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The
dilemma with general ideas The situation
is paradoxical: never before in the history of mankind
have science and professionalism played a more important part,
yet we experience what I see as a deeply seated rationality
crisis. It has become unclear what rational practice means and
how it can be secured. There is a need to bring the normative-ethical
dimension back into our conception of "practical reason"
(cf. Kant, 1786; reviewed in Ulrich, 2011b), but also to pay more than just lip service
to the art of "interconnected thinking" (cf.
Vester, 2007; reviewed in Ulrich, 2005).
Faced
with this challenge, the present series of explorations is to
give us a chance to discuss such fundamental issues. No claim
to have "the" solutions is involved quite the
contrary: there are, as I think I made clear in the earlier
parts, no solutions that would at the same time be theoretically
sufficient and practicable. All we can hope to achieve
is a somewhat deeper understanding of the role of a few very
fundamental ideas such as the moral idea, the systems idea,
and the idea of rationality in general, for critical thought
and reflective practice. (I prefer to say "deeper"
rather than "better" as there is no guarantee of improvement,
although I realize "deeper" may equally be too ambitious
and may even sound presumptuous; however, no such presumption
is intended, on the contrary, a good portion of humility is
indicated in the face of the limitations of human reason and
that is what I mean by a "deeper" understanding.)
What is the role of such general ideas in systematic thought?
How can we understand them so that despite their general and
abstract nature, they could become guides for practice?
Overview:
where we stand
In Part 1 of the series, we considered the basic
ties between the rational, the moral, and the general
and then drew on this introductory reflection as a basis for
better understanding the difficulties of discourse ethics, not
to say its failure, in trying to propose a practicable model
of discursive moral justification of norms (and thus of the
normative content of practical claims). We concluded that its
operationalization is bound to break down in practice, as it
offers no way to reconcile the conflicting demands of reason
and practice. Or, as I put it in that first part, it does not
support professionals and decision-makers in managing the tension
between the general (a theoretical idea) and the particular
(a practical reality) in the moral, in rationally defensible
ways. Rational practical discourse is not the same
as rational practice. Given that discourse ethics represents
the most systematic and sophisticated attempt to date to operationalize
the ideas of rationality and morality and to bring them together
on the basis of a communicative (or discursive) turn
of the understanding of these ideas, such a result is rather
alarming.
In
Part 2, we therefore decided to return to Kant and examine
the place he gives to general ideas in human cognition. Kant
remains one of the most fundamental and thoroughgoing thinkers
of all times about reason and morality, so that we may perhaps
still learn from him. As earlier, in the second part of the
parallel "Reflections on reflective practice" series, I
had offered a detailed analysis and discussion of Kant's
conception of practical reason, we could in this present series
focus on Kant's basic notion of general ideas as indispensable
"ideas of reason" (or also, as a priori
ideas, transcendental ideas, problematic ideas, reflective ideas)
and on gaining an overview of his system of theoretical and
practical ideas.
Thus
equipped, we are now ready in the present Part 3
to turn towards more application-oriented issues, although my
interest is still in the fundamental role of general ideas.
In the first half of this third part, we are going to examine
the basic dilemma and some related requirements of any attempt
to employ general ideas of reason as guides for practice. We
will try to understand, still theoretically arguing, what it
might mean at least to approximate the intent of general
ideas in practice; Kant will still be our guide. The second
half will then turn to some rather elementary heuristic
conjectures as to how the thus gained understanding might be
translated into practice. By "heuristic" principles
I mean guidelines that, although they can be grounded in philosophical
considerations of the kind we undertake them in these essays,
can only be meaningfully validated in practice and individually,
in terms of what difference they make to our "applied"
reasoning. What matters for heuristic considerations is not
how sophisticated they look but whether they can make a difference
in practice; whether this is so, only practice (and their on-going
development and refinement through practice) can show,
which also implies that their practical relevance remains to
be tested and experienced in individual practice and
to some extent will remain a personal matter or, as Polanyi
(1958, 1966) puts it, a matter of partly "tacit knowledge."
Accordingly disappointing such considerations are bound to be
from a scholarly point of view, as they cannot be argued as
rigorously as philosophical ideas can and should. When it comes
to heuristics, we have to dare to be imperfect and merely approximate,
and even to fail, no less than all practice of reason is bound
to be imperfect and may fail at times. The explicitly explorative
and tentative character of the present series of essays is meant
to also give room to such merely heuristic considerations.
In
quest of practical reason
Not only philosophical reflection about ultimate speculative
questions but also everyday applied argumentation
depends for its cogency on providing sufficient reasons. "Sufficient reasons" consider
all the conditions on which a claim depends for its meaning
and validity, as well as all the consequences it may have
if it is used as a basis for practical action. Sufficient reasons are in this double
sense complete reasons; they take into account all conceivably relevant circumstances
on which the outcome of decisions and actions depends, and all
the concerns by which we judge the consequences.8) But
as we learned from Kant in Part 2 (see Ulrich, 2014a, p. 2),
the quest for completeness on the side of the conditions
that is, in the context of practical action, all the assumptions
(circumstances and concerns) that condition what we see as rational
action is
bound to remain an ideal; for the totality of conditions is
itself unconditioned (i.e., absolute) and as such exceeds all
possible knowledge. A similar difficulty applies on the side
of the consequences, in that any consequences we consider may
entail further long-term consequences and side-effects that
we cannot endlessly explore. Moreover, the further such effects reach into the future, the less certain
our anticipations will usually be. In short, the requirement
of "sufficient
reasons" refers us to conditions
and consequences beyond the particular real-world aspects that
we can consider empirically, which is only a different way to
say that they entail reliance on general ideas or principles.
We thus
face a dilemma: We need ideas because they lead us beyond the limitations
of our always particular and fragmentary knowledge and appreciation
of relevant
conditions and consequences. Yet it is precisely because they
take us beyond these limitations that we cannot
easily say what they mean in real-world contexts of argumentation
and action. Even more difficult is it to justify the validity of whatever meanings
we attach to them in a specific context. How, then, can we employ them productively,
so that they might help us
to bridge the gap between
the totality of circumstances that
sufficient argumentation would need to consider in principle
and
the particular
contexts of experience and concern that argumentation can actually consider
in practice?
To be sure, we can
take the easy way out and choose to arbitrarily
break off the process of reasoning whenever we find it convenient
or necessary to do so. Often enough, everyday constrains of
time and resources the needs and opportunities of the day,
as it were prompt us to choose this option. Moreover, we all
have a certain egocentric tendency, in that we tend to see and
judge things from the perspective of our own past experiences
and current concerns. Since the latter are shaped by the former,
the contexts that we take to be relevant tend to be determined
by personal or collective boundaries of current interest
and concern. But allowing us to be conditioned by the opportunities
and concerns of the day will do little to resolve the
dilemma. Arbitrariness and topicality do not go well with rationality. How
rational (or reasonable) is it to judge and argue on the basis
of conditions and / or consequences that arbitrarily remain unconsidered,
unexplained and unjustified or which, inasmuch as they are
considered, are judged merely on the basis of one's current
concerns and resources? A better approach might try to
carefully make ourselves aware of this argumentative gap between
experience and reason, and to somehow learn to handle it productively
so that we could at least "approximately" do justice
to both. This indeed appears to be the solution that Kant has in mind
when he describes the use of ideas in these words:
[Ideas of reason] contain a certain completeness to which no
possible empirical knowledge ever attains. In them reason aims only at a
systematic unity, to which it seeks to approximate the unity that is
empirically possible, without ever completely reaching it. (Kant, 1787,
B596, emphasis added)
Fourth
intermediate reflection:
On "approximating"
ideas
Two
initial conjectures
We have understood that ideas of reason as Kant understands
them are to guide us towards a unity and completeness
of thought that reaches beyond what we can consider and appreciate
in practice. It follows that in practice whether in research practice, professional practice
or everyday practice we can at best hope to "approximate"
such a quality of thought as reason would demand it. This situation
suggests two immediate conjectures to me.
About
"approximate" reasonableness
First, abstract and
difficult as Kant's demonstration of the role of "transcendental"
ideas of reason may appear at times, isn't it encouraging that
his notion of reasonableness is not quite as remote from everyday
life, or even irrelevant to it, as one might think at first.
Indeed, isn't such "approximate" reasonableness really
what we mean in everyday life when we demand "reasonable"
thinking and conduct from others, so that we can come to some
practical conclusion and move on? Under real-word conditions
of imperfect rationality, it certainly appears reasonable to
renounce perfection in the form of theoretically sufficient
(i.e., complete) reasons in favor of striking a balance between the
demands of reason and those of practice, between what rational
argument and action would strictly speaking require and what
pragmatic decision-making and implementation suggest. Kant would
hardly object to such common sense. Rather, he would admonish
us that in order to find such approximate compromises,
and even more so to be able to judge their quality as reasonable
approximations, we first need to understand what those demands
of reason mean in any specific situation. He would insist
that we be clear about the ideas that guide us and the way they
inform our claims to reasonableness.
There
is no "direct" approach
As
a second immediate reflection, it seems to me what Kant
had in mind is similar to what in my work on critical systems
thinking (CST) and critical systems heuristics (CSH)
I describe in the terms of an unavoidable, but unattainable,
quest for comprehensiveness. Reason cannot renounce its
own insight that sufficient reasons in all matters theoretical
and practical depend on knowing and considering all conceivably
relevant circumstances. Or, as systems practitioners put it
in (I fear) philosophically somewhat sloppy language (I'll nevertheless
adopt it here), to judge
the quality of any proposition one has to look at the "whole
system" (which from a perspective of pragmatic
rather than pure practical reason can only mean the whole relevant
system). But then, reason also cannot ignore the insight
that attaining comprehensiveness is not "empirically
possible," to use Kant's formulation. It's not
that we should not try, or that we may not actually come close to the
ideal sometimes; the point is, rather,
that we usually have no "direct" way of coming close to it
and knowing how close we have come, as there is no operational measure of comprehensiveness.
I say "usually" because there are exception; the examples
of mathematical induction and other mathematical methods of
approximation (e.g., infinitesimal calculus) come to mind.
They are "direct" methods of approximation inasmuch
as they can proceed according to defined procedures that make
sure that each step is indeed an approximation, although the
endpoint is never reached.
As
an example of an "indirect" though still scientific
approach, meteorologists
can tell us it is likely to rain tomorrow, but they can't and
won't usually claim they know for sure, as they know very well
that they don't have sufficient reasons to guarantee their forecast.
(Sometimes they try to resolve the problem by indicating probabilities
for the forecast such as "there is a 60% probability that
it will rain tomorrow," but again, they will not and cannot
guarantee such a forecast.) Conversely, the fact that their forecasts often turn out to
be accurate does not imply they had theoretically sufficient reasons. (Everyone
will occasionally predict rain accurately, but it might be due to
chance or rules of thumb rather than sufficient reasons.) For practical purposes,
though, the simulation models on which meteorological forecasts are
based today can very well be described as
an efficient "indirect" approach to (approximately
sufficient) comprehensiveness. Although it does not supply theoretically
sufficient reasons for any specific forecast, and although there
is no operational measure in advance of how far it is from accuracy,
statistically
speaking it does often achieve useful accuracy and reliability for practical
purposes. The snag is that from this rather good statistics
of success we cannot infer the accuracy and reliability of tomorrow's
forecast, which perhaps matters to us particularly (say,
in the case of a gale warning or flood alert, or because our
holiday begins). Even so I think it is fair to say that applied
meteorology has found ways to "approximate" the quest
for comprehensiveness reasonably well literally so,
in that the limitations of its "indirect" approach to
approximation are well reasoned and clear.
The situation is a
bit more difficult in those fields of applied research and professional
intervention, say, in political and corporate decision-making,
where, if things
go wrong, undesired outcomes may affect many people in morally relevant
ways, inasmuch as their personal integrity and their right to
fair treatment is at stake and adverse consequences are due to human action or
inaction rather than to nature. Think of the evaluation of the safety and social impacts of new technologies,
or of public health matters or medical interventions, or even
of professional misconduct. To be sure, to some extent meteorologists
also face such situations, say, in the case of natural disasters
they are expected to foresee; but we do not usually associate
failures of meteorological prediction with moral failures. It
is true, however, that due to the progress of applied science
and technology, the dividing line between "phenomena of nature"
and "consequences of human action" is becoming increasingly
difficult to draw. It is the latter which I have in mind here.
It
is characteristic of such situations that it is less clear
and often controversial what is to be considered a "reasonable"
approximation of rational practice, as the normative side of
things gains importance. The point is, in such situations we
need to "approximate" not only sufficient reasons
for predicting and handling nature but also for identifying
and managing the value implications of how we handle the situation.
These often manifest themselves in the form of distributional
issues: Who is to get the benefits and who
has to bear the costs and risks or other disadvantages? With
regard to such normative questions, too, the quest for "sufficient reasons" remains
a meaningful ideal, but what it means and how it can be approximated
becomes less clear. The effort we invest in trying to investigate
and define all relevant circumstances and concerns will usually
be a question of available time and resources as compared to how
much the outcome or the risks and costs at
stake matter to those involved or concerned, and there is nothing wrong with that. Situation-specific
aspects of feasibility may also act as constrains; for example,
in the case of issues with long-term implications (e.g., in
environmental and energy policy), it is not always feasible
to get all those concerned involved children and those not yet born usually can't get involved. But the more important
point is that no matter how much effort
we invest in approximating the ideal, it is dangerous
to assume we actually come close to it. Many poor decision outcomes
have their origin in this assumption, rather than in a lack
of sufficient effort. In the terms of CSH: "The quest
for comprehensiveness is a meaningful effort but not
a meaningful claim." (Ulrich, 2012a, p. 1236;
2012b, p. 1314; similarly 2013a, p. 38)
Three
essential ideas
Systems thinking is for me the messenger rather than the culprit
of the difficulty we face the fact that for successful and
responsible action, comprehensive consideration
of all possibly relevant circumstances is both necessary and
impossible. The difficulty
is not specific to systems thinking, it constitutes an integral part of reasonableness
in all fields of systematic thought and action. Rather than
causing the difficulty, systems thinking can be used in handling
it. It can help us understand the whole-systems
implications of our claims and thus can serve a critical purpose
against insufficiently questioned claims to comprehensiveness
and rationality. Thus-understood systems thinking becomes critical
systems thinking a tool for dealing carefully
with the situation. Once understood in this manner, systems
thinking becomes indispensable in a way that differs markedly
from the technocratic ring it has to many people. The "no-matter-how-much"
point made above then translates into a challenging new imperative
for systems thinkers: if systems thinking is to make
any sense, that is, to ensure a gain of rationality, we get no holiday from critical
systems thinking. We do not really need a "systems
approach" unless we are willing to take into account the
whole-systems implications of our claims.
In
the same vein, a scientific approach isn't really needed unless
we are willing to consider, within the mentioned constrains,
all possible sources of error. Likewise, moral discourse misses the mark unless we are prepared to consider
the situation of everyone concerned equally. The basic demand
of reason that we have described in terms of the quest
for comprehensiveness remains the same. Facing it is a relevant
idea regardless of whether we
seek to ground rational practice mainly in science or moral discourse or systems thinking,
or in some careful combination of them. The language and methods we use
may change, but the methodological challenge remains. It amounts to what I call the critical turn,
that is, a systematic methodological shift of focus from the
quest for comprehensiveness to a more practicable and critically
tenable quest for dealing carefully with the inevitable lack
of comprehensiveness in all our knowledge, understanding, and
rationality (see, e.g., Ulrich, 1983, pp. 21, 224f, 230, 260 and passim;
1996, p. 11f; 2001, p. 23f).
This is the basic concern that inspired my work on critical
systems heuristics (CSH), but it is an equally relevant concern
in the fields of applied science, professional intervention,
reflective practice, and moral discourse.
In
this discussion of the nature and role of general ideas for
rational practice, we
may thus add the systems idea to our list of general
ideas of reason, along with the ideas of rationality and morality on which we have focused so far. Ever since Critical Heuristics,
these three ideas constitute for me the most fundamental and
essential ideas of practical
reason (cf. Ulrich, 1983, e.g., pp. 217-225, 260-262, 264).
And if you ask me what precisely I mean by each of these three
essential ideas, I would invite you to find out and decide for
yourself what difference they are to make to you, so
that they can best orient your thought and action and also so
that you can always share your motives and reasons with all
others concerned rather than needing to conceal them.9)
As
a starting point for such reflection, it will be quite sufficient
to understand each of the three concepts in the most basic and
general sense you can think of, for instance (my personal notions,
to be read as only one among many meaningful readings of the
three ideas):
- the
systems idea, the notion of a whole of interrelated
parts that cannot be understood in isolation, as asking us to always think together
that which belongs together;
- the
idea of rationality, the notion of arguability
of claims in terms of logical consistency and pragmatic
cogency as essential (though not necessarily the only)
sources of accuracy, reliability, and relevance, as asking us to always question
the sources of guarantee on which we rely in our thinking;
and
- the
moral idea, the notion of an unconditional good
that could orient human thought and action, as asking us to always act so that
if others acted the same way, we could still agree and expect
that improvement
would result.
These
three ideas, then, are for me the essential general ideas that
I associate with Kant's ideas of reason. They are, as the
little exercise above (of reflecting on what they mean to you)
is meant so show, capable and in need of interpretation and
always remain so. To
be sure, whatever personal ideals or visions we may associate
with such general ideas, it is equally still clear that in practice
we can at best hope to approximate these ideals or visions more or
less, often enough with the emphasis on less. They can,
as I tried to make clear, orient
our reflection but not justify our claims. What
for practical purposes we take to amount to sufficiently comprehensive, rational, and moral considerations and
arguments will in the end always remain a go-between,
a compromise between the ideal and the actual state of affairs
or, as Kant puts it in the quote above, between what reason
demands of us and what is "empirically possible" to
us in real-world contexts of argumentation and action.
The
pragmatic tradition of thought When
Kant writes about general ideas of reason that "in them, reason aims only at a
systematic unity, to which it seeks to approximate the unity that is
empirically possible" (B596), he gives us an important hint but it is really
only a hint. It does not tell us much about how to do it, that is, how
we might somewhat systematically approximate that unity and
integrity of our reasoning which is empirically possible. All
it tells us is that we somehow need to learn to manage the tension between
the two poles of the unconditional and the empirical, the demands
of (pure) reason and those of (imperfect) practice. Interestingly
though, to do justice to Kant and also to make it clear that
the present effort need not start from scratch but is embedded
in a well-developed tradition of thought, one of the earliest
mentionings of the philosophical relevance of pragmatism
of which I am aware in modern "Western" philosophizing
can be found in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
It must have inspired the "American Kant," Charles
Peirce, to conceive of his work on the logic of inquiry in terms
of "pragmatism," although we have no secure knowledge
of this assumption apart from the fact that he had studied Kant
extensively. In one of the late sections of the Critique,
Kant beautifully explains his understanding of the practical
interest of reason
as it emerges from the first Critique, the critique of
theoretical reason, with these words:
Reason
is impelled by a tendency of its nature to go out beyond
the field of its empirical employment, and to venture in a pure
employment, by means of ideas alone, to the utmost limits of
all knowledge, and not to be satisfied save through the completion
of its course in [the apprehension of] a self-subsistent systematic
whole. Is this endeavour the outcome merely of the speculative
interests of reason? Must we not rather regard it as having
its source exclusively in the practical interests of reason?
[
]
By
'the practical' I mean everything that is possible through freedom.
When, however, the conditions of the exercise of our free will
are empirical, reason can have no other than a regulative employment
in regard to it, and can serve only to effect unity in its empirical
laws.
In this field, therefore, reason can supply none but
pragmatic laws of free action, for the attainment of
those ends which are commended to us by the senses; it cannot
yield us laws that are pure and determined completely a priori
(Kant, 1787, B 828).
That
is to say, practical reason is "pragmatic" whenever
it includes empirical considerations and thus is not "pure"
the normal case rather than the exception (the latter being
Kant's examination of the limiting case toward which practical
reason leads us if we relentlessly pursue its intent; on the implications of this recognition for the development of
a critical pragmatism, see Ulrich, 2006b, pp. 58-73). It's only
a brief and insufficient hint at the idea of a pragmatic employment
of the ideas of reason that Kant offers here, expressed in passing
as it were; and moreover it is only one of two mentionings of
the term "pragmatic" of which I am aware in Kant's
critical writings; but it was to prove influential. The other mentioning is in a later passage of the Critique
about the "hypothetical" use of reason, where Kant
explains his notion of what he calls a
pragmatic belief as follows:
Once
an end is accepted, the conditions of its attainment are hypothetically
necessary. This necessity is subjectively, but still only comparatively,
sufficient, if I know of no other conditions under which the
end can be attained. On the other hand, it is sufficient, absolutely
and for everyone, if I know with certainty that no one can have
knowledge of any other conditions which lead to the proposed
end. In the former case my assumption and the holding of certain
conditions to be true is a merely contingent belief; in the
latter case it is a necessary belief. [For example:] The physician
must do something for a patient in danger, but does not know
the nature of his illness. He observes the symptoms, and if
he can find no more likely alternative, judges it to be a case
of phthisis. Not even in his own estimation his belief is contingent
only; another observer might perhaps come to a sounder conclusion.
Such contingent belief, which yet forms the ground for the actual
employment of means to certain actions, I entitle pragmatic
belief. (Kant, 1787, B852)
In
The Metaphysical Club, a careful biographical history
of American pragmatism, Menand (2001, p. 227) cites
this latter passage. Personally, I prefer to think of the former
rather than the latter passage as Peirce's main source of inspiration,
or in any case as a source for my ideas on "critical pragmatism,"
as it locates the emergence of pragmatism closer to Kantian
practical philosophy than to the problematic means-end scheme
of later positivist thought, a misreading that an isolated quote
of the second passage could cause (for my critique of the means-end
scheme, see Ulrich, 2011a, pp. 13-18).
I
have not seen any references to these two passages in other accounts
of American pragmatism. Accordingly unsurprising it is that
so little appears to be known about this first appearance
of modern pragmatism in Kant, and thus also about the pragmatic
side of Kant's critical reasoning. Not even the unsurpassed
source of information about the history of terms, the complete
edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, mentions
Kant in its detailed accounts of the terms "pragmatic,"
"pragmatica," "pragmatical," and "pragmatism."
Nevertheless, through the work of Peirce and his later colleagues
and successors, these two brief hints of Kant were to prove
so incredibly influential in the history of modern thought!
Managing
the problem of practical reason: learning to manage the tension
between ideas and practice
I suspect
that the philosophically unresolved problem of practical reason
of how reason can become sufficiently practical so as to secure
reasonable practice
is indeed usefully understood in pragmatic terms of managing
the tension between the demands of reason and those of practice,
and that a proper understanding of the role of general ideas
is essential to that end. "Managing
the tension" means that we do not one-sidedly promote
either reason or practice at the expense of the other but
rather, try to bring reason and practice together. Yet
all the solution attempts of which I am aware tend to champion
one side only, usually (in moral theory) that of reason. The
view preferred here implies that there is and can be no such
one-sided solution, and that means: no complete theoretical solution;
for that would mean to miss the
core of the problem, which is that the two sides have to learn to live together anew in each specific situation.
"Managing
the tension," then, may not be an altogether bad idea. Again, though, it's easier
said than done: How are we supposed to find reasonable
positions in between, that is, viewpoints and proposals for action that would
at
least partly reconcile the demands of reason and practice? Further,
once we think we have found them, how do we know, that is, how
can we judge their quality and argue them? Kant, at least at
first sight, leaves us rather
alone with this sort of application-oriented questions. Understandably
so, as he was busy enough to lay the "transcendental"
foundations of reason's self-tribunal and to work out the
insights it yielded into the nature and limitations of reason.
Fortunately though, we do not have to start all over from where
Kant left us, thanks to the work of the American pragmatists
(Peirce, James, and Dewey) who took up Kant's hint at the option
of a "pragmatic" use of the ideas of reason and developed
a rich tradition of thought from which we can draw today (compare
Kant, 1787, B828 and Ulrich,
2006b, p. 58f; as well as footnote 8; I have also explained
the roots of my work in philosophical pragmatism, along with
Kantian practical philosophy, in Ulrich, 2001, esp. pp. 8-14).
Even so, I propose to start from a somewhat more basic beginning,
given that it seems to me that the critical aim of Kant's
understanding of a "critique of reason" has been somewhat
lost out of sight in the pragmatist tradition of thought. Pragmatism
will play a central role in the continuation of the "Reflections
on reflective practice" series but in the present exploration
of the meaning of ideas, I prefer to venture into somewhat
less charted terrain.
To prepare us a bit better ventures into uncharted or unfamiliar
terrain always risk failing I suggest we briefly consider
the moral idea in a bit more detail, as it is the one general
idea of reason that has been in the center of many Bimonthly
essays of the past few years and thus may be familiar to many
readers, even more so than the systems
idea. It will be useful in the further course of our "approximation"
attempt to have in mind this major example. In what way is the
moral idea a mere idea of reason, and a general one for
that; what difficulties and chances are involved in applying it,
wherein consists its power?
The moral
idea, a powerful heuristic fiction
More
obviously than the two other essential ideas, the moral idea
embodies a normative core. It describes not just a dry methodological
requirement of rationality such as the search for systematic
unity of thought a requirement one may like or not but which
is simply an indispensable ingredient of cogent argumentation
but also a remarkable, perennially inspiring vision of the human world as it could be. The fact that it describes
a utopia rather than a normal state of matters does not invalidate
it, however. Rather the contrary; it makes it the most fundamental
and essential idea
of all in the realm of practical reason. We cannot argue rigorously
and systematically about practical questions without implying
some well-defined ultimate standard of evaluation, a standard
that is above all the divergent specific norms and values to
which people adhere. The moral idea provides such a standard.
Almost by definition it is highly abstract, given that it has
to abstract from any specific norms, and that makes it difficult
to use in support of specific claims. Even so, if we properly
understand it as an indispensable idea of practical reason,
we can still learn a lot from it about
the quality of our practical reasoning, by examining our
arguments and reasons in its light.
In
the realm of the practical, the quest for sufficient reasons
leads us to consider our moral reasons. Moral reasons
inform not just the norms by which we evaluate things but also the facts
we consider empirically relevant. Norms challenge
that which is taken to be normal, including the facts
considered relevant for understanding situations, therein lies their power. Norms
can change "facts." Or, as I have put it in one earlier
essay, moral reasons help us in "drawing the future into
the present" (Ulrich, 2008c). Without the moral idea, we cannot think and argue rationally about empirical
contexts of action in the full
sense of "rational practice," which includes that
which is the case at present (the factual) and that which
might or ought to be the case in future (the possible and desirable);
that is, the theoretical-instrumental
and the practical-normative dimension of reason.
In
Kantian terms, the moral idea stands for the totality of the conditions
that together would make possible a moral world (1787, B836f), if it were to become
real at all. In this sense it is merely a fiction, one
might say: a projected unity (1787, B675), but
one we need for consistent and rigorous thinking about practical
questions. Methodologically speaking, it serves a heuristic
purpose in "drawing the future into the present,"
as I suggested above, by supplying a standard of practical reason
towards which we can think, argue, and act, even though we can
never fully live up to it. This heuristic fiction includes the
notion that morality or a morally good will is universal, in
the double sense that we owe it to all individuals and conversely,
we must also demand it from all human agents. A moral world would
consequently be a world in which all agents would in this sense be agents of good will and would
act
according to universalizable (or generalizable) norms or principles of action. This notion
of a moral world is "only an idea" (Kant, 1787, B384f),
but what a powerful heuristic fiction it is! As moral agents we are to adopt it as a guide for moral action as if it were real, quite regardless of how
"realistic" or "unrealistic" it may be. Moral agents will act as if they
lived in a moral world.
Two
basic doubts As
a last introductory consideration regarding
the role and handling of general ideas, I propose we briefly consider
two kinds of doubt that may come up at this stage, although
perhaps less so with the moral idea than with the other two
essential ideas. The first
concerns the success of science in dealing with general ideas
(a); the second, the role of domain-specific principles of critical
practice (b).
Re
(a): Science practice
Some readers, especially those with a scientific background, may wonder whether we are not trying to reinvent
the wheel here, given that science has long since found successful
ways
to approximate the quest for comprehensiveness and thus to be in control of its use of essential
general ideas such as "causality," "laws"
of nature, the "forces of nature" such as gravitation,
the inertia of mass, the conservation of energy, the infinity
of the universe, and countless others. To some extent this is indeed so. Through its
institutionalized processes of open discourse and critical review,
science has found ways to implement the "indirect"
approach, along with its recourse to mathematical methods that
permit "direct" approximation of ideal endpoints.
We can learn from this success. However, there are limits
to the transfer of the methods and institutions of scientific
criticism to other domains, especially when we compare the requirements
of moral discourse to those of scientific discourse. In both
domains it is essential that we keep the assumptions that inform people's views and proposals under constant review;
but the ways to do this will differ, due to the different nature
of scientific and moral judgment.10)
In comparison
to moral discourse, the situation in scientific discourse is
less complicated, for
two main reasons. First, science benefits from the circumstance that for its purposes,
an ultimate, impartial and unchanging arbiter is available in the form of Nature
nature with a capital N, understood as the sum-total (and
ultimate unity) of all the phenomena
and underlying "laws" and properties that make up
the physical
universe. Disputed claims can in principle
(although in practice it is often a complicated and controversial
matter) be subjected to Nature as the arbiter, as many times
as desired,
so as to test their accuracy and reliability. Second, there
is usually a global community of researchers that is large enough, and in principle
is unlimited, so as to ensure
independent replication and review of research findings and conclusions (again
a complicated matter that in practice remains prone to doubts
and misuse). In moral discourse, by contrast, no impartial
arbiter such as Nature is available, neither in principle nor
in practice, and to the extent
some individuals or groups of people claim to be such an arbiter, serious
doubts are always
indicated. The lack of an objective arbiter may explain why
moral theory could in principle be an important source of orientation
for moral practice, in replacement of Nature as it were. But of course,
moral theory has its own difficulties, which have prevented
it from being as relevant to practical people as it is to philosophers. In this respect the situation is not unlike that of
scientific research practice and its relation to science theory; one can
be a competent research practitioner in biochemistry and not
know beans about science theory, just as one can still be a
responsible moral agent without mastering the complexities and
subtleties of moral theory. Even so, at least in principle such theoretical backing is more urgently lacking
in moral practice than in research practice,
due to the absence of Nature's arbitral role. In practice though,
it has proven more helpful in both domains to refer to the community of those interested
as a critical instance the scientific community, defined
as the community of competent inquirers, in the case of research
practice and the moral community, as the community
of those concerned, in the case of moral discourse. Unfortunately,
in the latter case it is less easy
to define the relevant community and to find practical ways of getting
it involved (think again of future generations in the case of environmental
issues), quite apart from the fact that the moral community
rarely amounts
to a global audience of rationally motivated and good-willed agents
such as the moral idea would require it. These differences explain why the search for theoretically defensible and
practicable models of
justification is not only more urgent but also more difficult in
moral reasoning than it is in science.11)
Re
(b): Domain-specific principles
Not only science but also diverse applied disciplines and fields
of practice have developed pragmatic guidelines that appear
to work well. Two well-known examples are the general principle
of primum non nocere in medicine, that is, of making
sure one doesn't cause harm in the first place, before attempting
to do good; and the precautionary principle in environmental
and developmental policy and other fields of practice, which
shifts the burden of proof from those fearing that harm may
be done to those claiming no harmful effects have been proven.
Readers might wonder whether there is really a need for going
into the difficult methodological issues to which our discussion
of general ideas or principles points, given that such domain-specific
guidelines appear to demonstrate successful cases in which the
"direct" approach works. Haven't these principles
proven to resolve such uncertainties as we associate them with
the quest for comprehensiveness? I would argue that this is
not so. Even if a general idea has been formulated and proven
useful for a specific field of practice, this does not alter
the core difficulty in applying general ideas, namely, that
we need to interpret what they mean in the specific situation
at hand. No general idea can tell us what we should take to
be the relevant empirical and normative context for defining the
circumstances ("facts") and concerns ("values")
that matter,
and how in their light we should decide what difference the
idea should make. (For critical purposes, I define a "context" as the set of contextual assumptions,
regarding both facts and values, on which a specific claim
or argument depends, a topic to which I will turn in a moment.) Different concerned parties will have different
views and interests regarding relevant contexts, and no general idea can tell
us what priorities should be assigned to these different perspectives.
Hence,
while such guidelines provide valuable orientation, they do
not supersede the need for interpreting and assessing the situation
in their light. The issue of "sufficient
reasons," particularly of sufficient moral reasons, reappears
at this point, no less urgently than before. In fact, the
more some general principle has proven to be relevant as a domain-specific
guideline, the more we have to expect that its situation-specific
interpretation and implementation
will be controversial; for the way this is done will indeed make
a difference. Controversies are a clear symptom that sufficient
reasons are lacking; they can't be decided in a clear and sufficiently
argued way, thus they tend to go on and impede productive action.
As
a further observation, the more reliance on some guideline becomes a matter
of course or even a standard procedure of competent professional
conduct in a field, the less it will tend to fulfill its original critical function.
Routine will creep in, along with references to special expertise
and authority not available to all, and will determine how situations have
to be seen and handled in its light. In this way the mentioned
controversies can be overcome or avoided. But in questions of rational
and moral practice, reference to routine and expertise are not
good guides. What is rationally and morally defensible in the
light of conflicting views and needs must always anew be unfolded
in the situation itself, no amount of experience and no theory
of rationality or of morality can tell us what the situation
is and how it may differ from previously encountered situations.
Accordingly important it remains that all those concerned are
heard and their concerns are carefully identified and handled,
and that the relevance and use of such guidelines in specific
situations be kept under constant critical review, also in the
light of such testimonies.
There
is thus, again, no such thing as a direct and unambiguous application
of general ideas or principles, even in their domain-specific
variant. We may be very clear in our mind about how we understand
the moral idea, but the moment we apply it to some context of
application, its meaning becomes ambivalent and in need of interpretation,
as it depends on how the situation is seen. One may indeed see
its essential practical role in challenging us to clarify our
view of the situation and to agree with others concerned about
what it means to see the situation from a moral point of view. Inasmuch
as the moral idea is an essential idea that can make a difference,
it is again to be expected that there will be different opinions as
to what would be a moral handling of the situation. If we were
to expect the moral idea itself to give us the answers, these would
have to be predefined and so general that they could not do
justice to different possible ways of seeing or experiencing
a situation. In any case, such answers could not supersede the
need for situation-specific clarification and argumentation;
it is hard to see why and how such predefined answers should
suit or silence everyone.
The
same situation applies to all other general ideas. The systems
idea, for example, cannot tell us in a predefined way what the
relevant system to be considered is. The primum non nocere
principle cannot tell us what specific forms of harm can occur
in a situation and how we should weigh them, much less how we
can avoid them. And so on. These are the essential matters that
need to be clarified and unfolded in the situation itself. General
ideas remind us this is so and they can give us some basic directions,
but it is not their task to spare us the effort of careful thought
and discourse. It follows that uncertainties
and controversies are an intrinsic and meaningful part of the
use of all general ideas of reason. Kant has made us understand why this must be so:
it is because "the universal is [to be] admitted as problematic
only, and is a mere idea." (Kant, 1787, B674). The systematic
unity or integrity of thought that general ideas envisage is
a hypothetical, anticipated unity only or, as we have put it above with Kant, a "projected unity":
The
systematic unity (as a mere idea) is, however, only a projected
unity, to be regarded not as given in itself, but as a problem
only. (Kant, 1787, B675)
General
ideas formulate problems, not answers. They tell us where our
critical attention is needed, where arguments may deceive us
or where critically
reflective practice of research or intervention is indispensable. This is what Kant, as I understand
him, means by "approximation."
The key concept, then, is reflective practice. In line with my
understanding of "reflective practice," which is rather
different from the mainstream concept of reflective practice
as discussed by Schφn (1983, 1987),12)
my basic approach to supporting reflective practice is in terms of critical
heuristics of social practice, as distinguished from both
a "critical theory of society" approach (Habermas,
1984) and a "transcendental" approach to the critique
of practical reason. Despite the differences in question, it is obvious
that critically-heuristic reflection owes much to these two
approaches, as my frequent references to the writings of Habermas
and Kant betray.13)
Fifth
intermediate reflection:
Some heuristics for "critical
contextualism"
Some
elementary heuristic conjectures
In
what follows, I would like to explore some basic heuristic considerations concerning
a productive and critically reflecting use of general ideas
of reason, so as to approximate their intent without sacrificing
practicability (or conversely, so as to ensure practicability
without giving up their intent). Heuristic considerations as
I understand them stipulate frameworks or guidelines that, although
based in philosophical and methodological reasoning, can prove
their value only in practice. They become
critically-heuristic frameworks or guidelines to the extent
we succeed in translating such considerations into well-specified
conceptual tools for critical purposes. The "translations"
will not provide any specific answers to practical questions,
but they should at least challenge us to specify
and review our situation-specific views and concerns in the
light of general ideas, whether on an individual basis (reflection)
or by submitting them to the critique of others (discourse). In
one word, they should be apt to support reflective practice.
Whether and to what extent they do so cannot be decided theoretically
but has to be tried and tested individually, which is to say,
they need not prove equally helpful to all people. Within the context
of the present discussion, we can thus define critically-heuristic devices
as follows.
Definition:
Critically-heuristic devices are conceptual tools that
help us approximate an adequate, situation-specific
use of general ideas of reason, such as the systems idea
or the moral idea, through reflective practice,
that is, by supporting processes of systematic reflection and
discourse on the unavoidably imperfect understanding and use
of the ideas in question.
I
use the name "critical heuristics" as a convenient
shorthand for such reflective and argumentative devices. In
what follows I will focus on two rather elementary heuristic
considerations that are not yet sufficiently worked out for
operationalization as critically-heuristic guidelines, and accordingly
also cannot claim to have proven their critical significance
for many people. At this stage, they remain tentative and exploratory,
but I associate with them a hope that they lend themselves to
development into critically-heuristic devices properly speaking.
They are based in my professional life, in which I often had
to deal with the diverging demands of reason and practice, particularly
as I encountered them at the interface of science and politics.
I tentatively
call them the argument space
approach and the standpoint spotting
approach. The first focuses on the relationship between general
ideas and contextual reflection, the second on critical self-reflection
and patterns or movements of thought conducive to it. As I understand
them, the two efforts are not independent; if well-conceived,
they should support one another. Both are about managing multiple
perspectives overtly and critically. Both also share a fundamental
methodological core idea of all my work, which in the past ten
years or so I have come to understand as "critical contextualism."
Definition:
Critical contextualism is a reflective epistemological and ethical
stance aimed at a critical handling of the standpoint-dependent,
contextual assumptions that shape people's notions of what is true, right, and rational.
It is useful to apply a critically contextualist stance in connection
with general ideas of reason; critical contextualism then means
a systematic process of exploring alternatively delimited situations
in the light of the ideas in question. Critical contextualism
serves a merely critical purpose; it aims not at justifying
claims but rather, at avoiding untenable, because insufficiently
qualified, claims.
In
connection with the moral idea, for instance, a critically contextualist
approach moves between the two limiting cases of moral universalism
(i.e., moral is what holds universally for all rational agents
of good will) and moral contextualism (i.e., moral is
what a specific moral community considers right). Similarly,
in connection with the systems idea, a critically contextualist
approach moves between the two limiting cases of assessing systems
rationality in terms of the immediate system of interest
(i.e., rational is what serves the needs or interests of "the system"
under consideration, e.g., a traffic system, a hospital, or
a business company) vs. the whole-systems implications
of such systems rationality for humanity as a whole (i.e., rational
is what lays open, questions, and adequately manages the external effects of claims
to rationality, e.g., on the regional economy or the global
ecosystem).
It
should not surprise us that the moral idea and the systems idea
make similar demands on reflective practice, in the critically
contextualist sense just explained. Both confront us with the
simultaneous necessity and impracticability of the quest for
comprehensiveness; neither tells us how to handle these diverging
requirements in ways that would at the same time be theoretically
sufficient and practicable. In the terms of the present essay,
both only allow for some reasonable go-between, a critically considered effort of "managing
the tension" between what reason strictly speaking demands
and what is empirically possible.
In
the terms of CSH, a solution to the problem of practical reason
that is not embedded in such a critically contextualist effort
threatens to pervert the critically heuristic purpose of
systems thinking and of moral thinking, respectively
of uncovering sources of suboptimization and of normative conflict
into a mere heuristics of systems purposes. It is then
no longer the "system" (and the contextual assumptions
constitutive of it, along with the normative implications these
assumptions may have for all those concerned) which is considered the problem; instead,
the problems of the system are now investigated
and are taken care of. The point is, of course, that no singular
standpoint, not even the most comprehensive systems or moral
perspective, is
ever sufficient in itself to validate its own implications.
It follows that both systems thinking and moral reasoning, or
the practical claims grounded in them, are rationally arguable
inasmuch as they systematically reflect on their contextual
assumptions and make them transparent to everyone concerned.14)
Remember,
I define as "context" the set of contextual assumptions
that determine what counts as relevant facts and values for
judging a situation or changing it. In my published work I have
often dealt with the critical handling of contextual assumptions
(e.g., in my account of the open systems fallacy just mentioned
in note 13, or in my framework for practical boundary critique),
but only on a few occasions I have also referred explicitly
to the underlying epistemological notion of critical contextualism
(e.g., Ulrich, 2006b, pp. 70-74). The core concept of critical
contextualism shares this fate with the other idιe fixe
that equally is driving my current work, the development of a framework
of "critical pragmatism" for applied research and
professional intervention. Although both concepts have been shaping my understanding of critical systems thinking and reflective
practice all along, full awareness of their generic and fundamental
nature beyond the field of systems thinking has only gradually
emerged. I continue to work on the task of grounding them theoretically
(i.e., philosophically), as well as operationalizing them practically
(i.e., pragmatically). The current series of exploratory essays
on the role of "general ideas" is part of this endeavour,
along with the "Reflection on reflective practice"
series and many other Bimonthly articles. So let us now
turn to the two announced heuristic considerations. They are really
still quite tentative and certainly insufficient as measured
by the methodological importance that I attach to the idea of critical contextualism. They are, indeed, of a merely exploratory nature, with no claim
or ambition to
amount to more than that.
Heuristic
consideration #1: general ideas as "argument places" Earlier
we characterized general ideas of reason as "ideal reference points" or "limiting
concepts" towards which reason can orient itself (cf. Ulrich,
2014a, p. 7 and note 5). For example, if we follow Kant,
the moral idea stands for the ideal of a global moral community
in which people treat one another with equal respect for their
individual dignity and freedom. Meanwhile we have considered
the difficulty that such limiting concepts imply a comprehensiveness
and unity of what Kant calls the understanding
(= the empirical employment of the human intellect) that goes
beyond what is empirically possible. It follows that it is between
two limiting cases that a critical handling of general ideas can
move and must find reasonable "approximations" of
their intent: between taking for granted what is empirically
given on the one hand and presuming to achieve what a general
idea would imply on the other hand. Neither of these two extremes
is acceptable, only in-between is the proper argumentative
space for giving empirical and normative content to general
ideas. The ideas themselves don't tell us much about what that
content should be, they function as mere "argument places,"
blank spaces that need to be filled in with adequate situation-specific
considerations and argumentation.
It is indeed difficult in this connection not to think of Wittgenstein's
famous characterization, in
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, of
the mathematical idea of a point in space and time:
"A point in space is an argument
place." (Wittgenstein, 1922, Statement 2.0131, read as saying "A point
in space is a place [or space] for an argument.")
The
point is (sic!), a "point in space" is an idea
that stands not for an empirical object but for a mere argument
place, an argument to be worked out. We cannot conceive of
a point without thinking of it as being located in a space,
although this space may be empty and ill-defined. Yet as a theoretical limiting concept,
a point has no extension and thus does not itself occupy
any space it is the fiction of a space
without extension. We need this fiction to define an exact location
and to "argue" (or calculate mathematically) spatial
arrangements such as, for example, the trajectory
of a spacecraft or satellite that is to be launched
into space and should reach a defined endpoint in orbit, say,
an earth-synchronous orbit. Both the point to be reached and
the (ideal) trajectory that leads to it remain, in principle,
theoretical limiting concepts; however, mathematical (and based
on it, physical) approximation may get us closer and closer
to them, until it makes no practical difference whether
we continue to get any closer or not. The difficulty in practice
is to find out what it means in a specific context of application
to come "sufficiently"
close, so that the chosen approximation can be argumentatively
defended. In this precise sense "ideas of reason"
refer us to a need for argumentation and, because at the same
time they do not tell us on which situation-specific empirical
and normative considerations such argumentation is to rely,
are usefully understood as "argument places." Conversely,
it seems to me that the notion of argument places gains meaning
by being related to the notion of ideas of reason. In heuristic
terms, the two notions can thus support one another, in that
each suggests reflective or argumentative processes that help
to understand the other's situational meaning.
I
would argue that all ideas of reason, whether mathematical, scientific or philosophical,
function as such argument places, that is, as spaces for situation-specific
argumentation (I'll consequently also speak of "argument
spaces"). In addition they serve, as we just recalled
above, as limiting concepts that offer us ideal reference points for
reflection and argumentation. Combining these two uses, we can
now say that ideas
of reason stand for both a theoretical limiting case or endpoint of consequent reasoning and
for an empirical argument space within
which we have to try and approximate the limiting case, by filling
in situation-specific content. As a limiting concept, a general
idea is ideal but may be conceptually well-defined; as an argument
space, it is real but indefinite and thus ill-defined:
Definition:
A general idea of reason is a limiting concept that serves
as a reference point for systematic reflection and argumentation.
It stands not for an empirical object but rather, for an argument
space, that is, a space for argumentation that needs to be specified
in terms of contextual assumptions.
Conversely, we
can then define the notion of a general idea's argument space
the argument space we associate with an idea of reason
as follows:
Definition:
The argument
space of a general idea of reason is characterized on the one hand by a well-defined
limiting concept that serves as an
ideal reference point for reflection and, on the other hand,
by an ill-defined (because indefinite) space of contextual assumptions that may
range
from assumptions describing the situation as it currently is perceived
to assumptions describing it as it could (or should) be
in the light of that ideal.
The
notion of an "argument space" belonging to a general
idea is similar to the notions of a "context" or "contextual
assumptions," but it has the advantage of reminding us
of the need for argumentation. So long as there is no argument,
an argument space remains empty, whereas a context remains apparently
given or taken for granted. In addition, the above definition
should also remind us that unlike a "context," an
argument space is not adequately determined except in combination
with a defined general idea that is to serve as a reference
point for critical reflection and discourse. In real-world practice,
problems (say, moral questions) arise in a context; the
context is (apparently) given and the task is to surface and
challenge the contextual assumptions that are constitutive of
it. An argument space, by contrast, only emerges out of
a critical effort that is guided by some general idea of reason (such as the moral idea)
or a domain-specific principle (such as the precautionary principle)
as the reference point for contextual reflection. It's a rather
subtle distinction and some readers may find it confusing
rather than helpful; but experience shows that at early stages
of conceptual development, it is usually better to err on the side of too much rather
than
too little distinction (it's easier to abandon an unhelpful
distinction later on than to heal a lack of precision in underlying assumptions). At this stage I'd like to give the
notion of an "argument space," as the critical (or
reflected) counterpart of a "context" as it were,
a chance to prove itself; time will tell whether it's rather
helpful
or confusing.
Within
the argument space thus opened up, reflection and discourse
(for the sake of convenience, I'll simply speak of "argumentation")
can then move and unfold multiple options
for understanding or "approximating" a general
idea's intent or implications in the light of alternative
sets of contextual assumptions. Conversely, such argumentation
can specify multiple
sets of contextual assumptions in the light of what situational
meanings they suggest for the idea. Specifying contextual assumptions
and unfolding the meaning of ideas is thus an iterative process
in which both activities, specification and unfolding, can alternately
take the lead and can stimulate or challenge the other.
In the case of the moral idea, for example, it
is far from easy to specify adequate contextual assumptions
that would meet its demands and would be practicable.
Strictly speaking, the moral idea requires an argument to the
effect that the entire community of those effectively or potentially
concerned is included in the relevant context and is treated
with equal respect for their needs or concerns. It is equally
clear though that as a rule, actual moral discourse can hardly
ever engage a potentially worldwide moral community, as rarely
as even the most responsible
action can in practice do full and equal justice to all those concerned. It might,
however, be possible at
least to engage all those stakeholders who are directly affected or concerned
and are able to participate. Or, to the extent this is
not fully possible, one might call upon witnesses
of those not present to represent their concerns, so as to make sure these concerns are taken
into account.
This in turn raises the difficult issues of
who exactly is to be considered a stakeholder or a witness;
what options there are for engaging them so that they have an
equal chance to argue their concerns; and what in the end it means to properly
take their concerns
into account, given their usually conflicting nature. The moral
idea does not yield immediate, practical answers to such questions
and insofar allows no "direct" implementation; but
at least it can serve as a critical idea in terms of which we
recognize the ways we fail to implement it and thus might
try to better approximate its intent. In the terms of the preceding
definition, only an imperfect identification and unfolding of
the relevant argument space (context) is possible, but
such unavoidable imperfection does not invalidate the moral
idea's role as a limiting concept (ideal reference point).
Quite the contrary, it makes this role the more important.
Three essential points should have become clearer through
this discussion:
- First,
the
argument spaces belonging to general ideas of reason
can only be
adequately explored and understood with respect to specific situations,
in cooperation
with those concerned (or people representing them).
- Second,
it is nevertheless important that
the general ideas in question remain reference points of
argumentation, understood as ideals that provide critical
distance to the situation.
- And
third, adequate argumentation will provide sufficient
critical distance yet remain practicable and solution-oriented.
It will systematically explore the argument space in-between the
situation and the idea at issue, in the light of changing
sets of alternatively "realistic" or "ideal"
contextual assumptions.
Merely
insisting on either a "realistic" way of proceeding
or else on ideally comprehensive assumptions would risk begging
the question rather than amounting to a particularly reasonable
or moral approach. What is a reasonable approximation of a general
idea of reason can never be defined solely with reference to
what is practically feasible (an opportunist stance) or to what
is theoretically defensible (an idealist stance). An opportunist
approach avoids the need for managing the
tension on the basis of arguments rather than of non-argumentative
means; whereas an idealist stance avoids the core problem of
how reason can become practical. General ideas fulfill
their heuristic purpose by challenging us to manage the tension
so that the ideal of practical reason can be strengthened in
practice. This suggests to me that bringing reason and practice together is indeed
always an issue that calls for critical contextualism; for,
as we have learned, the general is to be
considered "only an idea" (Kant, 1787, B384f); or,
speaking with Wittgenstein (1922), it is only an
argument place.
Sources
of selectivity
The crucial difficulty in such argumentation is that selectivity
is unavoidably involved. To say that the intent of general ideas
the ideal reference point towards they are to orient our thinking
can only be approximated partially is the same as saying that
selectivity is involved.
Whether deliberately or not, any approximation represents a selection of what is
to count
as relevant circumstances and concerns. In mathematical approximation, this is not really
a problem,
as it can be defined at
a merely syntactic level of argumentation, that is, in purely
analytical terms. In the case of non-mathematical ideas, however, the
situation is more complex, as the contents to be specified
touch upon both empirical and normative questions. We'll need
to select and argue the
"facts" (circumstances) we take to be relevant as
well as the "values" (concerns)
we consider adequate for assessing and changing the situation. The
argument thus moves at a semantic and pragmatic levels of argumentation,
which means that substantive rather than just analytical arguments
are required.
A
new difficulty arises here: the circumstances and the
concerns to be considered cannot be identified independently
of each other. As a rule, when the relevant "values"
change, the relevant "facts" are likely to change, too,
and vice-versa. So we may find us caught in an indefinite,
iterative process of reviewing facts in the light of values,
and values in the light of facts. Moreover, both the facts and
the values in question may and often will be controversial,
as both represent selections from a larger, indefinite, argumentative
space. Neither selection can be shown to be objectively right
and beyond argumentative challenge, for such a claim would imply
either comprehensive reasoning or else an undubitable selection
both unarguable assertions.
Even the apparently modest claim
to merely approximating the intent of essential ideas
will thus not be immune to criticism, not to say it remains
highly problematic.
If there were a Richter scale of selectivity, it would be open-ended
towards above, as is the Richter magnitude scale for earthquakes.
The number of possible selections and non-selections, and thus
also the space of possible objections, is indefinite, in the
sense that there is no objective (unobjectionable) way to delimit
it. Any claim
to "reasonable" approximation, even where it meets
with the agreement of everyone involved, will still imply
a very strong presupposition, namely, that the chosen selections
of relevant facts and values, as well as the chosen ways to respond
to them, are indeed conducive to rational practice and are in
some arguable way "better" than alternative approximations. Regardless
of how carefully researched and reasoned an
approximation
may be, the selectivity built into it entails bias
of views, partiality of concerns, and ultimately, insufficient rather than sufficient reasons.
Reflective practice will need to keep the universe
of discourse accordingly open, by supporting systematic processes of contextual
reflection (see Ulrich, 2012a, b, and 2013b), so that a
better understanding can evolve of the sources of selectivity
and of the consequences such selectivity may entail.
Returning
to the example of the moral idea, we
begin to understand why, as we have seen in the case of discourse
ethics, it is such a precariously difficult undertaking to justify
practical claims with reference to the "moral point of view." Theoretically
sufficient reasons for the choice of some specific approximations
of the moral point of view (e.g., in the form of justified
"norms of action") would need either to be context-independent
(which is possible only for the abstract moral idea as such
one of the reasons why we talk of it as a "general idea") or else
to do justice to the whole indefinite space of alternative contextual
assumptions (which in turn would amount to abstraction from any specific, and thus selective,
context, that is, to decontextualization). The first alternative begs the problem, the second
is impractical and in its implication equally begs the problem.
Discourse ethics, because it has neglected this conclusion,
has found it impossible to justify any specific norms, or
at least to demonstrate how it can be done.
In
view of this situation, it seems to me that inasmuch as we presuppose
that argumentation
and discourse can be a source of at least "approximate" moral
justification
at all and rational ethics cannot presuppose less only a critically-heuristic
approach has realistic chances
to succeed. Yet I am not aware of any approach to rational ethics
thus far that would have drawn such a conclusion. Among the
major approaches that we have reviewed in the "Reflections
on reflective practice" series, all appear to lean toward
reason's side by relying on moral universalism, with the remarkable
exception of Aristotle, who grounds moral reasoning in the local
ethos and custom. A critically contextualist approach, by contrast,
would understand and implement the moral idea as an indispensable
though problematic reference point of moral argumentation, a
limiting concept that only serves to open an argument space
and provide a basic orientation in it. Accordingly it would
focus on the nature and methodological support of discursive,
participative processes or other means by which such moral argument
spaces could be reviewed systematically, for example, as in
our own critically-heuristic framework, by systematically reviewing specific
moral claims (as contained in proposals for action, definitions
of improvement, claims
to rationality and expertise, etc.) in the light of alternative
sets of contextual
assumptions so as to identify ways to better approximate the
moral idea. Further,
I would argue that such an approach, again in marked distinction
to all major approaches of which I am aware, would need to give
priority to a merely
critical over a justificatory intent (the earlier mentioned
critical turn) and would of course
also (as in existing approaches) need to be embedded in fair
procedures, procedures that would make sure that all those
concerned have a "fair" chance to voice their concerns
and see them being taken up. Such an approach, then, could
not secure moral justification of practical claims, no
more than current moral theories can. It is hardly too high
a price, however, to renounce a hope for justification that
is unachievable.
The
institutional challenge
The main burden of proof would then be shifted from "justification"
(the focus of discourse ethics) to "legitimacy" (an
alternative focus of deliberative democracy). A broad field
of discussion opens itself up here, concerning the institutional
side of rational practice. It raises many important issues
such as adequate inclusion of those concerned; equal or adequate
access to relevant
information for all; enabling rationally motivated discourse; civic
education of citizens (and of decision-makers, especially managers,
I am tempted to add); democratically
institutionalized processes of conflict resolution; protection of minority
rights; and so many others. This is not the place for such a discussion, but I do find it interesting and relevant
to note that if only we take Kant's call to practical reason
seriously and try to find at least a critical solution, we cannot
help but recognize the importance of the institutional
side of rational practice, and in particular of democratically
institutionalized procedures, as a source of legitimacy. Where complete
justification is unavailable, democratic processes of legitimation
become the more important, although they in turn require that free and
open argumentation (not to be confused with justification) is possible. The important
point is, critical argumentation is quite
sufficient as a basis for
democratic decision-making, no theoretically complete justifications are needed.
What is needed for purposes of democratic legitimation is only
that the assumptions and implications of proposals are on the
table. Perhaps we should in fact be grateful that sufficient justifications
are not available; for if they were available, chances
are that the experts those who know better would have the
say and thus the space for participative democratic decision-making would risk
to become even smaller than it already is.
Heuristic
consideration #2: "standpoint
spotting" a double movement of thought It is easier to see the standpoints
of others than one's own. In order to see one's standpoint,
one first needs to leave it. Since the contexts
we assume to be relevant for any specific issue depend on the view of the world that our current standpoint affords
us, an analogous conclusion holds for our contextual assumptions
and thus, for any specific argument's assumed context of meaning and validity: we
have (at least in our mind) to leave it and see it from outside, as
it were, to properly make ourselves and all the parties concerned aware
of its limitations, and thus also to realize that there are
options for defining it. The image that
comes to mind, in analogy to the popular hobbies of cloud spotting,
tree spotting, train spotting, and so on, is one of standpoint
spotting (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1: "Standpoint spotting"
To
see one's standpoint, one must first leave it; only then can
one
duly appreciate differing contexts of thought and argumentation
(including
one's own ones)
Standpoint
spotting is not currently a well-trained art. We don't learn
it in school. But perhaps we can learn it on the bus. Or more
comfortably, in the TV chair. I suspect we can and should indeed
make it a habit, perhaps even a favourite pass-time, to try
and spot people's differing standpoints and how they shape their
contextual assumptions, or vice-versa. As an example
for this "vice-versa," the case of nuclear waste storage
is instructive. Whether one assumes nuclear waste to be
a problem for the next 100 or the next 10,000 years, changes
the definition of the relevant context in terms of time
and is therefore likely
to shape one's standpoint on nuclear energy, with respect
to both its economic and its moral justifiability. Conversely,
one's standpoint concerning the current generation's responsibility
towards future
generations is likely to shape the time horizon one deems relevant,
as one of the most crucial contextual assumptions that matter for discussing
energy policy.
Many topics that people discuss on the
bus or in TV shows tend to be of this sort. They are controversial
topics precisely because they involve crucial assumptions of
standpoint and context, of which people are not always fully
aware. Because they are not fully aware of the role of contextual
assumptions, people tend to assume that the others get their facts wrong, or
else argue irrationally. In fact, because they assume different contexts
to be relevant for assessing the claim in question, it is quite
rational (or in any case, to be expected) that they should arrive at different judgments of fact and value. The crucial
skill they lack is not that of universalizing their claims but
quite the contrary, that of contextualizing them. Contextualizing
claims from different standpoints is key. The crucial skill
to this end is learning to
understand different standpoints in terms of different contextual
assumptions; and the crucial heuristic support needed consists
in frameworks for a systematic identification and critical discussion
of such assumptions. This is what I mean by the art of "standpoint
spotting." You don't need to read philosophical treatises
on moral theory to improve that crucial skill. Because we are
dealing with an everyday phenomenon,
you might as well start training your standpoint-spotting skills on
the bus or in your armchair (or both), by listening to
the way people discuss controversial topics and, due to different
assumptions of context, talk past
one another.
I
assure you it is a rewarding habit. It makes you learn so much
about people's differing contextual assumptions on controversial
topics and how they shape their views and arguments! You will
no longer need to ascribe these differences of views and arguments
to a lack of
information, rationality, or good will, and thus can develop
more tolerance towards people and better understand them.
Moreover, you can check and improve your own patterns of discussion and
argumentation, and thus gain a deeper critical competence in discussing with others.
To
be sure, with
a view to systematic practice more is needed than such general
hints.
Readers familiar with the boundary categories and questions
of critical systems heuristics (CSH) can take them as an example
of the kind of tools I have in mind, although I trust many other
tools are also conceivable for this fundamental task of standpoint spotting and contextual analysis.
However, what interests me at present is the general nature of such
tools. Are there general ideas (or requirements) for dealing
productively with contextual assumptions? In what follows, I
would like to briefly explore one such basic requirement. It
consists in a combination of two opposing movements (or orientations)
of critical thought, which together constitute what I will call
a
"double movement of thought". I should emphasize that what I propose
is really only a tentative first exploration, with no claim
to being argued and worked out in any definitive way.
Two
critical movements of thought In the name of
an inadequately understood "pragmatism," people tend
to adopt whatever contextual assumptions
appear opportune or convenient for solving a problem or deciding
an issue. But pragmatism is not well understood and practiced
as the enemy of careful reasoning. Pragmatic reasoning should
be a way to improve our thinking, not to avoid thinking. A better
"pragmatic" idea is to always work with alternative contextual assumptions, so
that it is possible to see the merits and defects of all findings
and conclusions in the light of differing contexts.
Accordingly,
we will try to keep moving between alternative standpoints.
This provides us with opportunities for identifying alternative
contexts that are conceivably relevant, so as to be able to
work with different contextual assumptions and thereby also
to understand the different views at which people arrive. At the same time,
it allows us to develop a better sense of the "bigger picture,"
the universe of different standpoints and discussion
contexts that we can think of but will hardly ever know
completely. Helpful in this respect is the so-called spectrum
idea (Prince, 1970; Ulrich, 1975), the idea that with respect to any particular aspect or
dimension of an issue, we can imagine a continuum (spectrum)
of argumentative
standpoints or spaces between two conceivable extremes (or
"ideal-types") of a relevant assessment dimension
or criterion, say, between "entirely positive" and
"entirely negative" valuation (the use that Prince
makes of the idea, see, e.g., 1970, p. 3) or between an
entirely subjective or particular and an entirely impartial
or universal perspective (the use that interests me here):
(The particular) "The
context I see" (The
general)
<-¦----¦----¦----¦----¦----¦----¦----¦----¦----¦----¦----¦----¦----¦----¦->
Copyleft 
2013 W. Ulrich Fig. 2: The spectrum idea
Conceiving of the universe of conceivable standpoints for seeing
an issue
in terms of a continuum of more or less particular
vs. universal perspectives
Note
that the spectrum from particular to general perspectives should
not be equated with a negative-positive scale.
Of course the temptation is great to judge immediately and to
think that the left-hand side of the scale is to be judged negatively
in that it is arbitrary and easy (anyone can do it, as no effort to meet the concerns
of others is involved), whereas the right-hand side would then be
judged positively, as an ideal that is laudable although it
is difficult to achieve and ultimately (at the right end of
the scale) impractical (nobody can do it, as no argument can do equal justice to each
and everyone's concerns). But the methodological point here
is a different one: the scale is meant to capture the idea of
a continuum between two limiting ideas that both are necessary for clear thinking but as
such do not constitute
possible spaces for substantial argumentation. It is
in the entire range in-between these two limiting ideas
that
critically contextualist thought moves. This is its argumentative
space or universe of discourse within which critically contextual
reflection should move freely.
In the terms of Kant we
may understand the scale as a continuum (or spectrum) of standpoints
that "approximate" the idea of moral universalization
(or any other general idea) to various degrees. The spectrum idea is apt to remind us that
there is no such thing as the one best "approximation" that would afford us a
proper view of the world.
Again, we find that critically contextualist thinkers must
keep moving, now along the imaginary scale that depicts a
spectrum of different conceivable standpoints for identifying
the relevant context.
Earlier
we noted that to see our own standpoint, we must first leave it
or (in our mind, if not physically) "step back"
from it. We might now add the basic methodological hint that
"stepping back" can be achieved systematically
by conceptually moving in both directions of the continuum, towards
the more particular and towards the more universal, and by then
looking back and observing where we have been standing before and how different things
now look. To the critical contextualist, more important than
the specific standpoint she assumes at any given moment is the
way everyone involved deals with it, namely, as a tentative
spotlight that illuminates other standpoints, so that in the
end we ideally can see each identified standpoint in the light of all others.
It
seems to me that in this process of identifying and "illuminating"
standpoints (or "standpoint spotting," to put it somewhat
casually), there are two basic movements of critical
thought involved (see Fig. 3):
- Critical
movement 1: Critical thought can focus on the fact that any substantial
argument (i.e., any argument that has some specific empirical and/or normative
content rather than remaining totally abstract, a mere idea)
is to some degree unavoidably particular, and thus may be too particular in
the sense of being overly selective with regard to the facts and values it considers.
Such arguments will tend to privilege some individual or group views and concerns over others, thereby "getting it right" for
some parties but not for others. The remedy consists in
moving towards the "general" end of the spectrum,
so as to de-contextualize such
claims, that is, universalize their contextual assumptions.
- Critical
movement 2: Alternatively, critical thought can focus on the fact
that any substantial argument is unavoidably generalizing, and thus may be
too general, in the sense of overgeneralizing with regard to the context
for which it claims to be meaningful and valid. Such arguments will tend to claim too much,
in the sense of portraying particular views or concerns as
more general than they are. The remedy
consists in moving towards the "particular" end
of the spectrum, so as to re-contextualize
such claims, that is, specify their contextual assumptions.
A
double movement of critical thought
The
two critical movements depend on one another in that each calls
for the other as a source for questioning and re-thinking its own
assumptions
and implications. Together, they combine to a double movement
of thought as tentatively shown in Fig. 3. Its message is that
there are two basic efforts involved in
handling ideas carefully, that is, in dealing reflectingly with both the empirical and the
normative content we
associate with them. There is, on the one hand, a need for enlarging the
thinking space within which we move, by expanding its boundaries and enriching
its content; but at the same time, there is also a need for limiting the reach of our
claims, by specifying their scope of meaningful and valid application and
thus qualifying their content. Both movements of thought can in principle, though
not in practice, continue
indefinitely, in that we can always seek to get more comprehensive and/or more
specific:
Critical
movement 1 - - - - - - ->
(The particular)
....................... "The
context I see" .......................... (The
general)
[Bounded
[Unbounded
thought]
<-¦----¦----¦----¦- "Context" -¦----¦----¦----¦-> thought] <<< (Indefinite range of argument
spaces) >>>
("A
specific situation") ........."Universe
of discourse"........... ("The
bigger picture")
<- - - - - - -
Critical movement 2
Copyleft
2014 W. Ulrich |
Fig. 3: A double movement of
thought
Thinking through contexts of argumentation
in terms of a spectrum of argument
spaces
The theoretical
endpoints of these two movements of thought are often referred to as "bounded"
and "unbounded thought" or "bounded vs. unbounded systems thinking." The
distinction goes back to Herbert Simon (1957), who coined the concept of
"bounded rationality" as a supposedly more pragmatic (or realistic) alternative
to the conventional focus on whole-systems models and optimization in decision
theory, operations research, administrative science, the policy sciences, and
other fields concerned with the modeling of decision situations. From our
present perspective, this proposal looks rather doubtful of course. The two
opposites do not stand for a true alternative. We cannot really appreciate how
"bounded" or "unbounded" our grasp of a situation is except in the light of the opposing idea. Nor is "bounded rationality" in any serious sense a less
problematic idea than the classical concept of a rationality grounded in
comprehensive situation models. Any way of framing the "relevant context" is
unavoidably limited as measured by the universe of all conceivable ways to frame
it. How "realistic" any framing of the relevant context is depends
on our conception of the whole of which it represents a part. Furthermore, and
as a last comment, it is the movement of thought the effort of
iteratively bounding a context more and less widely, so as to be able to gain
different perspectives and to appreciate each one in the light of the others
that matters from a critical point of view, rather than identifying any
supposed endpoint. There are, strictly speaking, no endpoints that could be
fixed empirically and normatively; for the two concepts of bounded and unbounded
rationality are to be understood as ideas of critical reason only. Any
empirical and normative contents we may associate with them represent (speaking
with Kant) mere "approximations" and are thus bound (sic) to remain problematic. This is the critical
reading that I propose for Fig. 3.
In
sum, we have
two complementary, critical movements of thought: the one moves towards a
wider, less narrowly bounded, perspective, the other towards a more specific,
less generalizing perspective. The one involves a generalizing, the other a
specifying direction of analysis. The two fictitious endpoints can be understood
in terms of "bounded" and "unbounded" thought, in the way I have just qualified
a proper understanding of these two concepts. What matters is to always remember
that neither supplies a reference point for justifying any claims
to superior rationality, as systems thinkers often appear to
assume. It is more useful to conceive of systems thinking, and
of all systematic employment of general ideas, in terms of a
double movements of thought between them. It's on this movement
rather than on the endpoints
where it would supposedly come to an end that we should focus.
Only thus can we hope to "see through" contextual assumptions. In
the end, it is not what our contextual assumptions are but how
openly and critically we handle them, which determines the reflective
quality of our thought and arguments.
Whatever context we may ultimately allow
to inform our claims, the essential points to remember are these:
- first,
that any validity claim is
conditioned by the context it assumes to be relevant for getting its "facts" and
"values" right;
- second,
that for any assumed context there
are always options; and
- third,
that we cannot properly
appreciate the selectivity of any assumed context without considering it in the
light of alternative contexts.
Accordingly,
the aim of such
critically contextual reflection and argument is not to arrive at some definitive bounding of contexts;
that would be to misunderstand the critical turn. (It is a frequent
misunderstanding of CSH.) The point
is, rather, to gain and maintain awareness of the big "as if" involved
in any validity claim in all our empirically and normatively
substantial thinking and argumentation in the form of contextual assumptions and resulting selectivity:
whatever universe of discourse emerges as a result, it will always remain a
"universe as if." Only temporarily and cautiously, for the specific
argument at hand, will it (perhaps) be adequate, as an unavoidably limited effort
to approximate rational practice. The point
of rational practice is not to avoid selectivity (an impossible
feat) but rather, to make sure the selectivity inherent to
any claim is laid open and the claims are qualified accordingly.
As soon as this conditional character of claims is forgotten
or taken for granted, it risks becoming a source of error and partiality. This
is what the "keep moving" imperative of critical thought
is all about.
The
cycle of critical contextualization Graphically
speaking, it may be helpful to imagine the two movements of thought depicted
in Fig. 3 as a cycle
of critical contextualization. In this cycle, the thrust of Critical Movement 1 consists in
decontextualizing a claim and that of Critical Movement 2 in
(re-) contextualizing it. Together they constitute
what I suggest to call the critically contextualist cycle (Fig. 4):
Fig. 4: The critically contextualist
cycle
An iterative process of decontextualization and (re-)contextualization
of the
assumptions and implications of claims
This reflective
cycle of decontextualizing and recontextualizing claims the
essence of critical contextualism as I propose to understand
it captures the way I try to understand the meaning and relevance
of systems thinking in CSH: as
a systematic form of critique, that is, as critical systems thinking (see, e.g., Ulrich, 2013b). In
addition I now suggest that the same double movement of thought can
and should play a similar role in pragmatizing all general ideas of reason,
in particular the moral
idea. Just like the systems idea, the moral idea and all other general ideas
will become tools of practical
reason when first we learn to understand and use them as critical
ideas of reason only.
Summary
and conclusion: "critical
contextualism" This
essay has explored some basic difficulties and requirements
in "approximating" the intent of general ideas of
reason. The focus was on the need for approximating such ideas,
in particular the moral idea, through processes of situation-specific
reflection and argumentation. As a result, the essay argues
that
a practicable, yet adequately self-reflecting and self-limiting approach to
the unsolved problem of practical reason of how reason can
be practical, and practice shown to be reasonable (i.e., rational
in a sense that includes the moral) should be conceived
in terms of critical
contextualism.
Critical contextualism recognizes that all application-oriented
thought and argumentation is inevitably
contextual, that is, limited by contextual assumptions or by
boundaries
of concern effective as such, which in turn are conditioned
by the standpoint from which the world is seen. General ideas
can lead us beyond such contextual limitations. This is why
we need them. It is their essential role, but it also makes
them impractical. Reference to them cannot justify claims to
rational and moral action, or generally speaking, give us "sufficient
reasons"; in the case of moral claims, for example, reference
to the principle of moral universalization does not supply sufficient
reasons for claiming the full moral universalizability of any
specific practical propositions. What remains possible, however,
is using them for critical purposes, in that reference to them
supplies a basic standard for questioning such propositions,
although their meaning needs to be specified in the situation
at hand.
Applied
to general ideas
Accordingly
a critically contextualist approach will refer to general ideas
as a way to encourage and support systematic processes of reflection
and argumentation on the standpoints and contexts of concern
that condition practical claims, whether consciously or not.
A "context" is defined
by the set of contextual assumptions on which a claim
or argument depends and which therefore is likely to limit its
reach of meaningful and valid application. The idea is to reflect on those limitations in the light
of alternative standpoints and contexts, so as to uncover their
empirical and normative selectivity and then to reconsider and qualify
one's claims accordingly. To this end, a systematic, iterative
process of decontextualization and (re-)
contextualization of
claims appears relevant, which the present essay has described as
a closely intertwined, iterative, double movement of critical
thought.
Applied
to discourse ethics With
respect to discourse ethics, our current topic in the
"Reflection on reflective practice" series (see Ulrich, 2009c,
d, and 2013a, with additional loops of reflection in 2010a, b; 2011c;
2013c), a specific conclusion of the present essay is this.
It has become more clear why earlier we found discourse ethics struggling with the principle of moral universalization
and unable to propose a practicable model of moral justification.
Discourse ethics has failed thus far to take the critical
turn, a methodological reorientation from the quest for
comprehensively rational argumentation according to the principle
of moral universalization towards a critically
contextualist approach. This explains why regardless of how
sophisticated discourse ethics may be in theory, it is bound to break down
in practice. Universalization is a theoretical idea that is,
at best, a theoretical
explication of the moral idea, although in rather thin air but not
a practical concept and goal (an achievable claim). Moral universalization
describes a problem,
not a solution.
Critical contextualism consequently replaces
moral universalism by a systematic effort of thinking through
the bounded nature of
moral claims, so as to allow us to qualify and limit them accordingly.
Thus it avoids the impracticable nature of moral universalism,
without giving up its critically-heuristic function as a reference
point for moral argumentation. This is why I believe that critically contextual reflection
might hold the key to a critically tenable pragmatization of
the moral idea, and indirectly, of discourse ethics.
Applied
to the moral idea in general (outlook)
With
regard to all general ideas of reason but particularly the moral
idea, my conclusion is that it is time to take the critical
turn from a justificatory to a critically-reflective focus,
and with it to take the fundamental methodological step from
"universalizing" to "contextualizing" moral
claims. I hope to take up this conclusion in the planned two
final essays of the reflective practice series. But before,
in the next two essays of the present series, we will complement
our exploration of the role of general ideas with the announced
excursion into ancient Indian thought, so as to learn about
its handling of general ideas. Whether this additional loop
will be of any methodological relevance to the emerging framework
I cannot tell in advance, nor is it of concern to me. For in
the end, I believe that no intellectual effort is ever completely
wasted, whatever one learns will in some ways bear fruit. So,
I hope you'll bear with me a little longer and will be back
next time when I invite you again to explore the nature and role of
general ideas, then from an ancient Indian perspective.
(To
be continued)
|
For a hyperlinked overview of all issues
of "Ulrich's Bimonthly" and the previous "Picture of the
Month" series,
see the site map
PDF file
Note:
This is the third part of a series of exploratory essays
on the role of general ideas, particularly the moral
idea, in rational thought and action as seen from different
vantage points. The first part appeared in the
Bimonthly
of September-October 2013 and the second, in the Bimonthly
of January-February 2014.
|
|
|
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