as an excuse for arguing that even in a given local situation and with a limited time horizon, unintended consequences and side-effects of actions are difficult to avoid and thus have to be accepted. The tacit message of the argument is that if only decision makers rely on the best available evidence and expertise, who can blame them if things go wrong? But this familiar line of argumentation is hardly compelling from a moral point of view. Agents have a moral obligation to deal carefully with the normative implications of their actions – with the ways they may affect uninvolved parties, that is – whether things are complex to foresee or not. Things are rather the other way round: the more complexity there is, the more responsibility grows. Assuming responsibility for our actions is an unconditional demand of rational practice. The technical difficulties of handling complexity and anticipating consequences do not immunize rational agents against moral demands.

The issue I have in mind goes deeper:] It is not just a "technical" (or methodological) difficulty that human thought and action has problems in meeting the quest for rational and moral practice. Despite the growth of science and expertise in almost all areas of human activity, which gives us ever more tools for dealing with the multifaceted, changing, and unpredictable nature of this world of ours, science and expertise that, the difficulty remains. It is basically part of the human condition that our knowledge and understanding of the world – of the whole of our existence – is for ever fragmentary and fallible. So are consequently our efforts to orient ourselves in this world of ours and to improve it; to think and act rationally or in "enlightened" ways so as to master our lives in it  and get things "right." It is already one of the more difficult challenges for each of us to find out what makes us happy as individuals and to live accordingly; the more demanding it is to act morally. Yet the universal in the moral implies that "right" (and thus, rationally defensible) practice should do equal justice to the happiness of all others who may be affected by our propositions and actions. Rational and moral ways of acting, and ideally also happy forms of life, would then converge; an ideal that traditionally we associate with the achievement of individual and collective wisdom; with a level of "enlightenment" – of insight into the inextricable links between the rational, the moral, and the general – that is rare and which few mortals can claim for themselves. We are, to put it mildly, cognitively and emotionally ill-prepared for achieving such an enlightened way of mastering the conditio humana, although we owe to modern science "an astounding human capacity to think in terms of the universe while remaining on earth, and the perhaps even more astounding human ability to use cosmic laws as guiding principles for terrestric action" (Arendt, 1958, p. 264; her book offers a penetrating philosophical analysis of the human condition from the vantage point of the vita activa, an effort of "[re-]thinking what we are doing." 1958, p. 5)

The Sanskrit perspective  In Sanskrit language and philosophy, there is a concept that captures the notion of the universe, and of the "whole of our existence" in it, as well as any word I can think of in English, including the talk of the "human condition": jagat, that which moves eternally in a universal motion and is the dwelling-place of all life,

According to the highly regarded, still authoritative Sanskrit-English Dictionary by Monier-Williams of 1899, which in its careful documentary approach is reminiscent of the Complete Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, there are quite numerous meanings of the term jagat (also written jágat), many of them appearing in compound words. I'll limit myself to the basic term "jagat"; its meanings most relevant to our present discussion are:

Jágat, root gam, moving, movable, locomotive, living

- air, wind;

- people; mankind;

- that which moves or is alive, men and animals, the plants;;

- the world, esp. this world, earth;

- heaven and the lower worlds;

- the worlds;

- the site of a house

- the world, universe.

 (Monier-Williams, 1899, p. 408, cf. http://www.ibiblio.org/sripedia/ebooks/mw/0400/mw__0441.html)

Another Sanskrit dictionary that is available online (no editor, not dated) adds and documents a number of related meanings, such as "the whole world," "the entire universe," "all over the world," "the cosmic manifestation," "all the worlds, both material and spiritual," "all that is animate or inanimate," "throughout the whole universe," "of the whole world," "of the complete creation," "universal," "moving," and so on.  The term thus appears to capture both the cosmological dimension of the "whole universe" and the human-existential dimension of being in this world and needing to "master" it, in a material as well as in a spiritual sense, despite our incomplete knowledge and understanding of it. It seems to me it thereby also captures both the phenomenal side of the world that we can experience and describe, and the abstract idea of that which encompasses (the ground of) everything, the universal, the complete, as the logically indispensable counterpart to the manifold particulars that we can describe.

OLD initial start with jágat

The concept appears in the first of the 18 verses of the Isha Upanishad, one of the shortest and latest Upanishads, which in turn belong to the main scriptures of the Vedanta (= "the end of the Veda," an appendix to the Vedic Hymns), written between 1,200 and 500 B.C. The first verse, in the translation of the Upanishads by Sri Aurobindo, reads:

All this is for habitation by the Lord, whatsoever is individual universe of movement in the universal motion. By that renounced thou shouldst enjoy; lust not after any man's possession. (Aurobindo, 1966, pp. 19 and 29).

[A footnote by Aurobindo on the term "habitation" gives us a notion of the richness of meanings of the term jagat, here translated as "the universal motion" (I have italicized some of the most interesting terms in it):

There are three possible senses of vâsyam [here translated as "habitation"], "to be clothed," "to be worn as garment," and "to be inhabited." The first is the ordinarily accepted meaning. Shankara [an early Hindu scholar, probably of the 8th century B.C.] explains it in this significance, that we must lose the sense of this unreal objective universe in the sole perception of the pure Brahman [the ultimate, unchanging, unfathomable source of all being]. So explained the first line becomes a contradiction of the whole thought of the Upanishad which teaches the reconciliation, by the perception of essential Unity, of the apparently incompatible opposites, God and the World, Renunciation and Enjoyment, Action and internal Freedom, the One and the Many, Being and its Becomings, the passive divine Impersonality and the active divine Personality, the Knowledge and the Ignorance, the Becoming and the Not-Becoming, Life on earth and beyond and the supreme Immortality. The image is of the world either as a garment or as a dwelling-place for the informing and governing Spirit. The latter significance agrees better with the thought of the Upanishad. (Aurobindo, 1966, p. 19n) ]

For some additional insight into the meaning of jágat readers may want to consult the Sanskrit Dictionary that is available on-line. It is clear though that for Western minds, the concept remains difficult to grasp. I can only give a tentative, personal interpretation here.

How, then, are we to talk about jagat?

In the face of the limitations of the human intellect in grasping the unfathomable richness of the world, jágat, the Indian tradition of spirituality and philosophy gives basically two answers: we can be silent, or humble. With a view to our present interest in grounding reflective practice ethically, silence may not be an adequate answer. Moral agents have to engage actively, it is not good enough to retire into one's private world of spirituality. Remains being humble: an Indian way to describe the core idea of reflective practice which consists in making sure that we do not claim too much.

Kant, inspired by the ancient Greek philosophers, had a third answer: relying on a careful, critical employment of ideas of reason. "Critique of reason," that is. I have sketched out my understanding of ideas above; I would now like to examine what we might learn from the Indian tradition for our understanding and adequate handling of ideas. I will focus on two major texts of the Vedantic tradition, the Isha Upanishad and the Bhagavad Gita. Both are part of the Upanishades, a major strand of ancient Indian scriptures, written between 1,200 and 500 B.C. As I lack sufficient familiarity with these scriptures, I rely on my limited understanding gained from discussing some basic notions of these Sanskrit texts with my Indian colleague D.P. Dash (my fellow editor of the Journal of Research Practice) along with the reading of a few extracts from English translations of the Isha Upanishad and the Gita along with a scholarly article that offers an accessible, language-analytical study of the Gita (see J. Dash, 2011).

Basic understanding  What is the role of general ideas in the two mentioned scriptures?

...

Conclusions Reserve

On the Upanishadic conception of knowledge

[moved from discussion of brahman to Conclusion --> 1. we have reasons to take the Upanishadic conception of knowledge seriously! +2. in view of its ideal character --> critical turn: --> double movement of thought ->> crit. contextualism with atman // critical idea (rationality), brahman // moral idea (universality), and jagat // systems idea (boundary critique, RP, = critical turn operationalized), ] This is a conception of knowledge that is important indeed for our understanding of general ideas of reason such as rationality, morality, and systemicity. Their underlying ideal is self-containment! In more usual terms, they are about the integrity of human thought and action. Critically turned, they demand from us a discipline of self-limitation, of laying open the conditioned nature of all our claims, or in the terms of CSH: their selectivity (being less than comprehensive) and partiality (not doing equal justice to everyone's concerns). The moral idea, the idea of rationality, and the systems idea not only call for such a discipline, they also serve as critical standards for it. The same holds true for the Upanishadic notion of brahman: it is the ancient-Indian equivalent of the Kantian notion of pure ideas of reason (or ideas of pure reason). There is indeed a striking parallel in this regard between the Upanishadic brahman and Kant's ideas of reason. All aim at securing the integrity of human thought and action. All require us, to this end, to face the larger reality that our perceptions and descriptions of the world cannot capture – in the case of the Upanishads, the overarching, infinite reality that both transcends and inheres this world of ours (brahman), and in the case of Kant, the totality of conditions (or infinite series of conditions) that reason cannot help but assume in attempting to understand the world, although if can never hope to fully grasp it.

Older: Emerging parallels  [1. with Kant, 2. as applied to CSH/DE] I would now like to consider some of the parallels I see between essential ideas of the two texts, and the way they should be handled, with Kant's treatment of ideas and my own use of them in CSH. Finally, we may then draw a few tentative conclusions for our understanding and possible development of discourse ethics.

For Kant, as I understand him, ideas are general concepts that our mind cannot help but imagine or presuppose in attempting to understand the particular experiences we have of the world and the particular actions we take to master and improve our lives in it //to grasp and describe the whole of the world of which we are a part (jagat), so as to be able to think and act systematically in it, despite its incredibly complex and for ever changing nature. [Ev. Footnote:In accordance with Kant's distinction of the two complementary but different functions or dimensions of reason, in his terms: the theoretical and the practical realms of reason, I would include in my understanding of jagat, without being familiar with the Sanskrit tradition of thought about it, both the phenomenal world of nature and the social world of human practice.]

The basic difficulty with the ideas by which we try to grasp the world in which we live and act is that, from a Kantian perspective, there is no empirical counterpart to them. Whenever we rely on them, we have to give them empirical content, and consequently have to remain aware whatever content we find in them, we have put it there ourselves. In other words, that there are options for understanding them. [Ex.: Similarly, in the Vedantic tradition, major concepts have no empirical counterpart that could be described In Kant's terms, "ideas" stand for the general, the universal, the whole rather than for the manifold particulars of our experience; for this reason they do not describe objects of possible experience. They are, at bottom, "ideas (or concepts) of pure reason," which explains the somewhat obscure title of Kant's first Critique, "Critique of Pure Reason." This is of course why we need them: precisely because they do not depend on experience, they allow us to go beyond it. The human mind needs them to bridge the gaps in experience that keep us from grasping the whole, the general, the true, the good, the moral, the rational, you name it. To put it differently, only by relying on general ideas can we avoid getting lost with, or overwhelmed by, all the fragmentary and unstable particulars of our limited experience, knowledge, and understanding.

The point is, general ideas are always at once unavoidable and problematic; rational and fictitious; our only chance for grasping and mastering the world yet only ideas. In Kant's terms, they are at once transcendental and transcendent. They describe necessary conditions of the possibility of rational thought and of the acquisition of knowledge, but they also reach beyond all possible knowledge and for this reason, unless we handle them very cautiously, stand for illusions into which our mind risks falling at all times. Still, inasmuch as we need them, they are not arbitrary but are rational ideas.

Picture that emerges: a fundamental dialectic between two eternal poles of thinking that stand for the particular and the general /minimum and maximum loop /bounded and unbounded thinking / contextualization and decontextualization

In my work on critical systems heuristics and boundary critique, I understand these two poles as limiting concepts; as "endpoints" as it were in a spectrum of thinking possibilities, endpoints towards which all consistent thought will move and at which it will arrive sooner or later. They both orient and limit our thinking, that is; they create an immeasurable large thinking space within which human reasoning, imagination, and action can move. But we must always remember that they have a heuristic purpose as sign-posts for our thought. They can inspire our thinking to move in the one or other direction, toward generalizing or specifying our conceptions what is or ought to be the case; contextualizing or decontextualizing our assumptions; and so on. But neither can serve as a reference point of justifying any conclusions; if we do misuse them in this way, we will unavoidably claim too much in that either what we propose is more particular than we claim or else, we overgeneralize. We need, in the terms I use in Critical Heuristics, to employ them (and never forget their nature as) methodological "as ifs": heuristic devices that we cannot avoid employing but which at least we can try to handle critically -- which is why I speak of "critical heuristics." The systems idea is such a heuristic device, whence comes the name "critical systems heuristics" (CSH). The moral idea is another prime example, which I think is as important as is the systems idea for grounding adequate notions of competent and reflective practice.

Two major illustrations, from two very different traditions of thought -- Kant's critical philosophy and rational ethics; and, to put this foundation of modern "Western" thought it in perspective, ancient Indian spirituality and philosophy, an important foundation of "Eastern" thought. I'll begin with Kant, as we are already reasonably familiar with his approach.

Kant's understanding of "ideas"  [hierhin verschieben: Introd. to Kant's notion of unavoidable but problematic ideas of reason]

Still a useful illustration of what happens when we forget this "as if" is provided by Kant's analysis of the misuse of general ideas. His major examples, of course, were the "theological" idea of God and the "cosmological" idea of an ultimate beginning and end of the World. As Kant argues, both are "only ideas" (not to say fictions) yet are unavoidable in the face of our mind's limits in grasping the world. We cannot tell any more that they are wrong than we can prove them true -- Kant's famous antinomies of pure reason.

I see a contemporary version of these examples in today's "big bang" model of the development of the early universe, supposedly some 14 billion years ago. A little less long ago, in 2006, the Nobel prize was awarded to two scientists, John Mather and George Smoot, who, in the form of the 3K cosmic background radiation phenomenon, supposedly discovered a proof and explanation of the origin of the universe, well, yes, in a "big bang." The laudatio explained that this scientific breakthrough marked "the inception of cosmology as a precise science" (Nobel Committee, 2006). How innocent science can be, from a Kantian point of view! Of course the question of the origin of the universe and, related to it, its finite or infinite character, remains unanswered by the big bang model and will remain so for ever. It asks for the totality of conditions that would explain the ultimate origin of the universe; but as Kant would point out, a totality of conditions is (by definition) itself unconditioned and thus cannot be a possible object of science. The notion of an ultimate beginning and end of the universe is bound to remain an unavoidable but problematic idea.

Reason must ask such questions, but science cannot answer them. Science can only explain empirical phenomena in terms of preceding conditions, but any empirical evidence of a "big bang" raises the question of what preceded it and how it came about. This is why, as Edmund Husserl (1970, p. 189) once remarked, "no objective science, no matter how exact, explains or ever can explain anything in a serious sense." Science may always find out a bit more about the big bang; but paradoxically, the more science can show that it is not only a heuristic fiction but is a theoretical hypothesis for which some scientific evidence can be gathered, the more it also defines the utmost limit beyond which science cannot reach back in time, as all phenomena it can possibly observe began with it. Interestingly, then, when it comes to thinking the universal, scientific hypotheses are weaker than heuristic fictions, for they must stay within the limits of the conditional; only thinking "as if" can grasp the unconditioned totality of conditions that includes that original, unconditional condition on which any serious explanation depends. Hence, in the terms of critical heuristics, we better understand the "big bang" model as a methodological "as if," which means that in due time we must "take it back" as it were and recall to ourselves and to everyone interested that it is only a heuristic device; or else science indeed risks becoming fiction. The Nobel Committee thus provided a doubtful model of how we should "sell" the results of science.

Back to the "systems" idea and the "moral" idea, two corner-stones of my proposed framework of CSH: What matters in systems thinking, and similarly in moral discourse (and of course also in all scientific discourse), is that we remain conscious of the "as ifs" on which all systematic thought, all rational efforts to understand and improve the world we live in, unavoidably rely. Accordingly important it is that we deal carefully with the insight that such "as ifs" embody attempts to reach beyond the limited nature of all our claims to knowledge and understanding, to moral practice, and quite generally, to rational and competent action. Whence comes the methodological core idea and principle of CSH: "boundary critique." Systems thinking thus becomes a form of critical thinking; of dealing carefully with the "boundary judgments" that condition our knowledge and understanding of any particular contexts of inquiry and action.

Boundary critique -- a critical employment of boundary judgments -- is the main "critically-heuristic" tool I was able to come up with in CSH for dealing with those "as ifs." It says, ultimately: all our thought and action is hopelessly limited as measured by human ideas about jagat, but this circumstance hardly provides an excuse for not trying to think and act rationally; rather, it means that we need to deal reflectively with those limits and actively seek to limit our claims accordingly. Since the only way we can hope to look beyond those limits is by means of ideas, such an effort means to deal carefully with the way we use ideas, lest they become sources of illusion or deception. So, in a way, "boundary critique" leads us back to the second option of antique Indian philosophy as you describe it: being humble. It combines that option with an effort at being rational, systematic, critical, responsible, mature -- in one word, "enlightened" in a modern, Kantian sense rather than an antique, Indian or Hellenic sense.

I conclude with some "background notes" that those readers may find useful who are first-time visitors to my site and/or are not familiar with my writings on reflective professional practice and critical systems heuristics.

--

Some background notes: (1) The need for going back to Kant, 35 years after I first studied him extensively, came up with my current study of discourse ethics, the moral theory of Jurgen Habermas, as a possible basis for grounding contemporary concept of reflective practice ethically, whether in research practice, in professional practice, in corporate and public decision making, or in everyday practice. After serious study of discourse ethics, I have come to the conclusion that against Habermas' intentions and despite its theoretically insightful character, it does not offer a practicable, discursive way of settling disputes about normative claims and thus cannot provide ordinary professionals and decision makers, much less ordinary people, with a framework for moral practice.

(2) More specifically, the question I have been grappling with is this. As innovative and insightful as I find discourse ethics as a moral theory, what value does a moral theory have that if it does not inform us about possible moral practice? So, I am currently looking into ways of pragmatizing Habermas' discourse-ethical version of the principle of moral universalization (U), the formulation of the moral idea to which Kant gave its boldest form with the Categorical Imperative. Habermas uses (U) as a "rule of argumentation" that supposedly is to allow us, under conditions of rationally motivated argumentation ("discourse"), to justify disputed normative claims with respect to their morality and thus, to end a dispute consensually. Justified consensus, as distinguished from merely factual consensus, is, then, Habermas' answer to the intellectual challenge of jagat.

(3) However, my review of discourse ethics leads me to the firm conclusion (unpopular as it may be) that this answer is bound to break down when it comes to practice. It is (at best) a theoretical solution that is not realizable in practice. Discourse ethics, then, is a piece of moral theory that cannot be translated into "real" discourses, which makes it redundant even as a moral theory; for as I noted above, what value does a moral theory have that is not about moral practice?

(4) So, there is a need to find a new, different beginning. In such cases I like to go back to Kant, as he remains the most fundamental, rigorous and powerful thinker whom I have encountered. Are there ways to understand the moral idea (U) that would capture Kant's very deep, compelling moral thought without giving up any chance for rationally motivated, discursive, moral practice? Since (U) is Kant's most rigorous formulation of what the moral idea means for systematic thought and action, I have decided to return to Kant's account of the role of ideas, "35 years later."

-----

RESERVE for final discussion

On the "as if" in our claims [From 'Discussion (3): A discourse-theoretical view {of the Isha}This is easier said than done, to be sure. It is part of the human condition that all our validity claims, whether they are claims to knowledge, understanding, relevance, rationality, rightness, improvement, or other merits or values, reach beyond what we can legitimately claim, as they imply that they are or can be grounded in a sufficient universe of discourse. We cannot help but claim such things as if we were talking about the total relevant contexts.Which is to say, the universe of discourse that informs our claims tends to be different from the one our claims presuppose (i.e., the one we apparently talk about). ]

[NOW FOR LATER/CONCLUSION] It is, like all philosophical dilemmas, a serious problem, as it has no definitive solution. Fortunately though, it is not quite as precarious methodologically as it presents itself metaphysically: it does not stop us from studying any particular set of condition(s) – any specific "situation" of interest, that is, an individual's subjective situatedness – so as to "expand and develop" (sic) our appreciation of it, as long as we like and can afford it. It only urges us to be careful about the claims we associate with such efforts. What is challenges to develop is our critical awareness of the problem, and perhaps, over time, some well-defined, disciplined, and self-limiting ways of dealing with it. At this place, I can only offer a few basic considerations in this direction.]

For a hyperlinked overview of all issues of "Ulrich's Bimonthly" and the previous "Picture of the Month" series, see the site map

PDF file

Note: This is the fifth essay on the role of general ideas in rational thought and action. It continuous the exploration of the world of ideas of the Ancient Indian Upanishads with an analysis of three essential concepts selected from them, brahman, atman, and jagat. The previous essays of the series appeared in the Bimonthlies of September-October 2013, January-February 2014, July-August 2014, and .September-October 2014.

Notes

20) The proper use of reason entails a double challenge to reason. On the one hand, reason itself is the only instance to control its proper use; on the other hand, it has to become practical, that is, it must "work" (ensure proper results) in real-world practice. Compare on this double touchstone Kant's (1787) call, in the preface of the first Critique, for a self-tribunal of reason along with Ganeri's (2001) nicely complementary call, in the subtitle of his book on classical Indian philosophy, for the proper work of reason. I have deliberately chosen the phrase "proper use of reason" so as to remind us of both touchstones of reason: when it comes to ensuring a proper use of reason, "proper" means "self-critical" (reason's concern in its own integrity) as well as "effective" (reason as a critical instance of practice). Bringing these two concerns together is the essence of what I propose we understand by reflective practice.  [BACK]

21) Many more examples can be found of contemporary English and German words that (with varying degrees of plausibility and available evidence) appear to be related to the three word families and which thus may also have some roots in jagat. Examples in English are the words to act, active, actor, agent, agile, chase, haw, jacket, jag, jagged, jaguar, to jog, to joggle; and jug; and in German, the words achten (= to esteem, respect), ächten (= to ostracize, banish), beachten (= to pay attention to, take into account), beobachten (= to observe), agieren, agil, Acker (=acre, field), Agrar-, Agrikultur, Aktie (= share), aushecken (= to hatch, think up), behaglich (= comfortable, cosy), hager (=haggard, lean, scraggy), Heck (=orig. gate in a hag, opening in a hedge, now back or rear door of a vehicle), Jacke (=jacket, from Middle English jaket and related to Old French jaque), joggen (= to jog), and many others.  [BACK]

22) The word "jagat" or derivatives of it can be found today in several languages of India that belong to the Indo-European language family (e.g., Modern Standard Hindi, Bengali, and Odia or formerly Oriya) as well as in others, for example in Tamil, which belongs to the Dravinian language family and knows the Sanskrit loan word "jagat" as well as its variant "jakat" for "world"). It is also found in other contemporary languages of South-East Asia (e.g., in Malay and Indonesian, which belong to the Austronesian language family, and in Nepali). In these contemporary languages, "jagat" now basically means as much as "land," "world," or "universe." For example, as the Hindi-English Online Dictionary tells me, "Academia" (the academic world) is referred to in contemporary Hindi as "shiksha-jagat," meaning literally "the world of education"; the same phrase occurs in Odia. Further, as my appreciated colleague of Indian origin and co-editor of the Journal of Research Practice, D.P. Dash (2013d) informs me, there exist today in India a few news media such as Jagat News, a news aggregation website, and Jagat Kranti, a Hindi newspaper. In Jakarta, Indonesia, I find Jagat Review, an online service offering reviews of household electronics, games, movies, etc. (By the way, the name of the city of Jakarta, too, is etymologically related to jagat.) And so on. It is quite possible that the term "jagat" is used more widely today than in the epoch in which the Upanishads originated (approximately 800-500 BCE). For readers who would like to do their own research, a good scholarly source to begin with is the Digital Libraries of South Asia site (CLR, 2013).  [BACK]

23) Compare on these three basic virtues (or demands) of reason the corresponding critically-heuristic ideas (or quasi-transcendental ideas) in my work on CSH, by which I mean ideas that play an essential part in "securing at least as critical solution to the problem of practical reason"– the systems idea, the moral idea, and the guarantor idea (Ulrich, 1983; on the concept of a "critical solution," see pp. 20, 35-37, 176f, 198, 265f, 313, and on the concept of "critically-heuristic ideas," pp. 231-234, 239f, 257-264).  [BACK]

24) As Nikhilananda explains more accurately: "The Isha Upanishad forms the fortieth chapter of the Vagasaneyi-Samhita of the Shukla Yajur Veda [also called "White" Yajur]. The Upanishads, containing the Vedic philosophy, generally form the concluding section of the Aranyaka, which, in turn, belongs to the Brahmana portion of the Vedas. The Isha Upanishad, however, is an exception, forming a part of the Samhitas, or Mantras. It derives its name from the opening word of the book: isha vasyam. A short treatise consisting of only eighteen mantras, or verses, the Isha Upanishad appears to be a very ancient Upanishad, as is evidenced by its versification and literary style." (Nikhilananda, 1949, p. 195, slightly edited, with the spelling of Sanskrit words adapted to the phonetic spelling used n the present essay)  [BACK]

25) A similar view can be found in Max Weber's (1958) work on the sociology of Indian religosity, where he analyzes the importance of the samsara and karma doctrines for the Indian caste system and quite generally for the prevalent ritualistic and traditionalistic orientation of Indian society, an orientation that as he sees it stood against the Western development of a this-worldly, rational ethics and, linked to it, of a capitalist-industrial spirit of enterprise (cf., e.g., pp. 111-113, 118-123 and 325)  [BACK]

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Ulrich, W. (2000). Reflective practice in the civil society: the contribution of critically systemic thinking. Reflective Practice, 1, No. 2, pp. 247-268.

Ulrich, W. (2001). The quest for competence in systemic research and practice. Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 18, No. 1, pp. 3-28.

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Ulrich, W. (2006a). The art of boundary crossing: another introduction to boundary critique. Ulrich's Bimonthly, May 2006.
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Ulrich, W. (2006b). Critical pragmatism: a new approach to professional and business ethics. In L. Zsolnai (ed.), Interdisciplinary Yearbook of Business Ethics, Vol. I, Oxford, UK, and Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang Academic Publishers, 2006, pp. 53-85.

Ulrich, W. (2006c). A plea for critical pragmatism. (Reflections on critical pragmatism, Part 1). Ulrich's Bimonthly, September-October 2006.
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Ulrich, W. (2006d). Rethinking critically reflective research practice: beyond Popper's critical rationalism. Journal of Research Practice, 2, No. 2, article P1.
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Ulrich, W. (2007a). Theory and practice II: the rise and fall of the "primacy of theory." (Reflections on critical pragmatism, Part 3). Ulrich's Bimonthly, January-February 2007.
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Ulrich, W. (2008a). Reflections on reflective practice (1/7): The mainstream concept of reflective practice and its blind spot. Ulrich's Bimonthly, March-April 2008 (1 March 2008).
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Ulrich, W. (2008b). Reflections on reflective practice (3/7): In search of practical reason. Ulrich's Bimonthly, September-October 2008 (8 Sep 2008).
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Ulrich, W. (2008c). Practical reason: "Drawing the future into the present." Ulrich's Bimonthly, November-December 2008.
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Ulrich, W. (2009a). Reflections on reflective practice (4/7): Philosophy of practice and Aristotelian virtue ethics. Ulrich's Bimonthly, January-February 2009.
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Ulrich, W. (2009b). Reflections on reflective practice (5/7): Practical reason and rational ethics: Kant. Ulrich's Bimonthly, March-April 2009.
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Ulrich, W. (2009c). Reflections on reflective practice (6a/7): Communicative rationality and formal pragmatics – Habermas 1. Ulrich's Bimonthly, September-October 2009.
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Ulrich, W. (2009d). Reflections on reflective practice (6b/7): Argumentation theory and practical discourse – Habermas 2. Ulrich's Bimonthly, November-December 2009.
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Ulrich, W. (2010a). Exploring discourse ethics (1/2). Ulrich's Bimonthly, March-April 2010.
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Ulrich, W. (2010b). Exploring discourse ethics (2/2). Ulrich's Bimonthly, May-June 2010.
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Ulrich, W. (2011a). What is good professional practice? (Part 1: Introduction).
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Ulrich, W. (2011b) Kant's rational ethics. Review of I. Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, transl. by H.J. Paton, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964. Amazon Customer Review, 7 July 2011.
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Ulrich, W. (2011c). A note on the convergence of Kant's concepts of rationality, morality, and politics. Ulrich's Bimonthly, September-October 2011.
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Ulrich, W. (2012a). Operational research and critical systems thinking – an integrated perspective. Part 1: OR as applied systems thinking. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 63, No. 9 (September), pp. 1228-1247.

Ulrich, W. (2012b). Operational research and critical systems thinking – an integrated perspective. Part 2: OR as argumentative practice. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 63, No. 9 (September), pp. 1307-1322.

Ulrich, W. (2013a). Reflections on reflective practice (6c/7): Discourse ethics and deliberative democracy, or the difficult path to communicative practice – Habermas 3 (1st half). Ulrich's Bimonthly, May-June 2013.
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Ulrich, W. (2013b). Critical systems thinking. In S. Gass and M. Fu (eds.), Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science, 3rd edn. (2 vols). New York: Springer, Vol. 1, pp. 314-326.

Ulrich, W. (2013c). The rational, the moral, and the general: an exploration. Part 1: Introduction, discourse ethics. Ulrich's Bimonthly, September-October 2013.
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Ulrich, W. (2014a). The rational, the moral, and the general: an exploration. Part 2: Kant's ideas of reason. Ulrich's Bimonthly, January-February 2014.
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Ulrich, W. (2014b). The rational, the moral, and the general: an exploration. Part 3: Approximating ideas – towards critical contextualism. Ulrich's Bimonthly, July-August 2014.
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Ulrich, W. (in prep.). Reflections on reflective practice (6d/7): Discourse ethics and deliberative democracy, or the difficult path to communicative practice – Habermas 3 (2nd half). Ulrich's Bimonthly (in prep.).

Vester, F. (2007). The Art of Interconnected Thinking: Tools and Concepts for a New Approach to Tackling Complexity. Munich, Germany: MCB Verlag (German orig.: Die Kunst vernetzt zu denken, Stuttgart, Germany, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 1999).

Weber, M. (1958). The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism. Transl. and ed. by H.H. Gerth and D. Martindale. Glencoe, IL: Free Press (reprint edn. Dehli: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1995).

Wittgenstein, L. (1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

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Picture data  Digital photograph taken on 29 January 2007, around 6:30 p.m., at Lake Geneva, Switzerland. ISO 50, exposure mode program shift, aperture f/4.5, exposure time 1/400 seconds, exposure bias 0, metering mode multi-segment, contrast normal, saturation normal, sharpness normal. Focal length 19 mm (equivalent to 85 mm with a conventional 35 mm camera). Original resolution 2272 x 1704 pixels; current resolution 700 x 525 pixels, compressed to 240 KB.

Brahman satyam, jagat mithya.
"Brahman is the real reality, the world is deceptive.”

(Adi Shankara, 8th/9th century, cited in Bowker, 2000, p. 96)

„All this is Brahman.... And that, Svetaketu, is how you are."
(Chandogya Upanishad, III.14.1 and VI.8.7, as transl. by F. Müller, 1879, pp. 48 and 101)

„All this is full. All that is full. From fullness, fullness comes.
When fullness is taken from fullness, fullness still remains.”
(Invocation to the Isha and the Brihadaranyaka Upanishads, as translated by E. Easwaran, 2007, p. 56)
„That is whole, this is whole. This whole proceeds from that whole. On taking away this whole from that whole, it remains whole.”

(Invocation to the Isha and the Brihadaranyaka Upanishads, as translated by S. Navlakha, 2000, p. xix)

„Sarvam idam brahman. Tat twam asi.”
(Chandogya Upanishad, III.14.1 and VI.2.3)

[„Now that which is that subtle essence (the root of all),
in it all that exists has its self. It is the true.
It is the Self, and thou, O Svetaketu, art it.”
(Chandogya Upanishad, III.14.1 and VI.8.7, as transl. by F. Müller, 1879, pp. 48 and 101)

„This whole universe is brahman. Let a man in all tranquillity meditate on this visible world as beginning, ending, and breathing in the brahman.… Now that which is that subtle essence [the root of all], in it all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the Self, and thou, O Svetaketu, art it.”
(Chandogya Upanishad, III.14.1 and VI.8.7, transl. Müller and Navlakha, 2000, pp. 146 and 190;
similarly Müller, 1879, pp. 48 and 101)
„The significance of brahman is metaphysical, not theological.”
(S. Navlakha, 2000, p. xviii)
„The choice is not between metaphysic and no metaphysic; it is always between a good metaphysic and a bad metaphysic.”
(Aldous Huxley) [cited in C. Sharma (2000), Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, p. 13]

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